Wallingford Bd. of Ed. v. State Bd. of Ed.
| Decision Date | 15 May 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. CV800178446S,CV800178446S |
| Citation | 36 Conn.Supp. 285,418 A.2d 961 |
| Parties | WALLINGFORD BOARD OF EDUCATION v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
Peter Janus, Hartford, for plaintiff.
Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., and Charles E. Gooley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant state board of education.
Stephen Wizner, New Haven, for defendant John Close et al.
This case arises out of the problems encountered in providing for the special education of a minor who is a resident of the city of Wallingford. The child is handicapped, fourteen years old, displaying autism and retardation. It is claimed that he has a variety of educational and other special needs, and requires a structured program to address those needs.
For some two years, the child has been an inpatient at Riverview School, an adjunct of Riverview Hospital. The school is an agency of the state of Connecticut, located in Middletown. It appears that the plaintiff, the Wallingford board of education (hereinafter the Wallingford board), was responsible for the child's placement in Riverview. The Wallingford board is obligated to provide special education for school age children within its jurisdiction who require special education. General Statutes § 10-76d(b)(1).
The child's parents were not satisfied with his institutional training and education at Riverview. On or about April 17, 1979, they requested a hearing before a state hearing officer to determine the proper special education program for the child. General Statutes § 10-76h(c).
The defendant state board of education (hereinafter the state board) appointed the defendant Joyce C. Driskell as a hearing officer to conduct the required hearing. After an initial hearing, a subsequent hearing was convened in this matter before Driskell.
Driskell handed down a written decision dated January 24, 1980, determining, in part, that the child was, in fact, handicapped. She concluded that a private institution, known as the Behavioral Research Institute (hereinafter the institute), located in Rhode Island, was the appropriate educational setting for the child. She also found that this "represents the least restrictive placement for (the child), because of the lack of a comparable residential program in Connecticut," and that "(p)lacement at (the institute) is a placement for educational reasons."
The Wallingford board claimed to be aggrieved by the decision, and prosecuted an appeal therefrom pursuant to General Statutes §§ 10-76h(e) and 4-183(b). The return date of its writ was March 11, 1980.
On or about March 24, 1980, the state board filed a pleading captioned: "Motion For Order To Compel The Plaintiff To Comply With Defendant Hearing Officer's Decision, Pending Final Judgment On This Appeal." It alleged therein that the Wallingford board failed to comply with Driskell's decision, and asserted that it has the power to take action at this juncture to enforce that decision pursuant to General Statutes § 10-76h(e).
So far as the court can determine, the issue herein is one of first impression under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter the UAPA). General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189.
The state board's motion cannot be granted for two reasons. Initially, under the UAPA, this court lacks power to grant the particular interim relief sought by the state board. Next, even if, arguendo, this court possessed the statutory power to act, the record herein does not warrant a favorable response to that motion.
Initial attention is focused on the UAPA as the vehicle for this appeal, and the rights of the parties thereunder.
A major issue herein is the meaning and scope of General Statutes § 4-183(c). That section reads:
The ruling of the hearing officer was favorable to the claims of the defendants. The Wallingford board has made no effort, to date, to request a stay of that order pursuant to § 4-183(c). Instead, the state board elected to file the present motion.
The state board's motion attempts to obtain a preliminary mandatory injunction or an order of mandamus of some type, compelling the Wallingford board forthwith to transfer the child to the institute pending final determination of the appeal. The defendants have not cited any precedent expressly permitting such an order to issue under the UAPA. The sole and exclusive interim action authorized under the UAPA is a stay requested by the non-prevailing party at the administrative hearing, here the Wallingford board.
Phrased alternatively, the court has no jurisdiction, under § 4-183, to enter an interim enforcement order against an appellant such as the Wallingford board, on the request of an appellee in the status of the state board. Royce v. Freedom of Information Commission, 177 Conn. 584, ---, 418 A.2d 939.
It is axiomatic that appeals to the courts from the actions of administrative agencies or hearing officers exist only under explicit statutory authority. Old Rock Road Corporation v. Commission on Special Revenue, 173 Conn. 384, 386, 377 A.2d 1119. Such appeals may be prosecuted only upon strict compliance with the statutes pertaining thereto. They cannot be maintained or inhibited by seeking orders not expressly provided for in such statutes. East Side Civic Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 558, 560, 290 A.2d 348; McAuliffe v. Carlson, 30 Conn.Sup. 118, 121, 303 A.2d 746. The court should not, by construction, supply a claimed omission in the UAPA appeal provisions, or add exceptions to them, merely because it appears to the court or the litigants that good reasons exist for adding them. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Frauwirth, 167 Conn. 165, 168, 335 A.2d 39.
An appeal from an administrative agency is a special statutory proceeding, and is not a "civil action," as is a declaratory judgment case. Bara v. Personnel Appeal Board, 30 Conn.Sup. 333, 334, 314 A.2d 434.
It is therefore clear that the court has no jurisdiction to compel the Wallingford board to take affirmative transfer action at this time and in the manner requested by the present motion. Compare Ingram v. Bethel Board of Education, 34 Conn.Sup. 277, 280, 387 A.2d 706. (Mandamus against school board denied in case of thirteen-year-old child requiring special education because of emotional and autistic problems).
The conclusion just expressed is fortified by additional comments pertaining to the actual substance of this motion. In rejecting the motion, the court finds persuasive the cogent analysis in Connecticut Life & Health Insurance Guaranty Assn. v. Daly, 35 Conn.Sup. 13, 17, 391 A.2d 735. In that case, the court, in discussing a stay, applied a ...
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