Walter v. Walter, 64641

• Decision Date: 14 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 64641,64641
• Citation: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 118,464 So.2d 538
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 118 Marilyn WALTER, Petitioner, v. David L. WALTER, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 538

464 So.2d 538

10 Fla. L. Weekly 118

Marilyn WALTER, Petitioner, v. David L. WALTER, Respondent.

No. 64641.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 14, 1985.

Michael R. Walsh, Orlando, for petitioner.

Jeff B. Clark, Orlando, for respondent.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a petition to review a decision reported as Walter v. Walter, 442 So.2d 257 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court award of permanent alimony in a dissolution proceeding. In its decision, the district court restricted the discretionary authority of trial courts to use permanent alimony by directing that permanent alimony should be awarded only as "the last resort." Id. at 259. We find direct conflict with our decision in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we quash the district court's decision.

The essential legal issue to be resolved is whether the test for the award of permanent alimony formulated by the district court in the instant case is proper and consistent with the criteria established by this Court in Canakaris and its progeny. The district court held that "[p]ermanent alimony, being a fixed and comparatively unadjustable form of alimony should be the last resort rather than the first." 442 So.2d at 259. It concluded that the trial judge must first consider awarding rehabilitative alimony for "an appropriate period" unless "there is no question about the permanency of the inability to self-support." Id. We find that the district court's holdings significantly modify the guidelines which we established in prior decisions for the award of permanent alimony. This Court clarified those guidelines in Canakaris, where we stated:

Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the necessities of life to a former spouse as they have been established by the marriage of the parties. The two primary elements to be considered when determining permanent periodic alimony are the needs of one spouse for the funds and the ability of the other spouse to provide the necessary funds. The criteria to be used in establishing this need include the parties' earning ability, age, health, education, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living enjoyed during its course, and the value of the parties' estates.

....

While permanent periodic alimony is most commonly used to provide support, in limited circumstances its use may be appropriate to balance such inequities as might result from the allocation of income-generating properties acquired during the marriage.

382 So.2d at 1201-02 (emphasis added).

By requiring trial courts to utilize permanent alimony only upon a showing of lack of capacity for self-support and only as a last resort, the district court largely eliminated the Canakaris criteria of "the duration of the marriage, the standard of living enjoyed during its course, and the value of the parties' estates" from the trial judge's consideration. Id. It also appears to have restricted the trial court's ability to use permanent alimony to "balance such inequities as might result from the allocation of income-generating properties acquired during the marriage." Id. at 1202. By its holding, the district court attempted to establish, as a new rule of law, the presumption that rehabilitative alimony generally must be awarded for an appropriate period before permanent periodic alimony may be made part of a final judgment. We reject this limitation on the discretionary authority of trial courts to utilize permanent alimony in dissolution proceedings. We do not dispute the general authority of the district courts of appeal to establish rules of law, but we must conclude that the strict rule of law set forth by the district court in the instant case is inappropriate because it eliminates from the trial judge's consideration factors that must be evaluated if a just result is to be ensured.

In reviewing the trial court's disposition of property and award of alimony and support, the appellate court's responsibility is to determine from the admitted facts, or the facts taken most favorably to the prevailing party, (1) whether the rules of law were applied correctly and (2) whether the trial court's discretionary authority was reasonably exercised under the test set forth in Canakaris. The correction of an erroneous application of law and the determination that the trial court abused its discretion are two separate and distinct appellate functions. An erroneous application of a rule of law is illustrated by a trial court order requiring payment of support for a child who has reached majority and is not dependent by reason of unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So.2d 853 (Fla.1984). An example of an appellate court's proper determination, upon known facts, that the trial court abused its discretion is found in the oft-cited decision of Brown v. Brown, 300 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). The decision of Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So.2d 203 (Fla.1983), illustrates the finding of a reasonable exercise of discretion.

This Court has repeatedly stated that appellate courts, in examining the discretionary acts of trial courts, must not reweigh the facts. In Conner v. Conner 439 So.2d 887 (Fla.1983), when this Court stated that "[t]he determination that a party has been 'short-changed' is an issue of fact and not one of law," we were simply reaffirming that view. Id. at 887 (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13 (Fla.1976)). That statement was not intended to either broaden or restrict the authority of the district courts of appeal to review the reasonableness of discretionary acts upon admitted facts or the facts taken most favorably to the prevailing party. That is how we interpret the use of the term "short-changed" in Brown. The Brown court, by its decision, did not broaden its reviewing authority or reevaluate the facts, but properly found, under known facts, that the trial court had not acted reasonably and had abused its discretion. 300 So.2d at 726. As expressed in Marcoux v. Marcoux, 464 So.2d 542 (Fla.1985), released simultaneously with this opinion, the critical determination is whether the trial court abused its discretion.

While we recognize the significant responsibility of the district courts to review the reasonableness of discretionary acts of trial courts in dissolution proceedings, we must reject the establishment of new rules of law that would unduly restrict the discretionary authority of trial judges to render equitable property dispositions or support and alimony awards. See Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So.2d 203 (Fla.1985). We reiterate that "[i]n considering the appropriate criteria for the award of the different types of alimony, it is important that appellate courts avoid establishing inflexible rules that make the achievement of equity between the parties difficult, if not impossible." Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1200 (emphasis added). That statement reflects our recognition that the discretionary authority granted trial judges in dissolution matters is necessary because such cases are not susceptible to fixed pattersn. The unique characteristics of the instant case illustrate the reason flexibility is needed to assure equitable property dispositions and support awards.

The parties in the instant case were married in 1965. Three children were born of the marriage. In 1972, the petitioner, Marilyn Walter, instituted a dissolution proceeding against the respondent, David Walter, because he was involved in an affair with an employee of the restaurant where he worked as a supervisor. The record reflects that this conduct may have resulted in the termination of his employment. The parties acknowledged in an agreement, made part of the final judgment of dissolution, that because David was unemployed, he was unable to pay child support or alimony at that time. The trial...