Walthart v. BD. OF DIRS. OF EDCO SC. DIST.

• Decision Date: 08 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-0177.,04-0177.
• Citation: 694 N.W.2d 740
• Parties: Carol WALTHART, Appellant, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF EDGEWOOD-COLESBURG COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

694 N.W.2d 740

Carol WALTHART, Appellant, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF EDGEWOOD-COLESBURG COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 04-0177.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 8, 2005.

William R. Unger, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brian L. Gruhn of Gruhn Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

Carol Walthart had been a teacher for eighteen years in the Edgewood-Colesburg Community School District (EDCO) when the school board terminated her contract under Iowa Code chapter 279 (1999). Following her appeal to an adjudicator, the district court upheld the termination, and she appealed. We affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

In September 2000 students from the EDCO school district gathered in a hay field on property owned by Carol Walthart and her husband, Dennis. The Waltharts' son, Mark (a senior at EDCO), was there, and he and several other students were drinking alcohol. Late that night, the beer ran out, so four students left by car to buy more. On their way to town, the driver lost control and hit a tree, killing all four of the students. Investigation later determined that the driver had an alcohol blood level of .380, more than three times the legal limit. In October 2000 the EDCO superintendent gave Walthart written notice under Iowa Code section 279.15 that he was recommending her contract with the school district be terminated, prior to the end of the current contract year, for just cause. See Iowa Code § 279.27. He gave the following reasons:

• Unprofessional conduct in allowing students to use teacher's property for a party where alcohol was illegally used by students.

• Failure to effectively monitor a party on teacher's property wherein student alcohol consumption contributed to the death of several students.

• Failure to protect the safety and welfare of students.

• Inability to be effective as a teacher.

• Poor role model.

• Poor and ineffective leadership.

Walthart requested a private hearing under Iowa Code sections 279.15 and .16, and the board held the hearing on November 3 and 4, 2000. The board's deliberation continued at a special session on November 13, 2000. At the close of that meeting, a roll call vote was taken, and the board voted unanimously to terminate Walthart's contract.

Following the board's vote to terminate her, Walthart filed a notice of appeal to an adjudicator under Iowa Code section 279.17. She claimed the termination violated statutory and constitutional provisions; was in excess of the statutory authority of the board; violated board rules, policies, and contracts; was made under unlawful procedures; was affected by errors of law; was unsupported by a preponderance of competent evidence; and was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.

Walthart also filed a certiorari action to assert matters she contended could not effectively be raised in a statutory appeal under chapter 279. The district court considered her certiorari arguments and concluded they were without merit. Walthart appealed to this court, which found that certiorari was not a proper remedy under the circumstances. Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs., 667 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Iowa 2003) [hereinafter Walthart I]. We explained that, because Walthart had filed an appeal with an adjudicator, the board's decision was not yet final. Id. at 876. Further, we held that the appeal to the adjudicator under section 279.17 was her exclusive remedy. Id. at 878. We affirmed the district court's decision to annul the writ of certiorari.

Walthart then resumed her appeal to the adjudicator. The adjudicator concluded that the board's finding of just cause to terminate was unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence and reversed the board's decision. The board appealed that decision to the district court pursuant to Iowa Code section 279.18. The district court reversed the adjudicator's decision and affirmed the board's decision to terminate.

II. The Issues.

Walthart raises five issues on appeal, but three of them may be subsumed into her two main arguments: (1) the district court erred by refusing to consider evidence outside the record as certified by the board, and (2) the board's decision to terminate her was "[u]nsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record" under Iowa Code section 279.18(6).

III. The Scope of the Record in District Court.

In Walthart's certiorari action against the school district, rejected in Walthart I, she made a record of alleged irregularities in the board's proceedings to terminate her. Specifically, she claimed that much of her case was

based on events bearing on the board's decision that occurred outside the formal hearing, such as the alleged involvement by the board's attorney in the decision-making process.

Walthart I, 667 N.W.2d at 876.

In this case, Walthart attempted to get the record of the certiorari case admitted in district court because it included matters outside the record as certified by the board. This additional record would have included the extraneous acts by board members and their attorney, which allegedly had impacted the board's decision. Iowa Code section 279.17 limits the evidence that may be considered by the adjudicator.

Within thirty days after filing the notice of appeal [to the adjudicator], or within further time allowed by the adjudicator, the board shall transmit to the adjudicator the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the private hearing which may be the subject of the petition....

The record certified and filed by the board shall be the record upon which the appeal shall be heard and no additional evidence shall be heard by the adjudicator.¹

(Emphasis added.)

A district court on judicial review of the adjudicator's ruling is also limited as to the evidence it may consider. Iowa Code § 279.18 ("In proceedings for judicial review of the adjudicator's decision, the court shall not hear any further evidence but shall hear the case upon the certified record."). This limited scope of the record in teacher-termination cases must be contrasted to that in other cases involving judicial review of agency action. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(7) ("In proceedings for judicial review of agency action a court may hear and consider such evidence as it deems appropriate.").

We believe the legislature's decision to limit the record on judicial review in teacher-termination cases was deliberate; a terminated teacher has an opportunity to expand the certified record by applying to the adjudicator under Iowa Code section 279.17:

Before the date set for hearing a petition for review of board action ..., application may be made to the adjudicator for leave to present evidence in addition to that found in the record of the case. If it is shown to the adjudicator that the additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the private hearing before the board, the adjudicator may order that the additional evidence be taken before the board upon conditions determined by the adjudicator. The board may modify its findings and decision in the case by reason of the additional evidence and shall file that evidence and any modifications, new findings, or decisions, with the adjudicator and mail copies of the new findings or decisions to the teacher.

We agree that a terminated teacher must have a means of challenging the board's decision with evidence of matters outside the certified record, but we do not agree that it should be done by a district court on judicial review in light of section 279.18, which clearly prohibits it.

The only vehicle for getting outside evidence into the certified record of the board is through an application to the adjudicator requesting that the adjudicator order the board to consider the evidence. Id. § 279.17. Walthart initially made an application to do this, but she withdrew it before the adjudicator ruled on it. In doing so, she lost her only means of supplementing the record, and the district court did not err in rejecting her proffer of the additional evidence.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Walthart contends that the board's factual finding that she knew students were consuming alcohol at the party is not supported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record.

A. Standard of review. "On review, courts must determine whether a school board's decision is supported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record.... The court is limited on review to the record made before a school board." Bd. of Dirs. v. Banke, 498 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Iowa 1993). Review is "for the correction of errors at law." Sheldon Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs. v. Lundblad, 528 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Iowa 1995).

B. Preponderance of the credible evidence. "As in virtually every termination case, the controversy boils down to whether the record supports the board's conclusion that just cause exists to warrant [a teacher's] dismissal. That conclusion must be supported by more than just substantial evidence; a preponderance — or greater weight — of the competent proof is required." Id.; cf. Briggs v. Bd. of Dirs., 282 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1979)

.

The distinction between these two standards may be understood by considering the statutes and our cases explaining them.

"Substantial evidence" means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1) (2003); accord Mosher v. Dep't of Inspections & Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 501, 508 (Iowa 2003)

. Thus, "[a]n agency's decision does not lack substantial evidence because inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence." Mosher, 671 N.W.2d at 508 (internal quotations omitted).

On the other hand, a "preponderance"

means superiority in weight,

...