Warner v. Gabb

• Decision Date: 09 December 1952
• Citation: 93 A.2d 487,139 Conn. 310
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WARNER v. GABB. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 487

93 A.2d 487

139 Conn. 310

WARNER v. GABB.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 9, 1952.

Cornelius D. Shea, Hartford, for plaintiff.

Robert K. Killian, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Samuel Gould and Frank A. Murphy, Hartford, for defendant.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

INGLIS, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff became a member of the Hartford fire department on October 1, 1919, after he had completed a term of military service in World War I. He served continuously therein until called for active duty in the United States navy on August 8, 1941. He was honorably released from the navy on October 17, 1945. Thereupon he returned to the Hartford fire department and continued as a member thereof until January 31, 1950, when he was compelled to retire because he had reached the age of sixty-five years. Special Act No. 394 ¹ was passed by the General Assembly in 1945. 24 Spec.Laws 776. It is conceded that, for pension purposes, this act entitled the plaintiff to add the term of his service in World War I to his actual service for the city. It is likewise conceded that, in accordance with §§ 2-54 and 2-56 of the Hartford Charter and General Ordinances, 1949, enacted in 1945, he, like every other city employee, is also entitled to have included the time during which he was in military service during World War II. He claims that by reason of Special Act No. 281 ² enacted in 1949, 25 Spec.Laws 1021, he is entitled to an additional credit of one month for each month of his service in the armed forces during World War II. The defendant has denied this claim, taking the position that Special Act No. 281 is invalid. The question reserved for the advice of this court is (a) whether that act is valid or (b) whether the computation of service time under it 'would constitute exclusive emoluments or privileges from the community to the plaintiff or a group of policemen and firemen based upon no reasonable classification.'

The effect of Special Act No. 281 is to put into a class by themselves those members of the police and fire departments of the city of Hartford who are veterans of World War II and who were members of those departments when they entered military service. It segregates them from, and prefers them to, not only veterans who are employed by the city in other departments but also all other employees in the police and fire departments even though they are veterans of World War I. Indeed, it prefers those in question to other World War II veterans in the police and fire departments who had not been serving in those departments before they entered military service. Moreover, inasmuch as it increases the retirement pay which those favored are to receive by adding to their term of service for the computation thereof, it directs the expenditure of public funds.

The constitution of this state, article first, § 1, declares 'That all men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and that no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.' Legislation which grants to a limited class emoluments or privileges greater than those allowed to the public at large is, of course, not necessarily violative of the constitution. If such a grant serves a public purpose, the fact that it is so limited does not render it invalid. Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 516, 52 A.2d 702. Whether it does serve such a purpose rests in the sound judgment of the legislature; and the courts should not override the legislature's conclusion if that can be supported on any reasonable ground. Lyman v. Adorno, supra, 133 Conn. 514, 52 A.2d 704, 705; Murphy, Inc., v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 304, 40 A.2d 177, 156 A.L.R. 568; State v. Bassett, 100 Conn. 430, 433, 123 A. 842, 37 A.L.R. 131; Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 350, 82 A. 1030, and cases cited. On the other hand, if legislation directs the granting of an emolument or privilege to an individual or class without any purpose, expressed or apparent, to serve the public welfare thereby, the courts have a duty to declare such legislation unconstitutional.

In line with the principles just stated, it is incumbent upon us to inquire what purpose the General Assembly could reasonably have been seeking to serve in enacting in 1949 Special Act No. 281. We are committed to the proposition that the payment of public funds to veterans generally is not violative of the constitutional provision, because such payment serves to promote the public welfare by encouraging patriotism. Lyman v. Adorno, supra, 133 Conn. 518, 52 A.2d 706; Walsh v. Jenks, 135 Conn. 210, 221, 62 A.2d 773. The act now before us, however, does not benefit veterans generally. It provides an emolument for a very small group. For that reason it cannot be sustained on the theory that the purpose of the legislature in enacting it was to promote patriotism.

It is to be borne in mind that the special act in question was adopted as a portion of the legislation relating to the retirement of policemen and firemen of the city of Hartford. The intended effect of that legislation is, or may well be, threefold: First, the assurance of retirement pay facilitiates recruitment because it makes the job more attractive. Second, it furnishes a sense of security to the fireman or policeman while he is in the service of the city and thereby increases his efficiency. Third, it tends to prevent a rapid turnover of personnel in the departments by inducing the men to hold their positions until they reach retirement age. These purposes are public purposes. The only question is whether the provisions of Special Act No. 281 giving special treatment to veterans of World War II are reasonably designed to further them.

It is well recognized that when a piece of legislation treats one class of persons differently from another there must be "some natural and substantial difference germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation between those within the class included and those whom it leaves untouched." State v....