Warren v. Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hartford

Decision Date03 June 1919
Citation213 S.W. 527,202 Mo.App. 1
PartiesHOOPER W. WARREN, Administrator of the Estate of WILLIAM T. WELCH, deceased (Plaintiff Interpleader, Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, a Corporation, Defendant, and JAMES P. NEWELL, Public Administrator of the City of St. Louis, in charge of the Estate of EDITH WELCH, deceased (Defendant Interpleader), Respondent
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.--Hon. George H. Shields, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Judgment affirmed.

Henry S. Caulfield for appellant.

(1) The facts in evidence do not sustain the trial court's finding that the named beneficiary survived the insured. (2) The burden was on the defendant interpleader, administrator of the named beneficiary, to prove that the beneficiary survived the insured, and having failed in that proof he cannot recover, and the proceeds of the policy should go to the administrator of the insured, plaintiff interpleader unless the named beneficiary had a vested interest in the policy. Supreme Council v. Kacer, 96 Mo.App. 93; Unted States Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301; Aley v. Railroad, 211 Mo. 480. (3) The beneficiary did not have a vested interest in the policy, because the policy permitted the insured to displace his wife as the payee of the policy in favor of someone else. Supreme Council v. Kacer, 96 Mo.App. 93; May on Insurance (4 Ed.), sec. 399 M; 4 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance, p 3755; Kerr on Insurance, p. 690; Vance on Insurance, p. 399; 25 Cyc. 893; Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 22 F 204; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Daley, 25 Cal.App. 378; A. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gannon, 179 Mass. 294; McEwen v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal.App. 699; Townsend v. Fid. Cas. Co. (Ia.), 144 N.W. 576; Denver Life Ins. Co. v. Crane, 19 Colo.App. 199; Cavagnaro v. Thompson, 138 N.Y.S. 820; Wrather v. Stacy (Ky.), 82 S.W. 420; McNiel v. Chinn (Tex Civ. App.), 101 S.W. 467. (4) Our statute (R. S. 1909, sec. 6944) does not affect the rule, that the reservation to the insured of a right to displace the named beneficiary prevents the interest of the beneficiary from being vested. Eves v. Woodmen of the World, 153 Mo.App. 247; Robinson v. Insurance Company, 168 Mo.App. 259.

Campbell Cummings for respondent.

(1) A special finding of facts by the trial judge in an equity case may be adopted by the Appellate Court as a fair and substantial statement of facts shown by the trial and his written opinion may be of much service to the examination and adjudication of the case. U. S. Cas. Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 307, 309. (2) There is no presumption of survivorship when several persons perish in a common accident, as the law discards the intricate presumptions based on age, health, sex, etc. U. S. Cas. Co. v Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 311; Supreme Council v. Kacer, 96 Mo.App. 93, 110. (3) The facts in evidence clearly and satisfactorily sustain the trial judge's finding that the named beneficiary survived the insured. In fact, no other conclusion could have been reached under the evidence and such finding was independent of any question of law. See written opinion appendix respondent's brief. (4) Neither the insured alone nor the insured and the company acting together will be permitted to change the beneficiary in the policy where a privilege of arbitrary change or at will is not expressly reserved or expressly authorized therein. Their rights are necessarily subject to the terms of the contract, since such rights depend upon the contract and the vested right of the beneficiary is subject to be divested only in accordance with the express provisions of the contract. Leeker v. Ins. Co., 154 Mo.App. 440, 451 (adopted by St. L. Ct. of Appeals, 163 Mo. 523; Sov. Camp W. O. W. v Downing, 201 S.W. 952, secs. 5, 6; Protective League Life v. Downing, 202 S.W. 290; Eves v. Woodmen, 153 Mo.App. 247, 257; Packard v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 9 Mo.App. 469, 476; Coleman v. N. W. Mut. L. Ins. Co. , 273 Mo. 620, 626, 628; Lloyd v. Royal N. M. L. I. Co., 245 F. 162, 165, 168; Deal v. Deal, 87 So. Car. 395, 398, Ann Cas. 1912B. 1142, 1143; Condon v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 166 N.W. 452, 454; Met. Life I. Co. v. O'Donnell, 102 A. 163, 165; Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill.App. 278, 280, 281; Ind. M. L. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 10, 18, 22, 25; Neary v. Met. L. I. Co., 103 A. 661, 662; Kline v. Nat'l Ben. Ass'n, 111 Ind. 462, 465; 14 R. C. L., p. 1376, sec. 545. (5) The clause in the policy in respect to change of beneficiary is as broad as its terms and no broader, and hence it must be construed according to the terms and stipulations expressing it in a given case and the power to exercise it is measured by the language on which it is founded. McKinney v. Ins. Co., 270 Mo. 305, 315; U. S. Cas. Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 315; Deal v. Deal, 87 S. Car. 395, 400, 401; Rumsey v. N. Y. L. I. Co., 147 P. 337; Chance v. Simpkins, 91 S.E. 773, 774. (6) In order to effect a change of the beneficiary under a provision therefor in an old-line policy, the trend of the recent cases uphold the rule that the requirements of the policy in this respect must be complied with, even where there is an express reservation of divestiture. Deal v. Deal, 87 So. Cas. 395, 400, 401; Neary v. Met. L. Ins. Co., 103 A. 661, 662; Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill.App. 278; Ind. L. Ins. Co. v. McGinniss, 180 Ind. 9, 21, 22, 24; Chance v. Simpkins, 91 S.E. 773, 774; Townsend v. Townsend, 127 Ky. 230, 316; Met. Ins. Co. v. Clanton, 76 N.J.Eq. 4; Mueller v. Penn. M. L. I. Co., 161 P. 148, 150; Sullivan v. Maroney, 76 N.J.Eq. 104, 110; Washington L. Ins. Co. v. Berwald, 97 Tex. 111, 116; Sheppard v. Crowley, 61 Fla. 735, 740; Filley v. Ill. L. Ins. Co., 93 Kan. 193, 197; Lloyd v. Royal N. M. L. I. Co., 245 F. 162, 165, 168; Perry v. Tweedy, 128 Ga. 402, 405; Thomas v. Thomas, 131 N.Y. 205; O'Donnell v. Met. L. Ins. Co., 95 A. (Del. Ch.) 289; Met. L. Ins. Co. v. O'Donnell, 102 A. 163, 165 (S. C.); Leeker v. Ins. Co., 154 Mo.App. 440, 451; Christman v. Christman, 163 Wisc. 433; Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 F. 200, 205; Ann. Cas. 1912-B, p. 1145, 2nd. Col., last par.; Arnold v. Empire Ins. Co., 3 Ga.App. 685; Smith v. Head, 75 Ga. 755, 757; Holder v. Prud. Ins. Co., 77 S.C. 299; Urick v. W. Tr. Ac. Ass'n, 81 Neb. 327; French v. Prov. S. L. A. Ass'n, 205 Mass. 424, 427, 428; Freund v. Freund, 218 Ill. 189, 195, 199 (reversing 117 Ill.App. 565). (7) The naming of a beneficiary in an old-line policy is a part of the contract, and the vested interest of the named beneficiary cannot be divested except by a strict compliance with the stipulations of the policy, even where a change by the insured was actually attempted, and an interpleader suit by the company after the death of the insured is not a waiver in such policies. Chance v. Simpkins, 146 Ga. 519, 91 S.E. 773, 774; Filley v. Ill. L. Ins. Co., 93 Kan. 193, 196, 197; Johnson v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 138 P. 414, 416; Lloyd v. Royal N. M. L. I. Co., 245 F. 162, 165, 168; Neary v. Met. L. Ins. Co., 103 A. 661, 662; Muller v. Penn. M. L. I. Co., 161 P. 148, 150; City Nat'l Bk. v. Lewis, 176 P. 237; Deal v. Deal, 87 S. Car. 395, 400; Rumsey v. N. Y. L. I. Co., 147 P. 337; Met. L. I. Co. v. O'Donnell, 102 A. 163, 165; Met. Ins. Co. v. Clanton, 76 N. J. Eg. 4, 7. (8) Even where an express permission to change beneficiary is given in ordinary policy, such a change in beneficiaries is not completed until its indorsement by the company on the policy. An insurance policy, like any other written instrument, is to be considered as a whole. The parts concerning the change of beneficiary must be likewise then considered. That portion which provides that no change shall take effect unless endorsed on the policy by the company at the home office is entitled to the same consideration as any other portion pertaining to such change. Rumsey v. N. Y. L. I. Co., 147 P. 337; Met. L. Ins. Co. v. O'Donnell, 102 A. 163, 165; Neary v. Met. L. Ins. Co., 103 A. 661, 662. (9) The law favors vested estates and no remainder will be construed as contingent which may, consistently with the intention, be deemed vested. Byrne v. France, 131 Mo. 639. (10) When the beneficiary has a vested interest in the policy, the burden of proof of survivorship is on the administrator of the insured, and the rights of the beneficiary being vested, they could not be divested prior to the innovation of inserting in such policy a contract provision which entitled the insured to change the beneficiary. U. S. Cas. Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 309-310, 313-315; Blum v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 197 Mo. 513, 522-523; McKinney v. Ins. Co., 270 Mo. 305, 315; Grisby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149; Mas. Ben. Ass'n v. Bunch, 109 Mo. 560, 579-580; Wells v. Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 126 Mo. 630. (11) We submit, that it is still an open question in this State whether or not section 6944, R. S. 1909, does or does not give the beneficiary, the wife, a vested interest in old line insurance policies when it is considered that section 5854, R. S. 1889, was repealed and a new section enacted in lieu thereof in section 7895, R. S. 1899 (Laws of 1899, p. 246). Sec. 5854, R. S. 1889; Sec. 7895, R. S. 1899; Sec 6944, R. S. 1909; McKinney v. Ins. Co., 270 Mo. 305, 316 (Sec. 6944, R. S. 1909); Clarkston v. Met. L. Ins. Co., 190 Mo.App. 624, 631 (Sec. 6944, R. S. 1909); Orthwein v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 261 Mo. 650, 667, 669, 673 (Sec. 6044, R. S. 1909); Haven v. Ins. Co., 149 Mo.App. 291; 294, 299 (Sec. 7895, R. S. 1899); Eves v. Woodmen, 153 Mo.App. 247, 254-58 (Sec. 5854, R. S. 1889); Robinson v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 168 Mo.App. 259 (Sec. 5854, R. S. 1889); Smith v. Gr. L. A. O. U. W., 124 Mo.App. 181, 200 (Sec. 7895, R. S. 1889); Blum v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 197 Mo. 513, 522, 523, 527-529 (Sec. 7895, R. S. 1899); Olmstead v....

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