Wash. State Dep't of Corr. v. Barnett
| Decision Date | 19 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 84009-6-I |
| Citation | 522 P.3d 52 |
| Parties | WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Washington State Personnel Resources Board, Respondent, v. Julia A. BARNETT, M.D., Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Gregory Mann Miller, Carney Badley Spellman PS, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7010, for Appellant.
Matthew Kernutt, Attorney General of Washington, 1125 Washington St. Se., Olympia, WA, 98504-0100, John S. Meade, Gov't Compliance & Enforcement Division A.G. Office, Attorney at Law, Attorney General's Office, P.O. Box 40100, Olympia, WA, 98504-0100, Darcey Elliott, Attorney General's Office, P.O. Box 40145, Olympia, WA, 98504-0145, Susan Sackett Danpullo, Office of the Attorney General, 7141 Cleanwater Dr. Sw., P.O. Box 40145, Olympia, WA, 98504-0145, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶1 The Washington State Department of Corrections ("DOC") terminated Appellant, Julia Barnett, M.D., in April 2019 from her position as staff physician and medical director of the Monroe Correctional Complex ("MCC") for "incompetence." The Personnel Resources Board ("PRB") upheld the decision following a three-day hearing in October 2020. The appellant sought a Writ of Review and/or Writ of Certiorari (the "Writs") from the Snohomish County Superior Court in October 2021. That court declined to issue the Writs, finding that the PRB had acted neither illegally nor exceeded its authority and that there was another potential remedy at law available to Barnett. The superior court made such findings without reviewing the entire administrative record, as the agencies had refused to produce it. Our Supreme Court denied direct review and transferred the appeal to this court in May.
¶2 In her appeal, Barnett asserts that the superior court erred by denying the Writs without demanding and reviewing the entire administrative record and without holding a hearing. Without such process, Barnett asserts that trial courts cannot determine whether the discharge and PRB's review exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise was unlawful.
¶3 We affirm the superior court's denial of the Writs because, as preliminary matters, (1) the PRB was not exercising a "judicial function" that would subject it to a statutory writ of review by a superior court, and (2) the trial court did not abuse its significant discretion when finding that there were other legal options available to Barnett, which defeat the need for a constitutional writ. Further, there is no authority holding that a superior court must receive and review the entire record or hold a hearing before assessing the preliminary aspects of either writ. We do not reach the merits of the dispute or other issues the parties present.
¶4 Barnett was a staff physician and the facility medical director at the MCC, which is within the DOC, from March 2017 until her termination in April 2019. In support of her termination, DOC conducted an investigation and produced a report, which concluded that Barnett:
[F]ailed to exercise sound clinical judgement; provide adequate medical care to patients; advocate for patients; make timely and necessary arrangements for adequate medical care to be provided to patients outside of MCC; ensure that providers whom [Barnett] clinically supervised were providing timely, adequate medical care, evaluations or assessments; ensure that sufficient documentation and charting was occurring so that the patient's condition could be adequately monitored; and communicate significant changes in a patient's condition to other critical medical providers.
In short, in Barnett's words, she was discharged by DOC for "alleged incompetence." DOC claimed that these actions constituted misconduct and had violated the DOC's Health Plan, multiple DOC policies, and her stated job expectations, including her formal position description and performance development plan. The investigative report further detailed the resulting suffering and harm to six specific patients. DOC found just cause for termination.
¶5 Barnett appealed her termination to the PRB in May 2019, alleging multiple violations of her procedural and substantive rights. A three-day hearing was held in October 2020, during which the PRB received over 1,200 pages of exhibits and heard testimony from all witnesses offered by both parties. In September 2021, the PRB affirmed the termination decision in a written decision. Such a process is contemplated by the State's Civil Service law, RCW 41.06.170(2), which states in pertinent part:
Any employee who is ... dismissed ... shall have the right to appeal, either individually or through his or her authorized representative, not later than thirty days after the effective date of such action to the Washington personnel resources board. The employee shall be furnished with specified charges in writing when a ... dismissal ... action is taken. Such appeal shall be in writing.
¶6 On October 25, 2021, Barnett filed a Petition and Application for Writ of Review or for Constitutional Writ of Certiorari in Snohomish County Superior Court, naming both DOC and the PRB as respondents. The Petition alleged that the PRB committed five types of evidentiary, procedural, and legal errors, which both respondents contested. The superior court denied issuance of either a statutory or constitutional writ of review after its review of a substantial record, including four briefs and multiple declarations, totaling several hundred pages. The court found that the PRB did not act illegally or exceed its authority and that other remedies at law were available to Barnett, while expressing uncertainty about whether the PRB was exercising a judicial function. Barnett sought review by the Supreme Court. Review was denied, and the case transferred to this court in May 2022.
¶7 There are two classes of writs: (1) the constitutional or common law writ and (2) the statutory writ. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson, 172 Wash.2d 756, 767, 261 P.3d 145 (2011). Barnett sought either.
¶8 As an example of the latter, RCW 7.16.040 provides that:
A writ of review shall be granted by any court, except a municipal or district court, when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void proceeding, or a proceeding not according to the course of the common law, and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
¶9 In other words, to obtain a statutory writ of review, "the petitioner must show (1) that an inferior tribunal (2) exercising judicial functions (3) exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, and (4) there is no adequate remedy at law."
Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Wash. Pers. Res. Bd., 91 Wash. App. 640, 646, 959 P.2d 143 (1998) (citing Raynes v. City of Leavenworth, 118 Wash.2d 237, 244, 821 P.2d 1204 (1992) ). If any of these elements is absent, there is no basis for superior court review. Clark County PUD v. Wilkinson, et al., 139 Wash.2d 840, 845, 991 P.2d 1161 (2000) (citing Bridle Trails Cmty. Club v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash. App. 248, 250, 724 P.2d 1110 (1986) ).
¶10 Review of a superior court's decision denying a statutory writ of review is de novo. City of Seattle v. Holifield, 170 Wash.2d 230, 240, 240 P.3d 1162 (2010) (citing Commanda v. Cary, 143 Wash.2d 651, 654, 23 P.3d 1086 (2001) ). A statutory writ is an extraordinary remedy granted by statute, which should be used "sparingly." Id. at 239-40, 240 P.3d 1162 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "Although the writ [of review] may be convenient, no authority supports its use as a matter of expediency." Dep't of Lab. & Indus. v. Bd. of Indus. Ins. Appeals, 186 Wash. App. 240, 246–47, 347 P.3d 63 (2015) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Commanda, 143 Wash.2d at 656, 23 P.3d 1086 ). Courts should be wary of "broaden[ing] the scope of the statutory writ so as to be generally available rather than to be an extraordinary remedy as consistently held." Id. at 247, 347 P.3d 63.
¶11 Barnett glides past the first two elements to argue that the superior court could not assess the third and fourth elements without the full administrative record. Specifically, she argues that without the record the court could For Barnett, the "sole issue on appeal" is the presence or absence of the record. That framing, whereby a court skips over the first two elements, simply is not the law.
¶12 There is no dispute that the PRB is a tribunal (thus satisfying the first element), but the respondents assert that, regardless of the record before it, the PRB is not exercising a judicial function. We agree.
¶13 To determine whether an agency was exercising judicial functions, courts weigh the following factors: (1) whether a court has been charged with making the agency's decision; (2) whether the decision is the type that courts historically have made; (3) whether the decision involved the application of law to fact; and (4) whether the decision resembled the ordinary business of courts as opposed to legislators or administrators. Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass'n, 91 Wash. App. at 646, 959 P.2d 143.
¶14 Our Supreme Court and this court have held on multiple occasions that the PRB's decision that DOC properly applied its policies and procedures in a dismissal review is not a "judicial function" under the above criteria. Namely, our Supreme Court held that "the function of the [PRB], in hearing and determining appeals from employees who have been dismissed for cause by their employing agency is nonjudicial in nature." State ex rel. Hood v. Pers. Bd., 82 Wash.2d 396, 401, 511 P.2d 52 (1973) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds...
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