Washington Heights-Highbridge Park Community Development Area, In re

• Decision Date: 04 April 1975
• Docket Number: HEIGHTS-HIGHBRIDGE
• Citation: 82 Misc.2d 557,369 N.Y.S.2d 932
• Parties: In re WASHINGTONPARK COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AREA, Stage II, City of New York. Application of the City of New York, relative to acquiring title to certain real property where not heretofore acquired for the same purpose, for a project known as Washington Heights-Highbridge Park Community Development Area (also known as the Washington Heights, Highbridge Park Urban Renewal Area) Stage II, et al.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 932

369 N.Y.S.2d 932

82 Misc.2d 557

In re WASHINGTON HEIGHTS-HIGHBRIDGE PARK COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AREA, Stage II City of New York. Application of the City of New York relative to acquiring title to certain real property where not heretofore acquired for the same purpose, for a project known as Washington Heights-Highbridge Park Community Development Area (also known as the Washington Heights Highbridge Park Urban Renewal Area) Stage II, et al.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Part VIII.

April 4, 1975.

Raphael, Searles, Vischi, Scher, Glover & D'Elia, New York City (Sidney Z. Searles, New York City, of counsel), for claimant, Columbia Univ Adrian P. Burke, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Dominick Sorrentino, New York City, of counsel), for City of New York.

WALLACE R. COTTON, Justice:

In the instant proceeding, the claimant, Columbia University, seeks to increase the prevailing rate of 6% Interest paid on condemnation awards to 8%, on the theory that since the date of vesting (October 1, 1971), conditions in the 'money' market were such that the prevailing rate of 6% Interest is inadequate and thus does not conform to the constitutional requirement of 'just compensation'.

'It is settled doctrine that a condemnee is constitutionally entitled to 'some sum in addition to the bare value of the property at the date of taking for the delay in making payment, so that the compensation may be just' (Matter of City of New York (Bronx Riv. Parkway), 284 N.Y. 48, 54, 29 N.E.2d 465, 468, affd. 313 U.S. 540, 61 S.Ct. 839, 85 L.Ed. 1508). And since the ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial question (Matter of City of New York, 190 N.Y. 350, 353, 83 N.E. 299; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327, 13 S.Ct. 622, 37 L.Ed. 463; United States v. Commodities Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124, n. 3, 70 S.Ct. 547, 94 L.Ed. 707; and see N.Y.Const., Art. I, § 7, subd. (b)), the specific provision in section 3--a of the General Municipal Law does not foreclose consideration of claimants' contentions as to what constitutes just compensation.' (Mtr. of City of N.Y. (Maxwell) 15 A.D.2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786).

Examination of Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, relating to 'just compensation' reveals:

'As regards property taken for public use, the term is comprehensive and includes all elements. Jacobs v. United States, Ala., 290 U.S. 13, 54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142, 96 A.L.R. 1; Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Adams, 16 Cal.2d 676, 107 P.2d 618, 621. But does not exceed market value. Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154, 158; United States v. Waterhouse, C.C.A. Hawaii, 132 F.2d 699, 703. It means a settlement which leaves one no poorer or richer than he was before the property was taken. United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Indian Creek Marble Co., D.C.Tenn., 40 F.Supp. 811, 818, 819; adequate compensation, State v. Hale, Tex.Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 135, 141; In re Board of Sup'rs of Chenango County, Co.Ct., 6 N.Y.S.2d 732, 739; fair market value, Cameron Development Co. v. United States, C.C.A. Fla., 145 F.2d 209, 210; United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Davis, D.C.Tenn., 41 F.Supp. 595, 597, 598; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of Baltimore, Parcel No. 12, D.C.Md., 43 F.Supp. 687, 689. Full and perfect equivalent of the property taken. Housing Authority of Shreveport v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295, 298; United States v 2.4 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Lake County, Ill., C.C.A.Ill., 138 F.2d 295, 297. It is the value of property taken at time of taking. United States v. 813.96 Acres of Land in Ouachita County, Ark., D.C.Ark., 45 F.Supp. 535, 538; Danforth v. United States, Mo., 308 U.S. 271, 60 S.Ct. 231, 236, 84 L.Ed. 240; plus compensation for delay in payment. Kieselbach v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 317 U.S. 399, 63 S.Ct. 303, 305, 37 L.Ed. 358; or consequential damages to the owner. In re Board of Water Supply of City of New York, 277 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.2d 789; or value of use of property from date of taking possession to date of judgment if possession is taken by condemnor prior to judgment. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 314, 119 P.2d 734, 735. It requires that the owner be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would otherwise have been. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A. 8, 52 F.2d 372, 379; In re Gratiot Ave., City of Detroit, 294 Mich. 569, 293 N.W. 755, 757; United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, C.C.A.4, 118 F.2d 79, 87.'

From the cases cited above, it is clear that our courts have consistently held that in eminent domain proceedings a claimant is entitled to receive 'just compensation' for the property taken and that 'just compensation' includes an amount for interest on the award and that the amount of interest to be paid is a matter for judicial interpretation to be guided by but not bound to the applicable statutes and surrounding circumstances. It is my interpretation that 'just compensation' means 'fair' and does not mean the maximum possible return on the fund if invested in some speculative, specific, or unusual manner.

In accordance with the procedure suggested by the late Mr. Justice Geller in Matter of City of New York (Municipal Building) 57 Misc.2d 156, 291 N.Y.S.2d 656, affd. 32 A.D.2d 530, 299 N.Y.S.2d 677, affd. 27 N.Y.2d 518, 312 N.Y.S.2d 995, 261 N.E.2d 106, a separate hearing was held and testimony taken with regard to the conditions of the money market, as well as the mortgage and securities...