Washington State Human Rights Commission ex rel. Spangenberg v. Cheney School Dist. No. 30

• Decision Date: 25 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 47539-3,47539-3
• Citation: 641 P.2d 163,97 Wn.2d 118
• Parties: , 51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 928, 2 Ed. Law Rep. 1169 WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION on the Relation of Mary SPANGENBERG, Appellant, v. CHENEY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 30, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 118

97 Wn.2d 118

641 P.2d 163, 51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 928,

2 Ed. Law Rep. 1169

WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION on the Relation of Mary SPANGENBERG, Appellant, v. CHENEY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 30, Respondent.

No. 47539-3.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Feb. 25, 1982.

Ken Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Morton M. Tytler, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael Flynn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellant.

Winston & Cashatt, Joseph J. Rekofke, Spokane, for respondent.

Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Donna Leong, Asst. City Atty., Gary Locke, Dept. of Human Rights, Seattle, for amicus curiae.

DORE, Justice.

The sole issue in the subject case is whether a hearing tribunal of the Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter Commission) has authority to award compensation for humiliation and mental suffering caused by unlawful age discrimination. We hold it has no such authority.

FACTS

Mary Spangenberg applied for a teaching position at Garden Springs School in the Cheney School District (hereinafter District) in 1977 when she was 40 years of age. The only requisite qualification for the job listed in the job bulletin was a valid Washington State teaching certificate. At the time, Spangenberg held a valid teaching certificate and had been employed by the District for seven years. Although she was found qualified, she was not hired. One of the reasons for refusing her employment was that the District wanted a younger person for the position. The District's She filed a complaint with the Commission and the case was heard by a hearing tribunal. The tribunal found that the District did not hire Spangenberg because of her age, and awarded her a judgment of $4,500 for humiliation and mental suffering.

decision caused Spangenberg to suffer humiliation and mental anguish and grief.

The District appealed to the Superior Court which ruled that the Commission and/or its hearing tribunal have no authority to award damages for mental suffering and/or humiliation in any amount. However, the court did grant judgment for nominal damages in the amount of $1,000. The Commission appealed to this court, claiming they had authority to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering and asked that the $4,500 award against the District be reinstated. The District did not appeal the $1,000 award for nominal damages, presumably on the basis that it did not include damages for mental suffering.

The Washington law against discrimination, when originally enacted in 1949, covered only discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color or national origin. Chapter 183, Laws of 1949. Tribunals were authorized only to issue cease and desist orders. Chapter 183, section 8, Laws of 1949. In 1955, the law against discrimination was revised and reenacted. At that time, RCW 49.60.250 was enacted, authorizing the tribunal to issue

an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unfair practice and to take such affirmative action, including, (but not limited to) hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, an admission or restoration to full membership rights in any respondent organization, or to take such other action as, in the judgment of the tribunal, will effectuate the purposes of this chapter, ...

(Italics ours.) The underlined language was added in 1957.

Pursuant to RCW 49.60.250 and the underlined language "or to take such other action," the legislature granted the Commission the power to give hearing tribunals acting in Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself. In re Lehman, 93 Wash.2d 25, 604 P.2d 948 (1980); Garrison v. State Nursing Bd., 87 Wash.2d 195, 550 P.2d 7 (1976). Ambiguous statutes such as the one in the present case, however, should be interpreted in a reasonable manner, and courts should strive to seek out the intent of the legislative body. Odessa Trading Co. v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 6 Wash.App. 423, 493 P.2d 809 (1972). The primary role of this court in interpreting statutes is to determine the intent of the legislature and to give effect to that intent. Burlington N., Inc. v. Johnston, 89 Wash.2d 321, 572 P.2d 1085 (1977). To this end, the statute must be read as a whole; intent is not to be determined by a single sentence (or, in this case, the single phrase "or to take such other action"). State v. Fenter, 89 Wash.2d 57, 569 P.2d 67 (1977).

their behalf "general jurisdiction and power" to eliminate and prevent prohibited discrimination. Both parties agree that the legislature did not expressly give such a tribunal the power to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering. However, appellant claims this power by inference under the statutory language of "or to take such other action".

To determine the intent of the legislature regarding the meaning of the words "or to take such other action as" as set forth in RCW 49.60.250, one must examine the 1957 journals of the House and Senate. There is no mention of the authority of the Commission to set up a tribunal having the power to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering. However, in the 1977 session of the legislature; to wit, on February 7, 1977, Senate Bill 2482 was introduced which, on page 17, suggested an amendment to RCW 49.60.250 which, in part, provided

(8) If, upon all the evidence, the ((tribunal)) administrative law judge finds that the respondent has engaged in any unfair practice ((it)) said judge shall state ((its)) the findings of fact and shall issue and file with the ((board)) commission and cause to be served on such The suggested amendatory matter set forth in the above paragraph of S.B. 2482 is underlined. If the administrative law judge was guided by policies and precedents of the Commission, he would presumably have legislative authority to order damages for humiliation and mental suffering, for this is appellant's current policy. The Senate bill was reported out of committee on May 4, 1977. The Senate Journal, 45th Legislature (1977), at 1457-59, reflects legislative intent as to whether the Commission or a hearing tribunal appointed by the Commission had the authority to assess damages for humiliation and mental suffering. There is no mention specifically regarding the authority to assess damages, but the dialogue reflects legislative intent to expand the powers and authority of the Commission and its tribunals only as "expressly" stated in the statute. ¹

respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unfair practice and to take such affirmative action, including, (but not limited to) hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, an admission or restoration to full membership rights in any respondent organization, or to take such other action as, in the judgment of the ((tribunal)) administrative law judge, guided by policies and precedents of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of this chapter, and including a requirement for report of the matter on compliance.

After considerable discussion of this measure on the Senate floor, S.B. 2482, as amended, was referred back to the Judiciary Committee with recommendation that it be referred back to the Senate at the next session of the legislature. It has not surfaced since. The rejection of this bill by the legislature implies that the legislature did not want the subject tribunal to have the power to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering for age discrimination violations. As the legislature rejected this request for expanded powers, municipalities or the Commission itself Mary Spangenberg, who suffered damages by humiliation and mental suffering caused by age discrimination, is not without a remedy. She can sue for damages under RCW 49.60.030 which specifically grants a civil remedy for anyone injured by an act of discrimination as follows:

cannot change this rejection to approval by means of municipal ordinances and the Washington Administrative Code. The authorization of tribunals to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering for age discrimination is a substantive matter and cannot be granted under an agency's rule-making power.

(2) Any person deeming himself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him, or both, together with the cost of suit including a reasonable attorney's fees ...

In Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 Wash.App. 48, 573 P.2d 389 (1978), the appellate court held that courts may award compensation for humiliation and mental suffering in a discrimination case. Consequently, there is no compelling need to vest a law tribunal with the power to award such damages.

WAC 162-08-061(2) provides in part:

A court confines its judgment to the parties before it, and it seeks to resolve in a single action the entire dispute between them. The commission was not designed to compete with the courts as a forum for the vindication of private rights; its task is to work for the public good of eliminating and preventing discrimination. If the commission were obligated to dispose of every contention between a complainant and respondent arising out of the alleged discrimination, then its resources would be diverted from this central task. RCW 49.60.020 preserves the civil and criminal remedies of a person who has filed a complaint under the law against discrimination, and RCW 49.60.030 authorizes suits directly in court, in order to free the commission to work for the remedy best designed to eliminate and prevent discrimination.

(Italics ours.)

The above rule puts the enforcement of civil rights into perspective. The Commission was established by the legislature as a "fire department" designated to take immediate action in the event of an emergency in the...