Lehman, In re, 46150
| Decision Date | 10 January 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 46150,46150 |
| Citation | 604 P.2d 948,93 Wn.2d 25 |
| Parties | In re the Personal Restraint Petition of Dennis L. LEHMAN, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Kafer, Good & St. Mary, David Mitchell, Everett, for petitioner.
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Nate D. Mannakee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondent.
Dennis L. Lehman filed a personal restraint petition challenging the revocation of his parole by the State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles (Board). The petition is granted and the cause remanded to the Board to reinstate petitioner's parole and conduct a hearing pursuant to RCW 9.95.120.
On April 16, 1971, petitioner was convicted of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. He was paroled in August of 1974. On April 13, 1976, his parole was suspended following the Board's receipt of notice that he was in federal custody on a charge of bank robbery.
Petitioner was convicted on the federal charge on October 12, 1976 and sentenced to 25 years in the federal prison. His state parole was administratively revoked by the Board without a due process hearing on November 9, 1976, in accordance with RCW 9.95.120 which provides in part:
Whenever a paroled prisoner is accused of a violation of his parole, other than the commission of, and conviction for, a felony or misdemeanor under the laws of this state or the laws of any state where he may then be, he shall be entitled to a fair and impartial hearing of such charges within thirty days from the time that he is served with charges of the violation of conditions of his parole after his arrest and detention.
Petitioner has obtained a federal parole date and the state officials apparently intend to take custody of him pursuant to their administrative order of parole revocation. However, the Board has not yet filed a detainer with the federal officials.
On August 3, 1978 this court held that despite the express terms of RCW 9.95.120 a parolee, convicted of a felony while on parole, is entitled to a hearing before parole is revoked. In re Akridge, 90 Wash.2d 350, 581 P.2d 1050 (1978). Petitioner has filed this personal restraint petition contending Akridge should be applied retroactively. He also contends that RCW 9.95.120, by its terms, entitles a state parolee, subsequently convicted of a federal offense, to a hearing prior to parole revocation.
Addressing petitioner's second contention, we note that RCW 9.95.120 entitles a parolee to a hearing when accused of having violated parole, except when the alleged violation involves the "commission of, and conviction for, a felony or misdemeanor Under the laws of this state or the laws of any state where he may then be . . ." (Italics ours.) Petitioner argues that the exception applies only to persons convicted of state offenses and not to those convicted of federal crimes, I. e., the word "state" does not include the United States. Since he was convicted on federal bank robbery charges, petitioner contends the Board's failure to accord him a hearing prior to revocation of his parole violates the express language of RCW 9.95.120.
Unfortunately, there is no legislative history or manifestation of intent to guide us other than the wording of the statute itself. Consequently, we must resort to traditional rules of statutory construction. Champion v. Shorelines Sch. Dist. No. 412, 81 Wash.2d 672, 504 P.2d 304 (1972).
In interpreting a statute, it is the duty of the court to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the legislature, as expressed in the act. Burlington N., Inc. v. Johnston, 89 Wash.2d 321, 572 P.2d 1085 (1977). Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself. Garrison v. State Nursing Bd., 87 Wash.2d 195, 550 P.2d 7 (1976). When the legislature uses words of common meaning that meaning will be applied to the statutory language unless it results in absurd or incongruous results. State v. (1972) Dan J. Evans Campaign Comm., 86 Wash.2d 503, 546 P.2d 75 (1976); Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 319, 382 P.2d 639 (1963). Applying these basic principles, it is clear the exception in RCW 9.95.120 applies only to convictions under State law. 1
Respondent contends RCW 9.100.010 Art. II(a) supports its argument that "state", as used in RCW 9.95.120, includes the United States. However, reference to Art. II(a) supports Petitioner's contention. Article II(a) specifically defines "state" to include the United States, making it clear that when the legislature...
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> FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES, TENINO AERIE NO. 564 v. Grand Aerie of …
...organization. If the statute is unambiguous, its meaning must be derived solely from the statutory language. In re Pers. Restraint of Lehman, 93 Wash.2d 25, 27, 604 P.2d 948 (1980). Resort to other tools of statutory construction, including consideration of legislative history, is improper.......
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