Washington v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 13 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:17-cv-01064-CMC-JDA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Tommencita Washington, Plaintiff, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B).1 Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI").2 For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In April 2013, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB [R. 220-224; see R. 21] and SSI [R. 225-233; see R. 21], alleging a disability onset date of June 1, 2012 [R. 220, 225]. The claims were denied initially [R. 139-146] and on reconsideration [R. 135-138] by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") and on May 14, 2015, ALJ Marcus Christ conducted a de novo hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 43-64.]
The ALJ issued a decision on August 31, 2015, finding Plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined by the Act from June 1, 2012 through the date of the decision. [R. 21-42.] At Step 1, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act ("the Act") through March 31, 2017, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2012, the alleged onset date. [R. 23, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: depression; fibromyalgia; osteoarthritis; gastroenteritis; iron deficiency anemia; and sarcoidosis. [R. 23, Finding 3.]
At Step 3, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926). [R. 23, Finding 4.] Before addressing Step 4, the ALJ determined:
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally stoop, crouch, knee, and crawl; and must avoid concentratedexposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, and gases, moving machinery, and unprotected heights. Additionally, the claimant is limited to simple routine and repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast paced production requirements involving only simple work related decisions with few, if any work place changes; and only occasional interaction with the public.
[R. 25, Finding 5.]
At Step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a data entry clerk and certified nursing assistant. [R. 35, Finding 6.] However, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R.35, Finding 10.] Thus, on that basis, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act from June 1, 2012, through the date of the decision. [R. 36, Finding 11.]
Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, however, the Council declined review. [R. 1-7.] Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on April 24, 2017. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and should be remanded because the ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of her multiple impairments [Doc. 14 at 16-18]; and failed to provide a proper credibility analysis in accordance with SSR 96-7p [id. at 18-20].
The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision and that the ALJ adequately considered the combined effect of Plaintiff'simpairments [Doc. 15 at 6-8]; and properly evaluated her credibility in accordance with the regulations [id. at 8-9].
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ( ).
Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court todetermine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).
The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).
The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1091-92 (11th Cir. 1996) (); Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980) (). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four may be appropriate to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision. See Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. See Smith, 782 F.2d at 1182 (). After a remand under sentence four, the court enters a final and immediately appealable judgment and then loses jurisdiction. Sargent, 941 F.2d 1207 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).
In contrast, sentence six provides:
The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may remand a case to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence only if four prerequisites are met: (1) the evidence is relevant to the determination of disability at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence is material to the extent that...
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