Washington v. Commissioner of Social Sec.

• Decision Date: 21 September 2009
• Docket Number: C/A No. 8:08-2592-RBH.
• Parties: Michelle S. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

659 F.Supp.2d 738

Michelle S. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

C/A No. 8:08-2592-RBH.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Anderson/Greenwood Division.

September 21, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Beatrice E. Whitten, Beatrice E. Whitten Law Office, Mt. Pleasant, SC, for Plaintiff.

Marvin Jennings Caughman, U.S. Attorneys Office, Columbia, SC, for Defendant.

ORDER

R. BRYAN HARWELL, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Michelle S. Washington, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and security income benefits ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.

The role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the Social Security Act is a limited one. Section 405(g) of that Act provides: "The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive...." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but less than [a] preponderance." Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir.1964); see, e.g., Daniel v. Gardner, 404 F.2d 889 (4th Cir.1968); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640 (4th Cir.1966); Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F.Supp. 776 (E.D.Va.1976). This standard precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the court's findings for those of the Commissioner. See, e.g., Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir.1971); Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 299 (4th Cir.1968). "[T]he court [must] uphold the [Commissioner's] decision even should the court disagree with such decision as long as it is supported by `substantial evidence.'" Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir.1972). As noted by Judge Sobeloff in Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.1969), "[f]rom this it does not follow, however, that the findings of the administrative agency are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily granted right of review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative action." Id. at 279. "[T]he courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the [Commissioner's] findings, and that his conclusion is rational." Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157-58.

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI in July of 2005, alleging disability since February of 2005 due to depression, vision problems, and mental retardation. She is a 43-year-old female who graduated from high school with special assistance. Her past work experience includes employment as a janitor and housekeeper.

Plaintiff's claims were denied initially and upon consideration. The plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), which was held on November 27, 2007. The ALJ thereafter denied plaintiff's claims in a decision issued January 14, 2008. The Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request for review and the ALJ's findings became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Plaintiff then appealed to the Federal District Court.

In her appeal to district court, Plaintiff asserted that the ALJ decision should be reversed and remanded for an award of benefits on the basis that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her visual acuity, to perform a proper listing analysis, and to properly consider the combined effects of the plaintiff's multiple impairments.

Under the Social Security Act, the plaintiff's eligibility for the benefits she is seeking hinges on whether she "is under a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). The term "disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months...." Id. at § 423(d)(1)(A). The burden is on the claimant to establish such disability. Preston v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 988, 990 n. * (4th Cir.1985). A claimant may establish a prima facie case of disability based solely upon medical evidence by demonstrating that her impairments meet or equal the medical criteria set forth in Appendix 1 of Subpart P. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

If such a showing is not possible, a claimant may also establish a prima facie case of disability by proving that she could not perform her customary occupation as the result of physical or mental impairments. Taylor v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664 (4th Cir.1975). Because this approach is premised on the claimant's inability to resolve the question solely on medical considerations, it then becomes necessary to consider the medical evidence in conjunction with certain "vocational factors." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b). These factors include the individual's (1) "residual functional capacity," id. at § 404.1560; (2) age, id. at § 404.1563; (3) education, id. at § 404.1564; (4) work experience, id. at § 404.1565; and (5) the existence of work "in significant numbers in the national economy" that the individual can perform, id. at § 404.1560. If the assessment of the claimant's residual functional capacity leads to the conclusion that he can no longer perform his previous work, it must be determined whether the claimant can do some other type of work, taking into account remaining vocational factors. Id. at § 404.1560. The interrelation between these vocational factors is governed by Appendix 2 of Subpart P. Thus, according to the sequence of evaluation suggested by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is currently gainfully employed, (2) whether he suffers from some physical or mental impairment, (3) whether that impairment meets or equals the criteria of Appendix 1, (4) whether, if those criteria are not met, the impairment prevents him from returning to his previous work, and (5) whether the impairment prevents him from performing some other available work.

The ALJ made the following findings in this case:

1. The claimant met the insured status requirement of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2007.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful employment since February 1, 2005 the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b), and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: a right eye cataract and borderline intellectual functioning (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: The claimant is limited to work with no requirement for fine visual acuity, with simple routine repetitive one and two step tasks, in a low stress non-sequential production setting (defined as no decision-making and changes in the work setting), and no requirement for complex reading, writing, or math computations.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a housekeeper. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from February 1, 2005 through the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02(A), D.S.C, this action was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. On July 23, 2009, Magistrate Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks filed a Report and Recommendation ("R & R") suggesting that the Commissioner's decision concerning Plaintiff's visual acuity be reversed and remanded, explaining: "Additional medical evidence may be necessary to resolve any conflict in the evidence" regarding the plaintiff's visual acuity." (Report, page 8). However, she does not recommend a remand as to the Commissioner's decisions concerning Listing 12.05 and the combination of impairments.

The plaintiff timely filed objections to the R & R on August 10, 2009. The defendant also timely filed a Response (objection) to the R & R on August 10, 2009.

The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to the Court, to which any party may file written objections.... The Court is not bound by the recommendation of the magistrate judge but, instead, retains responsibility for the final determination. The Court is required to make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendation as to which an objections is made. However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual report and recommendation to which no objections are addressed. While the level of scrutiny entailed by the Court's review of the Report thus depends on whether or not objections have been filed, in either case, the Court is free, after review, to accept, reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations.

Wallace v. Housing Auth. of the City of Columbia, 791 F.Supp. 137, 138 (D.S.C. 1992) (citations omitted).

Visual Acuity

The Defendant objects to the magistrate judge's recommendation that the case be remanded for further clarification concerning Plaintiff's visual acuity and argues that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings. Defendant argues in the alternative that any arguable error was harmless since the ALJ acknowledged and sufficiently accounted for Plaintiff's visual impairments by...