Washington v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, 85295

• Decision Date: 16 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 85295,85295
• Citation: 915 P.2d 359,1996 OK 139
• Parties: Michael C. WASHINGTON, Petitioner/Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents/Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 359

915 P.2d 359

1996 OK 139

Michael C. WASHINGTON, Petitioner/Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Respondents/Appellees.

No. 85295.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 16, 1996.

Michael C. Washington, McAlester, pro se.

Linda L. Samuel-Jaha, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, for Appellees.

KAUGER, Vice Chief Justice:

The only issue presented on certiorari is whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the appellant's lawsuit pursuant to the appellees' motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment without giving the appellant an opportunity to respond to the motion. We find that it did.

FACTS

This cause concerns a lawsuit brought by the appellant, Michael C. Washington, (Washington/appellant), an inmate at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma, against the appellees, the Department of Corrections and several prison officials (prison officials/appellees), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). ¹ In January of 1995, Washington filed a petition in the District Court of Pittsburg County, Oklahoma, seeking injunctive and monetary relief for alleged constitutional violations by various prison officials. ²

The substance of Washington's claims are that: 1) he was subjected to unconstitutional strip-searches; 2) prison officials revised disciplinary procedures which resulted in an ex post facto violation; and 3) a number of prison officials and guards violated his civil rights through a defective disciplinary proceeding which deprived him of good-time credits and the possibility of parole. On February 23, 1995, the appellees filed a motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment, arguing that Washington's cause should be dismissed under 12 O.S.1991 § 2012(B)(6) because he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ³

On March 2, 1995, the trial court dismissed Washington's lawsuit, finding that his Washington appealed the March 2, 1995, dismissal order, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing his cause without permitting him to respond to the appellees' motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed without specifically addressing the issue of whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the appellant's lawsuit pursuant to the appellees' motion without giving the appellant an opportunity to respond. We granted certiorari on February 27, 1996, to determine whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the appellant's lawsuit. ⁵

                lawsuit was frivolous and totally without merit. 4  Apparently unaware of the trial court's dismissal, the appellant filed a motion for an enlargement of time on March 8, 1995, requesting that the trial court grant him an additional thirty days after March 5, 1995, to respond to the appellees' motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment.  The trial court, by a court minute which was filed with the county clerk on March 10, 1995, found that Washington's request for an extension of time was moot because his lawsuit had already been dismissed
                

TITLE 12 O.S.1991 § 2012

AND RULE 13, 12 O.S.1991, CH. 2

APP., RULES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS, REQUIRE THAT THE

APPELLANT BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE

APPELLEES' MOTION UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED.

On certiorari, Washington argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his lawsuit without first giving him an opportunity to respond to the appellees' motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment. The appellees' motion asserts that Washington's cause should either be dismissed because his amended petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or that they were entitled to summary judgment.

Our review of the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, involves a de novo consideration as to whether the petition is legally sufficient. ⁶ In considering the sufficiency of a petition, the accepted rule is that a petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond any doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove facts in support of the claim entitling relief. ⁷ However, 12 O.S.1991 § 2012, mandates that: 1) when a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted includes matters outside the pleadings and those matters are not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment; and 2) all of the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by the rules for summary judgment. ⁸

The prison officials filed a motion seeking dismissal for failure to state a claim or in the alternative, summary judgment in their favor. In support of the motion they attached a brief which included various evidentiary Rule 13, 12 O.S.1991, Ch. 2 app., Rules for the District Courts, in clear and mandatory language requires that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment be allowed at least 15 days to respond to the motion and to provide evidentiary materials which would support a denial of the motion. ¹² Instead, the trial court entered its order dismissing the appellant's cause seven days after the appellees' filed their motion. It is clear from Washington's motion for an extension of time that he intended to oppose the prison officials' motion. The trial court erred when it failed to give Washington a reasonable opportunity to respond as required by 12 O.S.1991 § 2012 and Rule 13, 12 O.S.1991, Ch. 2 app., Rules for the District Courts. ¹³

                materials which were outside of the pleadings and which cited legal authority in support of their position. 9  These matters were not excluded by the trial court. 10  Consequently, under 12 O.S.1991 § 2012, the summary judgment procedure must be used. 11
                

Even assuming arguendo, that the trial court excluded all of the matters which were outside of the pleading, and that it considered the appellees' motion as one for dismissal, we find that the appellant's cause was dismissed prematurely because not all of his claims appear to be frivolous on their face or without merit. ¹⁴ Accordingly, the trial

court's order is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to allow the appellant a reasonable opportunity in which to respond to the appellees' motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment and to present proof of his allegations.

CONCLUSION

Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2012, mandates that: 1) when a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted includes matters outside the pleadings and those matters are not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment; and 2) all parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by the rules for summary judgment. ¹⁵ Rule 13, 12 O.S.1991, Ch. 2 app., Rules for the District Courts, in clear and mandatory language requires that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment be allowed at least 15 days to respond to the motion and to provide evidentiary materials which would support a denial of the motion. ¹⁶

Because the appellees' motion included matters outside of the pleadings and these matters were considered by the trial court, the trial court erred when it dismissed the appellant's cause without allowing him the opportunity to respond to the appellees' motion. Even assuming arguendo, that the trial court excluded all of the matters which were outside the pleadings and considered the appellees' motion as one for dismissal, we find that the appellant's cause was dismissed prematurely because not all of his claims appear to be frivolous on their face or without merit. ¹⁷

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF APPEALS OPINION

VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED.

ALMA WILSON, C.J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS, HARGRAVE, OPALA and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.

HODGES, WATT, JJ., dissent.

WATT, Justice, dissenting:

Because the Petition for Certiorari was not timely filed, this Court was without jurisdiction to reach the merits as the majority opinion does today. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

1 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for deprivation of rights established by the Constitution or other laws which may be heard by the courts of this state. Willbourn v. City of Tulsa, 721 P.2d 803, 805 (Okla.1986). Even in the absence of a § 1983 claim, state courts review alleged violations of federal constitutional rights which occur within our borders if the parties are subject to state court jurisdiction. Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, 630 P.2d 772, 775-76 (Okla.1981).

2 Originally, the appellant initiated his lawsuit in August of 1993, and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 22, 1994. Subsequently, Washington attempted to supplement his pleadings to add another claim against additional prison officials. On December 14, 1994, the trial court allowed Washington to amend his petition to include all of the elements of his original petition and all supplemental matters that he wished to include. The trial court gave the prison officials 30 days after the petition had been filed to respond. It also found that any previous motions concerning discovery or motions to dismiss would be considered moot, and that the parties could file such motions...