Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter

• Decision Date: 19 January 1944
• Citation: 35 A.2d 837,130 Conn. 494
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WATERBURY TRUST CO. v. PORTER et al.

130 Conn. 494

35 A.2d 837

WATERBURY TRUST CO.

v.PORTER et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 19, 1944.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; McEvoy, Judge.

Action by the Waterbury Trust Company, trustee of a trust provided in the will of David G. Porter, deceased, against Nathan T. Porter, City of Waterbury, Francis A. Pallotti, Attorney General of the state, and others, for a declaratory judgment as to the rights and duties of the plaintiff as trustee. From judgment entered, the plaintiff, the Attorney General and City of Waterbury filed a joint appeal. On motion to erase the appeal of the plaintiff and the City of Waterbury.

Motion denied as regards the plaintiff but granted as regards the City of Waterbury.

Charles M. Lyman, of New Haven, and John M. Compley, of Stamford, for appellees, in favor of motion.

Walter F. Torrance, of Waterbury, for appellant, against motion.

Maurice T. Healey, of Waterbury, for appellant City of Waterbury, against motion.

Harry L. Brooks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Attorney General of state.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, now the sole trustee of a trust provided in the will of David G. Porter, who died in 1905, brought this action, originally or subsequently making defendant all the known heirs-at-law of Mr. Porter, the city of Waterbury and Francis A. Pallotti, the attorney general of the state. The testator directed that when the fund, augmented by possible donations from other sources, should be deemed sufficient, trustees named by him were to establish a school or college on a piece of land in Waterbury forming a part of the trust. The complaint recited that the fund was and in the absence of such donations would for many years be insufficient to carry out the intent of the testator; that the General Assembly had appropriated money for a trade school in Waterbury, its use conditioned upon provision by the city of Waterbury of a proper building and a substantial sum toward the expense of maintaining the school; that the mayor of the city had requested the trustee to turn the fund in its hands over to the proper authorities to be used in connection with the establishment of a trade school; and that the plaintiff had been advised that it could not do this in safety to itself and the rights and interests of others without the advice of the court. The complaint asked an adjudication of the questions raised by this request and a decree advising the plaintiff as to its rights, duties, powers and authority, so that it could execute and administer the trust lawfully and with safety to itself. Certain of the heirs, answering the complaint, claimed that the trust was void. The trial court decided that the fund could not lawfully be used for the suggested purpose, that the trust was void and that the property should be distributed as intestate. From that decision, on September 14, 1943, the plaintiff, the attorney general and the city of Waterbury filed a joint appeal. The appellees made a motion in this court to erase the appeal as regards the plaintiff and the city on the ground that neither could be ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of our statute establishing the right of appeal to this court. General Statutes, § 5689, amended, Supp.1943, § 728g.

Yudkin v. Gates, 60 Conn. 426, 22 A. 776, was an action of habeas corpus against a sheriff to secure the release of the plaintiff, held by the defendant on a mittimus; the plaintiff obtained a judgment in his favor and the defendant sheriff filed an appeal. The plaintiff moved to dismiss it on the ground that the sheriff could not be aggrieved by the order. The court denied the motion, saying (page 427 of 60 Conn., page 776 of 22 A.): ‘The statute referred to provides that, if either party thinks himself aggrieved, he may appeal. This language plainly expresses what we should hold to be the rule had the words ‘thinks himself’ been omitted, namely, that the right to appeal depends upon the fact of being a party, not upon whether it shall finally be determined that the decision is one by which he is aggrieved. Any other construction would involve the decision of the question raised, in a preliminary hearing as to whether it could be raised.' See also Guarantee Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Philadelphia, R. & N. E. R. Co., 69 Conn. 709, 715, 38 A. 792, 38 L.R.A. 804; McWilliams v. Morton, 97 Conn. 514, 518, 117 A. 557; Miner v. Marsh, 101 Conn. 733, 127 A. 513.

On the other hand, in Re Premier Cycle Mfg. Co., 70 Conn. 473, 39 A. 800, a receiver appealed from a judgment removing him from office and, while we considered the substantial question arising in the proceeding, we said (page 479 of 70 Conn., page 801 of 39 A.): ‘In many matters, a receiver may be treated as representing those entitled to the fruits of the action in which he is appointed, even for purposes of appeal from final orders in interlocutory proceedings. * * * But it would be an inadmissible extension of this doctrine to allow him to except, in his representative capacity and at the expense of the estate, to his removal from office.’ See Avery's Appeal, 117 Conn. 201, 167 A. 544, 88 A.L.R. 1154; Spencer's Appeal, 122 Conn. 327, 188 A. 881; Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Malcolm-Smith, 129 Conn. 67, 69, 26 A.2d 234, 140 A.L.R. 805. In Rollins v. Holcomb, 112 Conn. 664, 190 A. 260, certain defendants in a foreclosure action sought to appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff mortgagee, Rollins; it appeared that pending the disposition of an appeal from that judgment an action to foreclose a mortgage on the same premises prior in right to that of Rollins had gone to judgment; Rollins as a subsequent incumbrancer was a party defendant; he redeemed, and so secured title to the premises regardless of the final disposition of the action he had brought; the appeal in that action was dismissed; and the opinion states (page 666 of 122 Conn., page 261 of 190 A.): ‘So, as no practical benefit could follow from the determination of the questions sought to be raised by the appeal, it is not incumbent upon us to decide them.’

It is a fundamental concept of judicial administration that no person is entitled to set the machinery of the courts into operation unless for the purpose of obtaining redress for an injury he has suffered or to prevent an injury he may suffer, either in an individual or representative capacity. 47 C.J. 21, § 30. There is no reason why this principle is not applicable to the invocation of...