Waterman v. Nashua-Plainfield Community School Dt.
| Decision Date | 15 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-CV-2029-LRR.,06-CV-2029-LRR. |
| Citation | 446 F.Supp.2d 1018 |
| Parties | Karen WATERMAN, Plaintiff, v. NASHUA-PLAINFIELD COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
James L. Sayre, James L. Sayre, P.C., Clive, IA, for Plaintiff.
Beth E. Hansen, Swisher & Cohrt, PLC, Waterloo, IA, for Defendant.
The matter before the court is Defendant Nashua—Plainfield Community School District's Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") (docket no. 5).
On May 1, 2006, Plaintiff Karen Waterman filed a five-count1 Complaint against Defendant Nashua—Plainfield Community School District ("Nashua"). In the Complaint, Waterman claims (1) breach of contract; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) denial of equal protection; (4) failure to pay wages and (5) denial of due process. Waterman brought the equal protection and due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On June 16, 2006, Nashua filed the instant Motion. On June 28, 2006, Waterman filed a Resistance. On June 30, 2006, Nashua filed a Reply.
Neither party has requested oral argument on the Motion. The court concludes oral argument is not necessary and thus turns to consider the Motion.
The court finds that, at the present time, it has subject matter jurisdiction over Waterman's Complaint. The court has jurisdiction over Waterman's federal equal protection and due process claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state law claims. See id. § 1367(a) (). But see id. § 1367(c) ().
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the district court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In assessing Nashua's Motion, the court is required to view the allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Waterman, the nonmoving party. In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2005). The court must accept all the factual allegations in Waterman's Complaint as true. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d at 917. The court may "dismiss the case only when it appears beyond [a] doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d at 917 (internal quotations omitted). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the [plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Thus, "as a practical matter, [dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted] only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show, on the face of the [C]omplaint, that there is some insuperable bar to relief." Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Frey v. Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir.1995)).
Accepting the allegations in Waterman's Complaint as true and affording her all reasonable inferences, for purposes of the instant Motion the facts are these:
From 1963 to 2002, Nashua employed Waterman as a teacher under a written contract, pursuant to Iowa Code § 279.13. During the 2001-2002 school year, Nashua paid Waterman a salary of $39,132.
On January 28, 2002, Nashua's Board of Directors ("Board") passed a new policy called the "One Year Early Retirement Program" ("Early Retirement Program"). Under the Early Retirement Program, eligible employees could elect to retire early and receive a lump-sum payment of eighty percent of their salary for the 2001-2002 school year or "leave . . . [such] moneys on account with [Nashua] and apply it toward future health insurance costs up to the age of sixty-five ." If the lump-sum option was chosen, Nashua agreed to make the payment to the employee on either July 20, 2002 or February 20, 2003. An eligible employee had to meet two requirements: the employee had to (1) be between the ages of 55 and 60 on June 1, 2002 and (2) have worked for Nashua for fifteen years by that date. Eligible employees desiring to participate in the Early Retirement Program were required to submit an application to Nashua's Superintendent on or before February 15, 2002.
On an unspecified date between January 28, 2002 and February 15, 2002, Waterman timely applied for the Early Retirement Program and elected to receive a lump-sump payment of eighty percent of her salary for the 2001-02 school year. Eighty percent of Waterman's salary is $31,305.60.
On February 28, 2002, Nashua's Superintendent informed Waterman that she did not qualify for the Early Retirement Program, because she turned sixty-years-old before June 1, 2002. Waterman qualified for the Early Retirement Program in all respects except for her age.
On the same date, Waterman submitted a letter of retirement and resignation to the Board. The retirement and resignation was effective at the conclusion of the 2001-2002 school year. On the same date, the Board accepted Waterman's retirement and resignation.
The first count in the Complaint alleges breach of contract. Waterman alleges that the Early Retirement Program is part of a unilateral written contract between Waterman and Nashua. Waterman contends any limitation on the maximum age of eligible employees for the Early Retirement Program is an illegal term that the court cannot enforce. Specifically, Waterman contends the age limitation violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. See, e.g., Jankovitz v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 421 F.3d 649, 655 (8th Cir.2005) (). Therefore, Waterman concludes that Nashua's failure to allow Waterman to participate in the Early Retirement Program constituted a breach of contract. Waterman claims she is entitled to damages equal to eighty percent of her base salary for the 2001-2002 school year.
Nashua does not dispute that the ADEA renders the age limitation in the Early Retirement Plan illegal. Rather, Nashua claims that Waterman's breach of contract claim must be dismissed because she did not exhaust the administrative remedies required by the ADEA or the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), Iowa Code § 216.1 et seq., or initiate certiorari proceedings in state district court pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1402.
Under Iowa law, Waterman must prove the following five elements to succeed on her breach of contract claim:
(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the terms and conditions of the contract; (3) that [plaintiff] has performed all the terms and conditions required under the contract; (4) [that] defendant[ ] breach[ed] ... the contract in some particular way; and (5) that plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the breach.
Molo Oil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 222, 224 (Iowa 1998) (citing Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Iowa 1993)). A "unilateral contract" exists where "an offeror mak[es] a promise and an offeree render[s] some performance." Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Iowa 1995) (citations omitted). Contract terms that are contrary to the public policy as expressed in a statute are unenforceable. See, e.g., Bruton v. Ames Cmty. Sch. Dist., 291 N.W.2d 351, 356-57 (Iowa 1980) (); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178(1) (1977) ().
The Complaint alleges that the Early Retirement Program is part of a unilateral contract between Waterman and Nashua. Furthermore, Waterman alleges she performed all of the legal terms and conditions of the contract, Nashua failed to pay her a lump-sum payment in July of 2002 or February of 2003 and, as a consequence, she suffered damages. Plaintiff has correctly recited the five elements for a breach of contract claim in her Complaint. Mob() Oil, 578 N.W.2d at 224. Accordingly, the court holds that Waterman has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
...their Rule 23 class action because the IWPCL provides for a two-year statute of limitations. See Waterman v. Nashua-Plainfield Cmty. School Dist., 446 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1027 (N.D.Iowa 2006) ("The statute of limitations for an IWPCL action is two years from the time the action accrues." (citin......
-
Williams v. Hawkeye Community College
...applied a two-year statute of limitations to various § 1983 claims in Iowa. See, e.g., Waterman v. Nashua-Plainfield Cmty. Sch. Dist., 446 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1025-26 (N.D.Iowa 2006) (holding that a § 1983 action asserting violations of equal protection and due process rights under the federal ......
-
Hood v. Upah
...two years when such claims arise out of the original act and not a subsequent amendment thereto); Waterman v. Nashua-Plainfield Cmty. Sch. Dist., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1026 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (same). As previously noted, Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint purports to state a claim for a F......