Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co.
Decision Date | 04 December 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 41,41 |
Citation | 118 Lab.Cas.P 56,789 S.W.2d 538 |
Parties | Charles Howard WATSON and Gilbert Garner Barnett, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. CLEVELAND CHAIR COMPANY, Defendant/Appellant. 789 S.W.2d 538, 118 Lab.Cas. P 56,538, 4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 1779 |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Denny E. Mobbs, Cleveland, Ind., for defendant, appellant.
R. Jerome Shepherd, Cleveland, Ind., for plaintiffs, appellees.
Issues are raised in this case involving federal preemption under the Commercial Motor Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.App. 2301, et seq.; State Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims under the provisions of the Act, and the viability of a State cause of action for the retaliatory discharge of at-will employees.
Plaintiffs, Charles Howard Watson and Gilbert Garner Barnett, filed a complaint against defendant, Cleveland Chair Company, alleging that their discharge as employee truck drivers was precipitated because they attempted to excuse themselves from a dinner given by defendant due to prior arrangements they had made to have dinner elsewhere. It was further alleged that the reasons given for their discharge by the defendant were fraudulent and they were actually fired as a result of the culmination of bad relations between the parties caused by the wrongful, illegal and intentional acts set out in their complaint. They asserted that separation notices furnished by the defendants were defamatory and injured them in their reputations and ability to obtain other employment by charging plaintiffs were insubordinate, all in violation of T.C.A. Sec. 50-7-711, the penal statute setting penalties for misrepresentation to prevent benefit payments or to evade contribution liability under the Employment Security Law.
The complaint further charged that defendants made unreasonable and unconscionable demands upon plaintiffs, at the peril of discharge, to break the speed laws and regulations of the several states and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of Transportation as relative to rest and speed and to coerce them into falsifying trip logs, all of which constituted the tort of outrageous conduct. They say further they were discharged for refusal to socialize, voicing approval of a possible affiliation with a union and for complaining about being forced to drive illegally, all in violation of public policy. As a result of the foregoing related actions plaintiffs allege they suffered emotional distress.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a supporting affidavit, asserting there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion asserted that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The accompanying affidavit of William Ronald Jackson, President of Cleveland Chair Company, confirmed that plaintiffs were employed by it as truck drivers, averred they were terminated for insubordination, unacceptable attitude and inappropriate language and stated they were employees at-will.
Plaintiff Barnett filed an opposing affidavit on behalf of himself and plaintiff Watson conceding that one of the chief grievances defendant had against them was that each had tampered with the governing mechanism on the trucks driven by them to increase the speed on the vehicle which had been set at 62 mph. It alleged that the governing device was adjusted by plaintiffs because the company was forcing its drivers to run in excess of ten (10) hours [a day] following eight (8) hours off duty and more than sixty (60) hours in any seven (7) consecutive days in violation of the maximum driving and off duty time set out in Federal Highway Administration Regulations 395.3, 392.6, 395.8(a)(3), 392.3 and 398.4(c), rules promulgated under U.S.C. Title 49, Sec. 301 et seq. That defendant's insistence upon plaintiffs breaking Federal Highway Administration regulations constituted an illegal violation of Regulations 392.6 (schedules to conform with speed limits) and 391.7 (aiding and abetting). The affiant further deposed that defendant, through its agents, forced plaintiffs to falsify log entries in order to meet their running demands in violation of Sec. 395.8(a)(b) which constituted further illegal acts by the carrier and the driver. It was averred that defendant willfully and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon its drivers to force them into violating the subject regulations of the Federal Highway Administration.
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint upon defendant's motion and the evidence introduced by affidavit. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals, noted the long standing rule in this State that an employee at-will can be discharged for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong without being guilty of a legal wrong. Payne v. Western and Atlantic Railroad Company, 81 Tenn. (13 Lee), 507 (1884); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn.App.1981). They recognized the only exception this Court has made to that rule. In Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Company, 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn.1984), the Court held that, (Citations omitted). Citing an unreported opinion of that court, as well as various decisions from other jurisdictions, the intermediate court found that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge arises when an at-will employee is terminated solely for refusing to participate, continue to participate, or remain silent about illegal activities.
They reasoned that although there is strong public policy in Tennessee and apparently throughout the south for not recognizing exceptions to the employment at-will rule they did not believe a further exception to the rule would adversely affect the quality of the lives of our citizens but rather would remove unfortunate employees from the untenable position of having to violate the law or lose their means of support for themselves and their family. They opined that the adoption of a further exception would promote the overriding public policy that the people of this State should be encouraged to be law-abiding citizens.
We agree in principle with the expressed views of the lower court, however we are of the opinion that only in the most extraordinary circumstances should the courts of this State impose their judgment in an area which, in the first instance, is clearly a legislative function. A definitive statement on the authority of the courts to determine public policy can be found in Nashville Ry. and Light Co. v. Lawson, 144 Tenn. 78, 91, 229 S.W. 741 (1920), citing from License Tax Case, 5 Wall, 469, 18 L.Ed. 497:
In Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 747 (Tenn.1987) the Court stated the principle in these words:
Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 475-476, 239 S.W. 767, 768 (1921) (citation omitted). See also Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300, 311-312, 140 S.W.2d 1088, 1093 (1940).
For the Court to find that no public policy prevents the continuing development of the common law is wholly different from positively declaring the public policy of the State. Cf. Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn.1987); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn.1983); Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn.1983). This observation is especially pertinent to any case in which the Court must determine which of several competing public policies represents the most compelling and controlling public policy for this State. The Court simply does not function as a forum for resolution of such generalized public issues; rather, it must decide the legal...
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