Watson-Wojewski v. Wojewski

• Decision Date: 11 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 21083.,21083.
• Citation: 2000 SD 132,617 N.W.2d 666
• Parties: Leslie Tyler WATSON-WOJEWSKI, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Paul A. WOJEWSKI, M.D., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

617 N.W.2d 666

2000 SD 132

Leslie Tyler WATSON-WOJEWSKI, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Paul A. WOJEWSKI, M.D., Defendant and Appellant.

No. 21083.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued June 1, 2000.

Decided October 11, 2000.

Linda Lea M. Viken of Viken, Viken, Pechota, Leach & Dewell, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

Joseph M. Butler of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant.

JAMES W. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge

[¶ 1.] Paul Wojewski appeals a circuit court order which increased his child support obligation and imposed other obligations not expressly mandated by the South Dakota child support statutes. Paul also contends that in setting child support, the circuit court erroneously excluded the potential value of his ex-wife's liquid assets from her gross income. We reverse and remand for further findings.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Paul Wojewski (Paul) is a successful cardiac surgeon and Leslie Tyler Watson-Wojewski (Tyler) is a former news anchor who currently operates a daycare business. They met and married in 1988 and had one child, John Paul. John Paul was approximately four and a half years old at the time of the modification order at issue.

[¶ 3.] Beginning in July 1996, Paul suffered a psychotic episode caused by a bipolar condition. During this time, he told Tyler he wanted a divorce, chartered a jet to California and engaged in other bizarre behavior. Paul eventually received medical treatment for his condition and his psychotic episode was brought under control in late October 1996. Since this time, Paul has consistently taken his medication and received psychological assistance to keep his bipolar condition under control.

[¶ 4.] Prior to Paul's manic episode, he was highly regarded as a surgeon and his income ranged from approximately $40,000 to $70,000 monthly. After the episode, his hospital privileges were taken away and he was unable to practice his profession for approximately one year. After treatment, he began the process of rebuilding his medical practice, earning back his reputation as a surgeon and increasing his income to his pre-illness level.

[¶ 5.] The divorce trial was held before the Honorable Merton B. Tice, Jr., on August 12 through 16, 1997. On December 12, 1997, Paul and Tyler entered into a post trial stipulation and agreement in which Tyler waived any alimony claim in exchange for a negotiated property settlement. On the same date, Judge Tice signed the judgement and decree of divorce. This decree incorporated the post trial stipulation. In addition, Tyler was given primary physical custody of John Paul and Paul was granted reasonable visitation. The decree also ordered Paul to pay $2000 per month child support subject to six month reviews until Paul had reestablished his practice and his pre-illness income level.

[¶ 6.] On September 14, 1998, Tyler filed a motion for review of child support. She alleged that she had difficulty meeting the actual needs of John Paul which included a maintenance of his pre-divorce standard of living. She also argued that because Paul's income had greatly increased since the time of the original child support order, John Paul's standard of living would have likewise increased. The motion was tried before Judge Tice on January 19 and 20, 1999.

[¶ 7.] The circuit court issued its findings on Tyler's motion on May 27, 1999 and set Paul's monthly child support amount at $4,200. The court found that Paul's gross income at the time of the hearing was $74,267 a month with a child support net of $46,501.¹ The court also determined that Tyler's gross income at the time of the hearing was $2,948 per month with a child support net of $2,367.

[¶ 8.] When determining Tyler's gross income, the court included her interest and capital gain income from an individual investment account and the income from her daycare. The court did not include potential income from certain limited partnership interests.

[¶ 9.] The court also ordered payments for John Paul's education. It required Paul to pay 90 per cent of the ongoing cost of private schooling for John Paul. It also ordered Paul to deposit $400 per month into an account established exclusively for John Paul's post high school education.

[¶ 10.] Finally, the court declared that it had taken Paul's air travel costs for visitation² into account when setting the $4,200 per month child support award. Therefore, the court ordered Paul to pay Tyler $345 for any month he did not exercise visitation.

[¶ 11.] Additional facts will be discussed as they relate to particular issues.

[¶ 12.] Paul appeals four issues:

Whether the circuit court considered both the actual needs and standard of living of the child under SDCL 25-7-6.9 when setting child support based on a combined net income above the child support schedule?

Whether the circuit court should have included the potential income from and appreciation in value of Tyler's liquid assets when calculating her monthly net income for child support purposes under SDCL 25-7-6.3?

Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering Paul to pay $400 per month into a special account to be used for John Paul's post minority college education?

Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering Paul to reimburse Tyler $345 for every month he did not travel from Rapid City to Houston to visit John Paul?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 13.] We first note the standard of review for each issue presented. We review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. To overturn the circuit court's findings, this Court must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Billion v. Billion, 1996 SD 101, ¶ 13, 553 N.W.2d 226, 230 (citing Parsons v. Parsons, 490 N.W.2d 733, 736 (S.D.1992) (Parsons II).) Questions of law are fully reviewable. Hendricksen v. Harris, 1999 SD 130, ¶ 7, 600 N.W.2d 180, 181.

[¶ 14.] This Court will not disturb a child support award unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Steffens v. Peterson, 503 N.W.2d 254, 257 (S.D.1993). Abuse of discretion is "`a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.'" Billion, 1996 SD 101 at ¶ 14, 553 N.W.2d at 230 (quoting Kanta v. Kanta, 479 N.W.2d 505, 507 (S.D.1991)). This Court does not determine whether it would have made the ruling in question, but rather "whether a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion." Id. (citing Nelson v. Nelson, 454 N.W.2d 533, 534 (S.D.1990)).

DECISION

ISSUE ONE

[¶ 15.] Whether the circuit court considered both the actual needs and standard of living of the child under SDCL 25-7-6.9 when setting child support based on a combined net income above the child support schedule?

[¶ 16.] Paul argues that the monthly $4,200 child support award was excessive under the evidence and applicable law.³ Paul claims that: (1) the circuit court considered expenses which related solely to Tyler's needs; and (2) the circuit court failed to consider the actual needs of the child as required by SDCL 25-7-6.9.⁴ Paul asserts, therefore, that part of the child support award must be either de facto alimony or a pre-distribution of Paul's estate.

[¶ 17.] In order to address these contentions, we must look to the circuit court's findings of fact on the child support calculation. A main purpose of such findings is "to aid the appellate court in reviewing the basis for the trial court's decision[.]" Heikkila v. Carver, 416 N.W.2d 591, 592 (S.D.1987) (citing J. Moore & J. Lucas, 5A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 52.06[1] (1987) and C. Wright & A. Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571 (1971)). Therefore, "[i]t is for the trial court to make adequate findings to enable us to make a meaningful review." Jensen v. Weyrens, 474 N.W.2d 261, 266 (S.D.1991) (Sabers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In child support cases, we must have sufficient findings of fact to "make the appropriate calculations and render a meaningful review[.]" Grunewaldt v. Bisson, 494 N.W.2d 193, 195 (S.D.1992).⁵

[¶ 18.] In this case, there were very limited findings on the child support calculation. The circuit court found that Paul's child support net was $46,501 per month and that Tyler's child support net was $2,367 per month. The court also concluded that "the proportion of the parents' child support income is 90% for [Paul] and 10% for [Tyler]." In addition, the court mentioned Tyler's budget, which showed monthly expenses over $14,000, but it did not make specific findings about which of these budget items were allowed.

[¶ 19.] These limited findings do not illustrate how the circuit court calculated the $4,200 per month child support award. Therefore, we are unable to "make the appropriate calculations and render a meaningful review." Id. As a result, we must reverse and remand to the circuit court for sufficient findings on the child support figure to allow us meaningful review of Paul's contentions. See Grode v. Grode, 1996 SD 15, ¶ 29, 543 N.W.2d 795, 803 (failure to make adequate findings constitutes reversible error).

[¶ 20.] After reviewing Tyler's budget, however, we are compelled to provide some guidance to the circuit court on remand. The first point of guidance concerns any items of Tyler's budget which relate solely to her needs. Under SDCL 25-7-6.9, the trial court is to establish child support "at an appropriate level, taking into account the actual needs and standard of living of the child." SDCL 25-7-6.9 (emphasis added). The custodial parent has the burden of proving his or her claimed expenses reflect the child's needs and standard of living. Ochs v. Nelson, 538 N.W.2d 527, 530 (S.D.1995) (citing Jones v. Jones, 472 N.W.2d 782, 785 (S.D. 1991)).

[¶ 21.] In regard to this test, we have stated that "[t]he indirect financial...