Webb v. State, No. 06-03-00099-CR (Tex. App. 4/29/2004)
| Decision Date | 29 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-03-00099-CR,06-03-00099-CR |
| Parties | MICHAEL TODD WEBB, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 336th Judicial District Court, Fannin County, Texas, Trial Court No. 20602.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
Michael Todd Webb appeals his conviction by jury trial of possession of a controlled substance, specifically methamphetamine in an amount of less than one gram. The jury assessed punishment at two years' imprisonment. On appeal, Webb contends 1) the trial court erred in admitting his oral statement claiming possession of the substance, 2) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to sustain a conviction, and 3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to challenge the admissibility of the controlled substance. We affirm.
On or about December 7, 2002, Officer William Abbott of the Bonham Police Department stopped Webb for operating a vehicle with only one headlight. During the investigation of the traffic offense, Webb granted consent to search his vehicle. Abbott discovered a plastic bag containing trace amounts of methamphetamine in a closed container on the seat of the vehicle. When none of the three occupants of the vehicle would admit ownership, Abbott informed all three occupants they were under arrest. At this point, Webb admitted to possession of the substance. Abbott placed Webb under arrest and released the truck into the custody of Webb's girlfriend, who was one of the passengers.
In his first point of error, Webb contends his oral statement in which he claimed ownership of the substance should not have been admitted because it was the result of a custodial interrogation. Webb objected to the admission of the statement because he was in custody at the time it was made and had not received the mandatory admonishments. Webb argues that the unrecorded statement was admitted in violation of Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Miranda. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon Supp. 2004); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Webb's argument fails because the statements do not stem from a custodial interrogation.
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The general rule is that an appellate court should afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court's fact-findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We are also to afford such deference to a trial court's ruling on "application of law to fact questions," also known as "mixed questions of law and fact," if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856. We may review de novo those questions not turning on credibility and demeanor. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the statements must "stem from custodial interrogation" for the procedural safeguards of Miranda to apply. R.I. v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). Miranda defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 386 U.S. at 444. Interrogation must be express questioning or its functional equivalent. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. The functional equivalent of express questioning is a practice that "police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect." Id. at 301.
The first issue in determining whether the statement stems from a custodial interrogation is whether Webb was in custody. The United States Supreme Court has held that the typical traffic stop does not constitute custody for the purposes of Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). Whether a person is in "custody" depends on whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe his or her freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The subjective intent of the law enforcement officials is irrelevant unless that intent is somehow communicated or otherwise manifested to the suspect. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 319 (1994). A determination of custody should be based entirely on objective circumstances. Dowhitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Dowhitt outlined four general situations which may constitute custody: 1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way, 2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect he or she cannot leave, 3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe his or her freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and 4) when there is manifestation of probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect he or she is free to leave. Id. at 255. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that, unlike the first three situations, the fourth situation does not automatically establish custody, but rather must be considered with other circumstances to determine whether the combined effect would lead a reasonable person to believe he or she is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest. Id.
Whether an individual was under arrest requires consideration of the degree of the restriction or restraint to distinguish an arrest from other detentions. Article 15.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a] person is arrested when he has been actually placed under restraint or taken into custody." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.22 (Vernon 1977). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted the above statute to require consideration of the degree of the restriction or restraint to distinguish an arrest from other detentions. See Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 411-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), modified sub silentio, Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The relevant inquiry according to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is whether "appellant had been restricted or restrained in his liberty to such a degree as to constitute an arrest." Id. at 412. An "arrest" occurs "when a person's liberty of movement is successfully restricted or restrained, whether this is achieved by an officer's physical force or the suspect's submission to the officer's authority." Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 773. In Medford, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held an arrest is complete only if "a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest." Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 773 (citing United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1988)). The subjective intent of either the police officer or the defendant is irrelevant. Vicioso v. State, 54 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 915 (2002); see Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 773; cf. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (). Factors which Texas courts have considered include whether the officer actually undertakes an investigation,1 the accused is handcuffed,2 the accused is detained at gunpoint,3 the number of police which far outnumber the citizens,4 the use of threatening language,5 the transporting of the accused to another location,6 the blocking of the accused's vehicle,7 and the use of other physical force.8
Abbott testified that, after he discovered the plastic bag, he asked Webb and the passengers who it belonged to. Abbott testified one of the suspects responded that "it didn't belong to any of them." Abbott then had them place their hands on the rear of the pickup truck and advised them he was placing them all under arrest. At this point, Webb admitted ownership of the narcotics. Abbott placed Webb under arrest.
We must look at the totality of the circumstances and determine whether Webb's freedom of movement was restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest at the time of the interrogation. Several jurisdictions have held that asking a suspect to identify evidence as his or her property is interrogation. United States v. Corbin, 494 F. Supp. 244 (M.D.N.C. 1980) (gun); Lornitis v. State, 394 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (luggage with marihuana); People v. Jordan, 413 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("grassy substance"). However, Webb was not in custody at the time Abbott inquired as to the ownership of the drugs. Although Abbott had probable cause at the time he inquired as to the ownership of the drugs,9 the circumstances of the detention indicate Webb was not restricted or restrained in his liberty to such a degree as that a reasonable person would have believed he or she was under arrest. Abbott did not inform the occupants he had probable cause to arrest all of them before inquiring into the ownership of the drugs. Further, Abbott did not restrain any of the occupants in any degree greater than a typical traffic stop detention until he ordered them to place their hands on the back of the truck and informed them of the arrest. This was after the inquiry as to the ownership of the drugs. Therefore, at the point of Abbott's inquiry, Webb was not in custody. It was not until the officer ordered all three suspects to place their hands on the back of the truck...
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