Weed v. Sidewinder Drilling, Inc.

Decision Date29 March 2017
Docket NumberCivil Action No. H–14–1658
Citation245 F.Supp.3d 826
Parties Jason WEED, Plaintiff, v. SIDEWINDER DRILLING, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Melissa Garcia Martin, Lionel Martin, Garcia–Martin & Martin PC, Sugar Land, TX, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan Clark LaMendola, Brian Joseph Sawyer, Cobb Martinez Woodward PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MELINDA HARMON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court in the above referenced cause, alleging disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. , is Defendant Sidewinder Drilling, Inc.'s ("Sidewinder's") motion for summary judgment (instrument # 24).

In his response (# 31 at p.11 n.84) to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff Jason Weed ("Weed") states that he is nonsuiting his accommodation claim with prejudice, so the Court dismisses it with prejudice.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the court determines that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant must offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant's claim or point out the absence of evidence supporting essential elements of the nonmovant's claim; the movant may, but does not have to, negate the elements of the nonmovant's case to prevail on summary judgment." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation , 497 U.S. 871, 885, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ; Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc. , 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the movant meets its burden and points out an absence of evidence to prove an essential element of the nonmovant's case on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant must then present competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of its claim and to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board , 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmovant may not rely merely on allegations, denials in a pleading or unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning every element of its cause(s) of action. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc. , 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).

Conclusory allegations unsupported by evidence will not preclude summary judgment. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board , 40 F.3d at 713 ; Eason v. Thaler , 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). " [T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment....’ " State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman , 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Nor is the ‘mere scintilla of evidence’ sufficient; ‘there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’ " Id. quoting Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Fifth Circuit requires the nonmovant to submit " ‘significant probative evidence.’ " Id. quoting In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig. , 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1978), and citing Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Cajun Electric Power Co–Op. , 799 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd. , 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Allegations in a plaintiff's complaint are not evidence. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ. , 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[P]leadings are not summary judgment evidence."); Johnston v. City of Houston, Tex., 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995) (for the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, "only evidence—not argument, not facts in the complaint—will satisfy' the burden."), citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westown e Assoc. , 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmovant must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Giles v. General Elec. Co. , 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001), citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The court must consider all evidence and draw all inferences from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board , 40 F.3d at 712–13. The Court may not make credibility determinations. Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009), citing Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center , 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).

Complaint's Factual Allegations

According to his conclusory complaint, Weed, age 31 when this suit was filed on June 13, 2014, began working for Sidewinder in June 2012, initially in Houston building an oil rig, and from August 29, 2012 until February 2013 as a Derrick Hand 21 on a rig in Williston, North Dakota. On February 16, 2013, on a bathroom break during his shift, Weed noticed blood in his urine.2 Weed notified his supervisor, rig manager Steven Hayes ("Hayes"), who purportedly walked away without acknowledging Weed's concern. A safety hand, Joshua Ransonet ("Ransonet"), was called, and he took Weed to the emergency room at Mercy Medical Center in Williston, North Dakota. Weed and the safety hand were told by the doctor that Weed had a large mass on his kidney and should have a CAT scan

. The doctor told Weed to call a neurologist on Monday. The safety, who was in communication with Hayes throughout this period, asked the doctor if Weed could return to work. Weed was given permission by the physician to return to the oil rig, provided that Weed be placed on light duty.

The next day Weed gave Hayes a letter from the doctor stating that Weed was to be restricted to light duty. Weed told Hayes that the doctor had told him that the mass on Weed's kidney could be cancer

. Weed was placed on light duty on February 17 and 18, 2013, teaching and supervising another Derrick Hand to do his job. On February 18, 2013 Hayes terminated Weed from working on the rig, allegedly for overflowing the trip tank and spilling fifteen barrels of mud that day when he changed the trip out valves. Weed objects that he did not change any trip out valves because it was not his responsibility when he was on light duty. Instead he was assigned to run the TM80.3 Even though Sidewinder was aware that Weed was not responsible for the mud spill, Weed claims that Sidewinder terminated him because it was known Weed had cancer or was perceived by Sidewinder to have cancer. Weed went home to Delta, Colorado and underwent a CAT scan, which confirmed that the large mass on his kidney was cancer and that it was likely he would have to undergo surgery. Subsequently he had his kidney removed.

Weed alleges that Sidewinder discriminated against him on the basis of his disability or perceived disability with malice or reckless indifference by terminating him from his job. Sidewinder also allegedly retaliated against him. Weed asserts that based on information and belief, similarly situated employees at Sidewinder were treated differently, and that Weed suffered damages as a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct.

Weed claims that he is a person with a disability as defined by the ADA: one who has the requisite skill, education, experience and other job-related requirements necessary to perform with or without accommodation the essential functions of his job at the time of termination. Weed claims he was disabled or viewed as disabled by Sidewinder. While employed by Sidewinder, Weed was a "qualified individual with a disability," was a qualified individual with a record of disability, and/or was regarded by Defendant as a person with a disability under the ADA. Weed claims he was terminated as a direct result of his disability or perceived disability, a physical impairment that limited a major life activity under the statute, and/or perceived disability.

Sidewinder's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief (# 24 & 25)

Sidewinder argues that Weed was a "subpar employee" whose incompetence resulted in "two careless and nearly identical mistakes that caused spills of oil-based mud." # 25 at p. 1. It claimed that such a spill could harm the health and safety of employees, risk damage to the rig equipment, and cause environmental contamination. The first spill occurred in November 2012, and Weed was given oral counseling by then rig manager Billy Pitts ("Pitts"). Nevertheless Weed's work...

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