Wells v. State
| Decision Date | 27 May 1942 |
| Docket Number | 14119. |
| Citation | 20 S.E.2d 580,194 Ga. 70 |
| Parties | WELLS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. On the trial of one charged as an accessory before the fact of murder, a witness may testify as to admissions and declarations of the principal, freely and voluntarily made after the crime, which tend to establish the guilt of the principal and do not merely show the guilt of the accessory to prove the guilt of the principal; and, where the court at the time of the admission of such evidence instructs the jury that it is admitted only so far as it might relate to the principal and not as to the alleged accessory, such evidence is relevant and admissible, although the principal's plea of guilty has already been introduced in evidence without objection.
2. A watch identified by the principal, on the trial of an accessory, as being one the principal took from the victim before he left the body, was relevant and admissible in evidence as tending to prove the guilt of the principal. It was not error requiring the grant of a new trial to admit such evidence as against the objection that it was not shown when the watch was recovered and that the State had not shown any connection between the watch and the alleged accessory.
3. A plea of guilty by one jointly indicted as principal is competent evidence, on the trial of an accessory before the fact, as tending to show the guilt of the principal; and such plea having been put in evidence by the State without objection, it was not error for the court to fail to instruct the jury to limit their consideration of the plea to the purposes for which it was admissible, in the absence of proper and timely request for such instruction.
4. The charge of the court on the subject of an accomplice fairly stated the principles of law applicable thereto, and was not subject to the criticism made.
5. It is improper for counsel for the State, on the trial of a defendant charged with crime, to state to the jury his belief that the defendant is guilty; but where the trial judge promptly expresses disapproval of the remarks and instructs the jury not to consider them in rendering its verdict, and such instruction is in effect a rebuke of the counsel, and full enough under the circumstances of the case the refusal to declare a mistrial will not require the grant of a new trial.
6. There was sufficient evidence to connect the alleged accessory with the crime, independently of the testimony of the principal, and the principal's testimony was sufficiently corroborated to support the verdict of guilty against the accessory.
Felix Wells was jointly indicted with Freddie Hooks, alias Tony McBrown, for the murder of Willie Lee Wells, the wife of Felix Wells, Hooks being charged as principal in the first degree, and Felix Wells as accessory before the fact. Freddie Hooks entered his plea of guilty, and was given a life sentence. Felix Wells pleaded not guilty, and being tried was found guilty, with a recommendation of mercy. He was sentenced for life. His motion for new trial was overruled and he excepted.
Lester F. Watson, W. W. Larsen, Jr., and Stanley A. Reese, all of Dublin, for plaintiff in error.
J. Eugene Cook, Sol. Gen., of Dublin, Ellis G. Arnall, Atty. Gen., and E. L. Reagan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
1. Grounds 1 and 6 of the amendment to the motion for new trial having been expressly abandoned, we will first consider special ground 2, which complains of the admission, over objection, of a statement by the sheriff, a witness for the State, that Freddie Hooks had pointed out to him the place of the homicide, and pictures of the witness and Hooks in an automobile at such place, and a declaration by the witness that he was present when Hooks said he committed the crime. It is contended that it was error to admit such evidence dealing with admissions and declarations of the principal, made after his arrest and after the completion of the criminal enterprise and not in the presence of the alleged accessory, especially when the principal's plea of guilty had already been admitted without objection.
To establish the guilt of Felix Wells, the accused accessory, it was necessary for the State to show, first, the commission of the murder by Freddie Hooks; and second, that Wells, being absent at the time of the commission of the homicide, procured, counseled, or commanded Hooks to commit it. Powers v. State, 174 Ga. 202, 162 S.E. 275; Cantrell v. State, 141 Ga. 98, 100, 80 S.E. 649.
Incriminatory statements of the principal tending to show his guilt, and the previous record of his conviction, are admissible, on the trial of an accessory before the fact, to prove the guilt of the principal. Powers v. State, supra; Smith v. State, 46 Ga. 298; Brooks v. State, 103 Ga. 50, 29 S.E. 485. The record of the principal's conviction is conclusive evidence of his conviction, and prima facie evidence of his guilt, but it is not conclusive evidence of the guilt of the principal. Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2; Coxwell v. State, 66 Ga. 309(3), 310. In the trial of one charged as an accessory, it is incumbent upon the State to show the guilt of the person charged as a principal, beyond a reasonable doubt; and, as a general rule, in order to establish this fact, any evidence may be introduced which would be admissible if the principal were on trial. Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31(20), 33, 56, 52 S.E. 1. In the Rawlins case, at page 56 of 124 Ga., at page 12 of 52 S.E., in an opinion by Cobb, P.J., it was said: 'The fact that the state introduces the record in evidence does not preclude the introduction of other evidence tending to establish the guilt of the principal.' On such a trial the free and voluntary admissions of the alleged principal are admissible to show his guilt. Howard v. State, 109 Ga. 137(4), 34 S.E. 330. Neither declarations nor admissions of the alleged principal, which merely tend to incriminate the alleged accessory, are admissible against the latter, if made after the completion of the criminal enterprise. Howard v. State, supra. The last mentioned rule is relied on by the plaintiff in error to sustain his contentions in this ground of exception. The character of the declarations made in the Howard case and in Lance v. State, 166 Ga. 15, 142 S.E. 105, differ from those in the present case. Here the admissions and declarations do not merely tend to incriminate the alleged accessory, but tend to establish the guilt of the principal. At the time the evidence was admitted the judge stated: Such evidence was relevant as tending to establish the guilt of the principal, and it was not improper for the court to admit it even though the principal's plea of guilty may have already been admitted without objection. There is no merit in this ground of the exceptions.
2. In ground 3 it is complained that it was error to admit in evidence, over objection, a watch which the principal said he took from Willie Lee Wells, the deceased. The objection urged was that, since the accessory was not questioning the principal's guilt, and it not being shown when the watch was recovered, it had no probative value, and the State had not proved any connection between the watch and the alleged accessory who was on trial. The principal had identified the watch as the one he took from the victim before he left the body. Under the applicable authorities cited in the first division of this opinion, it was relevant and admissible as tending to show the principal's guilt. The part of the objection urged, to the effect that the State had not proved any connection between the watch and the alleged accessory, illustrates in itself that the purpose of the evidence was to show the principal's guilt. It was not at all likely that the jury could have construed this evidence as merely tending to show the guilt of the accessory, even without specific instruction from the court at the time of its admission, limiting it to show the principal's guilt. No error sufficient to require a reversal is shown by this ground.
3. Error is assigned in ground 4 on a portion of the judge's charge where, after reading the indictment, the court stated that Freddie Hooks had entered his plea of...
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