Wendelken v. Superior Court In and For Pima County, 16567-PR
Decision Date | 26 September 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 16567-PR,16567-PR |
Citation | 137 Ariz. 455,671 P.2d 896 |
Parties | George WENDELKEN, a single man, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF PIMA, and the Honorable Lillian S. Fisher, a Judge thereof; and Henry S. Sherrill, Real Party in Interest, Respondents. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Goldman & Kaplan by David L. Sandweiss, Phoenix, for petitioner.
Bury & Moeller by David C. Bury, Tucson, for respondents.
George Wendelken, the plaintiff-petitioner, is a sixty-six year old widower and a member of an organization known as "Arizona Singles Who's Who." Wendelken is a resident of Scottsdale, Arizona. The defendant-real party in interest-respondent, Henry S. Sherrill, is also a member of "Arizona Singles Who's Who" and, in addition, belongs to a California organization, "International Singles Who's Who." Sherrill is a resident of Tucson, Arizona, with his home and business there. Sherrill also has a vacation home in Puerto Penasco (Rocky Point), Sonora, Mexico.
Sometime prior to October 12, 1979, the "Arizona Singles Who's Who" circulated an invitation from Sherrill to club members in Phoenix soliciting reservations for a Columbus Day weekend party to be held at Sherrill's Puerto Penasco property. A similar invitation was circulated by the "International Singles Who's Who." A personal letter from Sherrill detailing the planned weekend was also distributed.
With two friends, Wendelken arrived at Sherrill's Puerto Penasco home during the afternoon of October 12, 1979. Upon his arrival, he discovered that the Mexican government had shut off all electricity to the Sherrill property. It was still daylight, though, and Wendelken and his companions were able to move about the house and to walk down a path to the beach without difficulty. However, after dark, the house and grounds were illuminated only by candlelight. While walking along the path that led from Sherrill's house to the beach, Wendelken fell several feet over the edge of the path and sustained a broken hip. Other guests took Wendelken to a Mexican clinic for examination and then arranged with the Arizona Department of Public Safety for helicopter transportation to the Tucson Veteran's Administration Hospital. There, he underwent surgery and subsequent care.
Wendelken timely filed suit against Sherrill in Pima County, Arizona, seeking compensation for his injuries, his medical expenses, and his lost earnings. Trial on the matter was set for February 8, 1983. On January 5, 1983, the trial court, the Honorable Lillian S. Fisher presiding, entered a minute entry granting Sherrill's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and ordering that Mexican law would apply to "the issues of negligence, damages, and standard of care, etc." Wendelken filed a Petition for Special Action with the Court of Appeals Division Two (2 CA-CIV 4731) to vacate the trial court's order. Division Two dismissed that petition on March 10, 1983. This petition for review followed. Jurisdiction is found pursuant to the Arizona Constitution Art. 6, § 5(3) and the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, Rule 23. As we find that Arizona law should apply to all aspects of this case, we vacate the Court of Appeal's order dated March 10, 1983, as well as the trial court's ruling which granted Sherrill's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and remand the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This petition for review raises only one issue: whether the laws of the country of Mexico or the laws of the State of Arizona should apply to this action. To make this choice between laws, we must look to the conflicts laws of Arizona, the forum state.
In Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968), this Court adopted the rules embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as the rules for Arizona. In so doing, we discarded the doctrine of lex loci delicti. Had this case arisen while lex loci was still in effect, our response would have been automatic: since this incident occurred in Mexico, that country's law would be applied to all substantive issues. However, as this case arose after the demise of lex loci, our response is not at all automatic.
The Restatement (Second) § 145 sets forth the general principle by which tort choice of law questions are to be decided. Approved by this court in Schwartz, 1 § 145 provides:
As § 145 specifically incorporates § 6, which enumerates principles underlying all choice of law questions, that section also must be considered. See Gordon v. Kramer, 124 Ariz. 442, 604 P.2d 1153 (App.1979); Moore v. Montes, 22 Ariz.App. 562, 529 P.2d 716 (1974). Section 6 provides:
As § 145(1) makes clear, our task is to determine which state 2 has the "most significant relationship" to the parties and the issues in question. Of the four contacts specified in § 145(2), two obviously attach to Mexico--the place of Wendelken's injury and the place of Sherrill's alleged negligence. However, the other two contacts attach to Arizona--both Wendelken and Sherrill are domiciled in Arizona, both are residents of Arizona, 3 both are American nationals, Sherrill advertised this weekend party in Arizona via an Arizona organization of which both Sherrill and Wendelken are members, the solicitation reached Wendelken in Arizona, and the reservation was accepted in Arizona. Only the destination involved was Mexico. The "relationship between the parties" centered in Arizona. As we have made clear, "the determination of which state has the most significant contacts is primarily qualitative, not quantitative." Schwartz, supra, 103 Ariz. at 565, 447 P.2d at 257. Having established the numerical distribution of the important contacts, we now must evaluate those contacts to determine which law should apply. It is in this evaluation that the principles of § 6 are considered.
Our choice of law in this matter should have little effect on the harmonious relationship or on the commercial interaction between Arizona and Mexico. This was a purely private relationship between two Arizona residents. Neither public accommodation nor public transportation facilities was utilized. Had this trip been sponsored by the Mexican government instead of by a private American citizen or had the accident occurred at a Mexican hotel instead of at a private home, Mexican tourism might have been affected. In either event, this element would take on a greater weight in the choice of law decision. Those facts, however, are not before us.
Arizona, in addition to being the forum state and the place of the trial, has considerable interest in this matter. Both parties are domiciliaries of Arizona giving this state a natural interest in each of them. One aspect of that interest is the appropriate compensation of Wendelken for his losses. Striving insofar as possible to make the injured party whole, Riexinger v. Ashton Co., 9 Ariz.App. 406, 453 P.2d 235 (1969), Arizona allows unlimited recovery for actual damages, expenses for past and prospective medical care, past and prospective pain and suffering, lost earnings, and diminished earning capacity. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Shields, 58 Ariz. 239, 119 P.2d 116 (1941); Allen v. Devereaux, 5 Ariz.App. 323, 426 P.2d 659 (1967); R.A.J.I. Negligence 10. This is in sharp contrast to the compensatory scheme of Mexico. The parties have supplied this Court with a translation of Article 1915 of the Civil Code of Mexico. According to that translation, not only are damages resulting from personal injury recoverable only to the extent allowed by a quota system included in the Mexican Federal Labor Law, but the maximum wage that can be taken into account in this determination is twenty-five pesos per day. 4 As both Wendelken and Sherrill are Arizona residents, there is little reason to apply Mexico's measure of damages and undercompensate Wendelken for his losses. Faced with a similar situation, the Texas Supreme Court concluded:
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex.1979). The measure of Wendelken's damage...
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