Wenzel v. City of New Braunfels

• Decision Date: 21 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 3-92-020-CV,3-92-020-CV
• Citation: 852 S.W.2d 97
• Parties: Lawrence E. WENZEL and Myrtice Wenzel, v. CITY OF NEW BRAUNFELS.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 97

852 S.W.2d 97

Lawrence E. WENZEL and Myrtice Wenzel, v. CITY OF NEW BRAUNFELS.

No. 3-92-020-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Austin.

April 21, 1993.

Catherine M. Stone, San Antonio, for appellants.

Wren Gray Foster, Law Office of Tony Korioth, P.C., Austin, for appellee.

Before POWERS, ABOUSSIE and B.A. SMITH, JJ.

ABOUSSIE, Justice.

In a single point of error, Lawrence and Myrtice Wenzel ("the Wenzels") appeal the summary judgment that the trial court rendered in favor of the City of New Braunfels ("the City"). Mr. Wenzel was severely injured when struck by a motor vehicle as he was leaving the Comal County Fair. Mrs. Wenzel claims that she suffered severe emotional distress when she witnessed the aftermath of the accident. The Wenzels sued the City, alleging that it was negligent in failing to provide pedestrian cross-walks; in failing to erect a barricade, warning sign, stop light, or other similar warning device; in failing to provide a guard, policeman, or other person to regulate the flow of traffic and pedestrians; in failing to place a flare or flares to alert motorists and pedestrians of the dangers of the roadway; in failing to provide adequate lighting; and in failing to limit parking in the area adjacent to the crossing. The Wenzels also pleaded that the City had actual or constructive notice of a special defect which it failed either to warn about or to correct. They claimed that insufficient lighting, uncontrolled parking, and uncontrolled pedestrian activity each constituted a special defect.

The standards for reviewing a summary judgment are well established: (1) as the movant for summary judgment, the City has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the Wenzels will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the Wenzels and any doubts resolved in their favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). When the City moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense, it must conclusively prove all essential elements of that defense. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972); Dillard v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex.App.--Austin 1991, writ denied). The City moved for summary judgment on four grounds. We will affirm the district court's judgment based upon two grounds which assert that the City had governmental immunity for its failure to perform discretionary acts and that no special defect existed as an exception to this immunity. ¹

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Governmental immunity consists of two basic principles of law. First, the state as sovereign is immune from suit without consent. Second, the state has immunity from liability even though the state has consented to be sued. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 453

                S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1970);  Dillard, 806 S.W.2d at 592.   One exception to the general rule of governmental immunity is that a municipality is not immune when exercising its proprietary functions.  Dillard, 806 S.W.2d at 593-94.   Street construction and design, the presence of warning signals, traffic regulation, and maintenance of traffic signals, signs, and hazards are all governmental functions as defined by the Legislature.  Texas Tort Claims Act ("the Act") § 101.0215(a)(3), (20), (21), (31). 2  These governmental functions are not proprietary functions of a municipality.  Act § 101.0215(c).  As a general rule, therefore, the City is immune from suits based on the exercise of its governmental functions.  City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 125-127 (1884);  Dillard, 806 S.W.2d at 593-94.   However, this rule is not without a broad exception.  Section 101.025 of the Act permits actions against the state and other governmental entities;  the section also waives the state's immunity from liability.  Both provisions limit these waivers to the terms expressly set forth in the Act.  Id.;  see also McKinney v. City of Gainesville, 814 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1991, no writ).  Therefore, we must examine the Act's provisions before determining if the Wenzels may sue the City for damages
                

DISCRETIONARY ACTS

The waivers of immunity from suit and liability in the Act do not apply to a governmental entity's failure to perform a discretionary act. Act § 101.056(2). The City contends that its decision whether to place a traffic control device or take other precautionary measures is a discretionary act for which it is immune.

The reason for immunizing discretionary actions of governmental entities is "to avoid judicial review that would question the wisdom of a government's exercise of its discretion in making policy decisions." McKinney, 814 S.W.2d at 866 (quoting State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex.1979)). Courts distinguish the formation of policy from its implementation by according immunity to the former but not the latter. See University of Tex. at Arlington v. Akers, 607 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (university had discretion for policy decision whether to cancel classes due to bad weather); cf., Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Crossland, 781 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1989, writ denied) (decision to post warning signs did not make inclusion of lights in bridge design implementation of policy decision). The distinction also has been phrased in terms of policy formation and decisions incidental to the formation of that policy. See Norton v. Brazos County, 640 S.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (decision of jail to operate kitchen discretionary, but county not immune with respect to daily operation incidental to this policy).

The Wenzels and the City initially dispute whether determining the discretionary nature of a governmental entity's actions is a legal or a factual question. If we accept the latter proposition, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment, as the question would be one for the trier of fact. Recognizing a split in authority among Texas courts of appeals on this issue, we hold that it is a question of law. Compare McKinney, 814 S.W.2d at 867 (question of law) with Villarreal v. City of San Antonio, 657 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1983, no writ) (question of fact).

The supreme court has indicated that a governmental entity's initial decision to place traffic control devices is discretionary. See State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. King, 808 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex.1991). Other courts of appeals have held that the decision to regulate traffic by signs, barricades, or other means is discretionary. See McKinney, 814 S.W.2d at 866-67 (barricades along parade route);

Villarreal v. State, 810 S.W.2d 419, 420-21 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991, writ denied) (exit ramp sign); City of El Paso v. Ayoub, 787 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1990, writ denied) (guardrail); Shives v. State, 743 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1987, writ denied) (stop sign). We hold that the City's decision whether to regulate traffic near the County Fair by the means suggested in the Wenzels' petition was discretionary. Accordingly, section 101.056(2) of the Act bars the Wenzels from suing the City for the failure to perform such acts. ³

SPECIAL DEFECTS

The Wenzels assert that even if the City would ordinarily be immune...