Wessels v. Gipfel

• Citation: 522 S.W.2d 653
• Decision Date: 22 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 36046,36046
• Parties: Tonya Georgette WESSELS, a minor, by Luanna Sams, her next friend, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Howard GIPFEL, Jr., Defendant-Respondent. . Louis District, Division Four
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 653

522 S.W.2d 653

Tonya Georgette WESSELS, a minor, by Luanna Sams, her next

friend, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Howard GIPFEL, Jr., Defendant-Respondent.

No. 36046.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, Division Four.

April 22, 1975.

Friedman & Fredericks, Oval A. Phipps, Clayton, for plaintiff-appellant.

Heneghan & Roberts, Inc., Kemper R. Coffelt, Jay G. Newquist, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.

ALDEN A. STOCKARD, Special Judge.

Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment of the circuit court dismissing her petition for compensatory damages resulting from the alleged wrongful death of her putative father.

Certain facts are admitted, or for the purpose of this appeal are assumed by the parties. George Wessels, age twenty-five, met his death on October 24, 1971, by reason of the negligence of Howard Gipfel, Jr., respondent. At the time George Wessels was not married and was living with his widowed mother, Juanita Wessels, and was her principal source of support. On November 10, 1971, Juanita Wessels brought suit against Howard Gipfel, Jr. for the wrongful death of her son. That suit was dismissed on April 30, 1973, pursuant to a stipulation, apparently as the result of a negotiated settlement.

On August 28, 1973, almost four months after the dismissal of the wrongful death suit brought by the mother of George Wessels, the petition in this suit to obtain compensatory damages for the wrongful death of George Wessels was filed by Tonya Georgette Wessels. For the purposes of this appeal we accept as a fact that George Wessels was the natural father; that Luanna Sams is the mother of plaintiff; that plaintiff was born on May 16, 1972; and that George Wessels and Luanna Sams were never married.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff's petition on the basis that it was barred by the statute of limitations, and plaintiff has appealed.

There is no contention that an illegitimate child does not have the same right to sue for the wrongful death of its natural father which occurred before its birth, as a child whose mother was married to the natural father at the time of the father's death. See the annotation at 38 A.L.R.3d 613. Whatever right either has is now governed by § 537.080 to § 537.100, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., and it is only by virtue of these statutes, comprising what is called the Wrongful Death Act, that any claim or cause of action accrues. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 175 S.W.2d 889 (1943); Nelms v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. banc 1957).

By reason of the construction by the courts on previous wrongful death acts, and the relation between those provisions and the provisions of the present Wrongful Death Act, we will first refer to the previous provisions and the judicial construction of them. However, as to any wrongful death statute, 'A party suing under the statute . . . must bring himself in his pleading and proof strictly within the statutory requirements necessary to confer the right. Otherwise his petition states no cause of action, and his proof is insufficient to sustain his judgment. Only such persons can recover (and in such time and in such manner) as the letter of the law prescribes. Only such persons may sue as the statute permits, and they alone can sue. . . . It must 'be conceded that the section reserves to itself the exclusive power of naming those who can maintain the action and of fixing the time in which each of the enumerated persons could sue. '' Chandler v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S.W. 35, 37 (1913). Also, 'The wrongful death statute creates but one indivisible cause of action which remains the same whether enforceable by the surviving spouse, by the minor child or children, or by the others named in the statute.' Nelms v. Bright, supra, at p. 487.

Prior to the amendment of the wrongful death statute, Laws of 1967, p. 663, effective October 13, 1967, what was then §§ 537.080, 537.090 and 537.070, provided that the damages for wrongful death could be sued for and recovered:

(1) By the husband or wife of the deceased; or ceased; or

(2) If there be no husband or wife, or he or she fails to sue within six months after such death, then by the minor child or children of the deceased, . . .; or

(3) If such deceased be a minor and unmarried . . . (other provisions not here applicable); or

(4) If there be no husband, wife, minor child or minor children, . . . (other provisions not here applicable).

What was then § 537.100 provided that 'Every action instituted under section 537.080 shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action shall accrue; . . .'

In Uber v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 441 S.W.2d 682 (Mo.1969) the cause of action was governed by the above provisions. The alleged wrongful death occurreed on February 24, 1967. On February 21, 1968, more than six months but less than one year after the death, suit was filed in which the widow and a minor son were named as plaintiffs. On May 31, 1968, the minor son voluntarily dismissed the petition as to him only. The court held: 'As this case reaches this court, there is but one plaintiff, the widow, the original co-plaintiff (minor son) having voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the petition as to him only. . . . It must be kept in mind that when this cause of action accured the Wrongful Death Act contained two periods of limitation bearing on this case; the first provided that the widow, if there be minor children, shall sue within six months after the death; the second provided that every action instituted under the Act shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. The petition alleges that the decedent was survived by a minor child as well as by appellant (widow). Therefore, at the time the cause of action accrued, appellant had six months in which to institute her suit after which if she failed to do so, the cause of action vested in the minor child.'

In Forehand v. Hall, 355 S.W.2d 940 (Mo.1962) the widow, who was the administratrix of the estate, brought suit as administratrix, not as the widow, for damages for the wrongful death of Arthur Cobb. However, Arthur Cobb had died leaving surviving him a widow and a minor child. Neither commenced any action within the then one year maximum period. The court held: 'Under § 537.080 his surviving...