Western Maine Center for Children v. Department of Human Services, KEN AP-03-02
| Decision Date | 06 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | KEN AP-03-02 |
| Parties | WESTERN MAINE CENTER FOR CHILDREN, Petitioner v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent v. COMMUNITY CONCEPTS, INC., Intervenor |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
June 6 2003
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION
DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on intervenor's motion to dismiss petitioner's M.R. Civ. P. 80C appeal.
The petitioner, Western Maine Center for Children (petitioner or WMCC) seeks review of the December 11, 2002 decision of the Appeal Panel denying petitioner's appeal of the awarding of two grants by the Department of Human Services to Community Concepts, Inc. ("CCI").[1] The appeal was filed pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 1825-E and Chapter 120 of the Rules of the Division of Purchases, Department of Administrative and Financial Services ("Rules").
DHS and the Administration for Children and Families ("ACF") issued a joint request for proposals seeking a grantee to receive Head Start, Early Head Start and Child Care Funds, per an agreement between DHS and ACF dated May 10, 2000. Petitioner and CCI were the only agencies to submit proposals. Five reviewers evaluated the two proposals at the ACF office in Boston. The ACF's Regional Administrator initially adjudged petitioner the most qualified applicant, and proposed awarding the funding to petitioner. The recommendation was rejected, and the contracts awarded to CCI. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal of the decision. In its petition, the petitioner alleges it was denied due process in the appeal process; the Appeal Panel's findings were in error; the Panel misapplied Maine law regarding the awarding of the contract to the highest rated proposal; request for applications were not submitted to the Contract Review Committee as required by Rule 110; the review and scoring process did not conform to Rule 110; Rule 110 does not provide a sufficient procedure for reviewing competitive bids as required by 5 M.R.S.A. § 1825-D; and the entire process was arbitrary, capricious, and fundamentally unfair. CCI moves to dismiss the 80C Petition.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint, not the sufficiency of the evidence the plaintiffs are able to present." Barnes v. McGough, 623 A.2d 144, 145 (Me. 1993). In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court should "consider the material allegations of the complaint as admitted and review the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiffs to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Bussell v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 103, ¶ 1, 731 A.2d 862. "A dismissal is appropriate only when it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." Dexter v. Town of Norway, 1998 ME 195, ¶ 7, 715 A.2d 169, 171. The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. Sargent v. Buckley, 1997 ME 159, ¶ 10, 697 A.2d 1272, 1275.
CCI moves to dismiss the 80C petition, alleging that petitioner fails to properly invoke the Superior Court's jurisdiction by failing to name the Appeal Panel ("Panel") and the Bureau of General Services ("BGS") as defendants. CCI relies on 5 M.R.S.A. § 1825-B to point out that the Director of the Bureau of General Services has the direct responsibility and authority for making purchases of goods or services needed by the State or any department or agency of the State through competitive bidding. It also cites chapter 110 of the Rules of the Department of Administrative and Financial Services, Division of Purchases, giving the Bureau responsibilities for conducting the competitive bid process and making purchases. The intervenor argues that the Director of BGS is a direct party to the contract being challenged and BGS is the sole necessary and indispensable respondent from this appeal of its final agency action. The crux of CCI's argument is that, because BGS appointed the Panel, the Panel acted as an "arm" of BGS and BGS is therefore a required party to this petition.
Petitioner opposes the motion to dismiss, maintaining that BGS is not a necessary party because it's only role was to select the Panel; it had no part in handling the process of selecting CCI and was not a party to the prior appeal. In the event the court determines BGS is a necessary party petitioner contends that it should be permitted to amend the original petition.[2] DHS also opposes the motion to dismiss, asserting that the appeals panel acted in a purely adjudicatory role. DHS emphasizes that the Law Court has repeatedly held that an agency that performs a purely adjudicatory function is not a proper party to an appeal from a decision made by that agency. The issue is whether BGS is a required party to this petition.
Any person aggrieved by final agency action is entitled to judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") by proceeding in the manner provided by 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 11001--11008. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 11001. The court is limited to remanding the matter or affirming, reversing, or modifying the agency's decision. 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(4).
Title 5 M.R.S.A. 1825-E governs the competitive bid process for the state, the government, and their agencies; decisions by an appeal committee under § 1825-E constitute final agency action on the petitioner's appeal for the purposes of judicial review. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 1825-F. Pursuant to § 1825-E, the Director of BGS determines whether a person allegedly aggrieved by an agency contract award decision is granted an appeal hearing. Id. The appeal committee or panel consists of three members: two appointed by the Commissioner of Administrative and Financial Services (excepting anyone with a direct or indirect personal, professional, or financial conflict of interest in the appeal or any employee from any department affected by the contract). Id. The third member is the Director of BGS or the Director's designee. Id. The appeal panel can validate or invalidate the contract award; it may not modify or make a new contract award. Id.
"An agency that performs a purely adjudicatory function is not a proper party to an appeal from a decision made by that body." Bureau of Taxation v. Town of Washburn, 490 A.2d 1182, 1184 (Me. 1985)(citing Rice v. Amerling, 433 A.2d 388, n.1 (Me. 1981); Town of Boothbay Harbor v. Russell, 410 A.2d 554, 560--61 (Me. 1980)). An agency charged with administering or enforcing a statute, however, is entitled to participate in proceedings reviewing its actions by reason of interest in defending its policies as reflected in its actions. Id. (citations omitted).
Here, CCI cites to Chapter 110 of the Rules of the Department of Administrative and Financial Services ("Rules"), Division of Purchases, to assert that BGS has the authority to conduct the competitive bid process and make purchases for the state, including reviewing, finalizing, and executing the contracts. See Rules at 18-554-110(3)(B). However, the fact that BGS has the authority does not mean that it exercised such authority. Petitioner argues that BGS did not conduct the competitive bid process in this case. Rather, BGS's role was to select the Panel. There is no evidence that BGS conducted the bid process or reviewed, finalized, or executed the contract; nor is there evidence that BGS was a party to the appeal. See McElroy v. State Employee Appeals Board, 427 A.2d 958 (Me. 1981). Mc Elroy held that the State Employee Appeals Board was not a proper party to a petition challenging its original decision because it served a purely adjudicatory role by rendering decisions on grievances and disputes. Id. at 960. Also, the board's governing statutes in McElroy gave it no prosecutorial powers or enforcement responsibilities. Id. Thus, the court determined that the proper parties to the petition were those who participated in the hearing before the appeals board. Id.
There is no evidence or allegation that the Panel is able to administer or enforce a statute. The Panel has no prosecutorial powers or enforcement duties. The Panel was organized solely to adjudicate Petitioner's grievance. The governing statute regarding the appointment and functions of the Panel provides only adjudicatory duties and powers. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 1825-E.[3]
Even were the court to determines BGS to be a required party, the court believes that amendment to a petition would be allowed notwithstanding despite BGS not being served within the prescribed time. There is no Maine case law holding that an 80C petition should be dismissed because the wrong agency is named or served as a party.[4] A substitution of state agencies should not result in dismissal of the appeal. See Town of Ogunquit v. Dept. of Public Safety, 767 A.2d 291 (Me. 2001); Bureau of Taxation v. Town of Washburn, 490 A.2d 1182, 1185 (Me. 1985). Town of Ogunquit emphasizes that excessive or unreasonable delay in service of process may be grounds for dismissal unless shown to be a result of mistake or excusable neglect. Id. (citations omitted).
The entry will be:
Intervenor's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
Dated: June 6, 2003
[See Original for Image]
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Notes:
1 CCI was granted status as an intervenor on October 18, 2002.
2 The court should note that Petitioner's response to this motion was filed one day late of the February 20 2002 deadline, as prescribed by M.R. Civ. P. 7(c). CCI points this out in its Reply Brief, arguing that Petitioner's response should therefore be stricken and the Petitioner deemed to have waived all objections to the motion pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3). Rule 7(c)(3) provides that ...
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