Westfall v. Swoap

• Decision Date: 07 May 1976
• Citation: 58 Cal.App.3d 109,129 Cal.Rptr. 750
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Helen WESTFALL, Petitioner and Appellant, v. David SWOAP, Director of State Department of Benefit Payments, Respondent. Civ. 15357.

Page 750

129 Cal.Rptr. 750

58 Cal.App.3d 109

Helen WESTFALL, Petitioner and Appellant, v. David SWOAP, Director of State Department of Benefit Payments, Respondent.

Civ. 15357.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

May 7, 1976.

Community Legal Services of Riverside County, Robert K. Miller and William D. Schuetz, Riverside, for petitioner and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward M. Belasco and John H. Sanders, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

OPINION

TAMURA, Acting Presiding Justice.

Petitioner appeals from a judgment denying her petition for writ of mandate to compel respondent (director) to dismiss a scheduled rehearing after the director rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on a claim for alleged overpayment of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Sometime before August 14, 1973, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (county) notified petitioner of its intention to discontinue payment of AFDC benefits to her and to seek recovery of alleged overpayments for the period March 1971 through October 1972. Pursuant to petitioner's written request filed August 14, 1973, a hearing was held on February 7, 1974. Since petitioner had theretofore resigned from the program, the only matter considered at the hearing was the claim for overpayments. The referee rendered a proposed decision in favor of petitioner and the proposed decision was adopted by the director on May 14, 1974.

On May 30, 1974, the county requested a rehearing. The request was granted and a rehearing was scheduled for August 12, 1974, but upon petitioner's request it was continued to September 17, 1974. In the interim petitioner filed the instant mandate proceeding. Following a hearing on the petition and answer, the court made findings and conclusions and entered judgment denying the petition.

For reasons to be stated, we have concluded that the judgment should be affirmed.

The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) has promulgated regulations prescribing standards for hearing procedures to be observed by state welfare agencies in the administration of the various federally assisted programs under the Social Security Act. (45 C.F.R. 205.10. ¹ ) The specific regulation upon which petitioner relies in this appeal provides: 'Prompt, definitive, and final administrative action shall be taken within 90 days from the date of the request for a hearing.' (45 C.F.R. 205.10(a)(16).)

Petitioner does not contend that the federal regulations proscribe any rehearing after an initial fair hearing decision has been made; her sole contention is that no rehearing may be held after 90 days have elapsed from the date of her request for a hearing. The contention rests on two assumptions: (1) The term 'final administrative action' as used in the federal regulation includes the completion of any rehearing authorized under state law and (2) the 90 day period is jurisdictional. Neither assumption is correct.

The prime objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the enacting body so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Philbrook v. Glodgett, 241 U.S. 707, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525; Bravo v. Cabell, 11 Cal.3d 834, 838, 114 Cal.Rptr. 618, 523 P.2d 658; Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224.) Generally the same rules of construction applicable to statutes govern the interpretation of rules and regulations of administrative bodies. (Cal. Drive-In Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287, 292, 140 P.2d 657; Intoximeters, Inc. v. Younger,53 Cal.App.3d 262, 270, 125 Cal.Rptr. 864. See Miller v. United States,294 U.S. 435, 438--439, 55 S.Ct. 440, 442, 79 L.Ed. 977.) It is also a familiar principle that courts respect the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with its administration and when the construction of an administrative regulation is in issue, the administrative construction is accorded even greater deference. (Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616; Brubaker v. Morton, 9 Cir., 500 F.2d 200, 202.)

With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the federal regulation in question. The purpose of the 90 day regulation is to assure that a person who qualifies for assistance or for an increase in the amount of benefits receives his entitlement promptly. The 90 day rule is designed to make the administrative hearing meaningful to needy persons for whom delay will mean great hardship. (King v. Martin, 21 Cal.App.3d 791, 795, 98 Cal.Rptr. 711; Nelson v. Sugarman, D.C., 361 F.Supp. 1132, 1137.)

The California Legislature has established a fair hearing procedure which includes a provision authorizing the director to grant a rehearing to a party dissatisfied with a fair hearing decision. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 10950, et seq. ² ) In addition, pursuant to his authority to adopt regulations governing the administration of federally assisted programs under the Social Security Act (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 10553, subd. (d)), the director has adopted and published a Manual of Policies and Procedures (MPP) which includes regulations pertaining to fair hearings. The regulations require all 'fair hearing matters' to be disposed of by 'fair hearing decision' within 90 days from the request for a 'fair hearing' (MPP § 22--056 ³), command immediate implementation of fair hearing decisions (MPP 22--027 ⁴), and provide a procedure for rehearings (MPP 22--065). ⁵

California's statutory hearing procedure as implemented by the director's regulations makes it mandatory that the director's decision be rendered within 90 days of the request for the fair hearing (King v. Martin, supra, 21 Cal.App.3d 791, 795, 98 Cal.Rptr. 711), and requires immediate implementation of the decision notwithstanding the fact that a local welfare agency may have been granted a rehearing. (Taylor v. McKay, 53 Cal.App.3d 644, 650--652, 126 Cal.Rptr. 204.) Thus, the granting of a local welfare agency's request for a rehearing will not postpone the payment of benefits to a qualified recipient. California's rehearing procedure thus does not conflict with the purpose of the 90 day rule.

Petitioner nevertheless urges that the phrase 'final administrative action' as used in the federal regulation must be construed to include any rehearing authorized by state law. We are satisfied that it was not intended to be given that meaning. Applicable here is the familiar rule of statutory interpretation "that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers." (Philbrook v. Glodgett, supra, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, quoting from Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226.) Although an administrative rehearing is literally a part of the administrative process, to interpret the phrase 'final administrative action' as including the completion of a state authorized rehearing procedure would neither further the purpose of the regulation nor comport with the intention of its promulgator.

HEW has stated that "it has always been the Department's position that the words ('final administrative action' utilized in 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(11) ⁶) refer to the mailing of the check or increased check, or to the notification of denial of assistance or increased assistance, as the case may be." (Nelson v. Sugarman, supra, 361 F.Supp. 1132, 1137, quoting from HEW's amicus brief in that case.) An administrative construction of an agency's own regulation is 'of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' (Udall v. Tallman, supra, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616.) The California fair hearing procedure as implemented by the director's regulations and as interpreted by our courts is in conformity with HEW's interpretation of its 90 day regulation. Under California hearing procedures, the director has a mandatory duty to render his decision within 90 days. If the decision is in favor of a claimant, the decision must be implemented forthwith by the payment of benefits and if the decision is adverse, the claimant is promptly notified through a copy of the decision of the denial of benefits. These steps constitute 'final administrative action' according to the construction given that phrase by HEW.

Furthermore, the policy sought to be furthered by the 90 day rule would be thwarted rather than promoted if the federal regulation were interpreted to foreclose a rehearing after the expiration of 90 days from the initial request for a hearing. Such an interpretation would preclude the director from granting a rehearing to a claimant who may have been erroneously denied benefits by a fair hearing decision. The claimant's only legal recourse after the expiration of the 90 days would be to seek judicial review of the director's decision. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 10962.) The necessity of seeking judicial relief would undoubtedly deter many applicants from pursuing their claims. Even when such relief is sought, the time required to obtain a judicial determination would in all likelihood involve far greater delay and hardship to the claimant than the pursuit of an administrative rehearing. ⁷

Finally, as a practical matter, it would be unreasonable to construe the federal regulation as contemplating completion of a rehearing within 90...