Weston v. State

• Decision Date: 18 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 5734,5734
• Citation: 682 P.2d 1119
• Parties: Miller Z. WESTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 1119

682 P.2d 1119

Miller Z. WESTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent.

No. 5734.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

May 18, 1984.

Christine Schleuss, Asst. Public Defender, Anchorage, W. Grant Callow, II, Asst. Public Defender, Anchorage, Dana Fabe, Public Defender, Anchorage, for petitioner.

Charles M. Merriner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, Norman C. Gorsuch, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for respondent.

Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION

MATTHEWS, Justice.

This petition for hearing concerns the question of whether Miller Weston was improperly denied an instruction on self-defense as justification to the murder charge for which he was convicted. The court of appeals upheld Weston's conviction, ruling that any error was harmless. We reverse and order a new trial.

I. THE FACTS

On June 9, 1980, Miller Weston killed Donald Ahsoak in Barrow, Alaska. Weston is 5'7"' tall, weighed approximately 150 pounds, and was 26 years old at the time of the killing. Ahsoak was 60 years old and approximately the same height and weight as Weston.

Weston first met Ahsoak on the day of the killing, when they, along with several other men, spent the afternoon on the beach in Barrow drinking whiskey. At about 6:00 p.m. Ahsoak invited Weston and another man to his home, where they continued drinking. When the other man left, nothing unusual had happened. There were no third party witnesses to the homicide.

Weston testified that at about 9:30 p.m. Ahsoak left the house for about ten minutes. Upon Ahsoak's return, Weston prepared to leave, but Ahsoak shouted "Wait a minute" and demanded money. Weston, who had already contributed twenty dollars for liquor, denied knowing what Ahsoak was talking about. Ahsoak responded, "Come on, you Yupik thief, where's my money?" and charged at Weston with a knife.

In the struggle that followed, Weston managed to shake loose the knife. The struggle continued, but eventually Ahsoak lost his balance and fell to the floor. Weston got on top of Ahsoak, grabbed the knife, and said that he was going to kill Ahsoak. Ahsoak said "Don't, don't Miller," but Weston cut his throat, killing him. Weston turned himself in to the police later that evening after consulting with a friend.

Weston was convicted in a jury trial of first degree murder for the killing of Ahsoak. Judge Jay Hodges denied the defense request for an instruction on self-defense. However, the trial court did give the jury an instruction on imperfect self-defense.

The court of appeals upheld Weston's conviction, but did not reach the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to require instructing the jury on self-defense. Weston v. State, 656 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Alaska App.1982). The court of appeals held that even if an instruction on self-defense was needed, the failure to give one was harmless error because the jury had been instructed as to imperfect self-defense and had rejected that theory in convicting Weston of murder. Id. at 1188-89.

II. SELF-DEFENSE

Self-defense will justify the use of deadly force if the defender reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to defend himself from death or serious physical injury. AS 11.81.335. ¹ Thus, to employ self-defense a defendant must satisfy both an objective and subjective standard; he must have actually believed deadly force was necessary to protect himself, and his belief must be one that a reasonable person would have held under the circumstances.

A court is obliged to instruct the jury on self-defense only when the record contains "some evidence ... which places in issue the defense...." AS 11.81.900(b)(15)(A); ² see also Bangs v. State, 608 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1980); Toomey v. State, 581 P.2d 1124, 1126 n. 6 (Alaska 1978). Under this "some evidence" standard, a self-defense instruction must be given if there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. See LaLonde v. State, 614 P.2d 808, 810 (Alaska 1980) ("In accordance with our decision in Christie v. State, 580 P.2d 310, 313-16 (Alaska 1978), involving a defense request for an insanity instruction, we find that a 'heat of passion' instruction would have been proper only if LaLonde had produced 'some evidence' that she had acted because of extreme provocation, i.e., if there had been evidence in light of which a reasonable juror could have entertained a reasonable doubt with respect to LaLonde's malice.") (footnote omitted); see also Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 775 (Alaska App.1982); Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 113 (Alaska App.1982). In making this determination, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, Bangs, 608 P.2d at 5; Paul, 655 P.2d at 775, without questioning his credibility, Toomey, 581 P.2d at 1126 n. 6.

A. The Objective Standard

The issue here is whether Weston made a sufficient showing to raise a jury question as to whether a reasonable person would have acted in self-defense under the circumstances. We emphasize that the question is not whether Weston was in actuality mistaken in this belief. As Justice Holmes stated in Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 502, 65 L.Ed. 961, 963 (1921), "[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." We conclude Weston did produce "some evidence" that a reasonable person might have used deadly force under the circumstances.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Weston, shows that Ahsoak had made an unprovoked attack on Weston with a knife immediately prior to the killing. Further, Ahsoak had several guns and knives close at hand with which to continue his attack ³ and was intoxicated to the point of irrationality. ⁴ Under these circumstances, a jury could have concluded that at least a reasonable doubt existed that the danger to Weston had not ceased and thus that he acted reasonably in self-defense.

B. The Subjective Standard

We also conclude that Weston made a sufficient showing that he actually believed self-defense was necessary to avoid death or serious injury. First, evidence that a reasonable person might have believed in the necessity of using deadly force also provides circumstantial evidence that Weston held such a belief. The State argues, however, that Weston's testimony establishes that he acted out of anger, rather than fear. We do not believe Weston's testimony leads ineluctably to this conclusion.

Weston did testify that he was angry when he killed Ahsoak and that, "[m]y force and anger killed Mr. Ahsoak." However, Weston also testified that he killed Ahsoak "[b]ecause I was afraid ...." Further, he stated that during the struggle he was scared because he thought that Ahsoak was going to kill him, and that he was still scared even after the knife was dislodged from Ahsoak's hand. Thus, some of what Weston said would support a conclusion that Weston acted out of fear, while other parts of his testimony tend to contradict such a conclusion. Since the "some evidence" rule requires crediting testimony which is favorable to the defense and discrediting that which is unfavorable, we find that Weston provided some evidence that he actually believed his conduct was necessary to insure his own safety. Consequently, the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on self-defense as justification for the killing.

III. HARMLESS ERROR

The court of appeals concluded that even if the trial court had committed error by not instructing the jury on self-defense, the error was harmless since the jury rejected the affirmative defense of imperfect self-defense. We disagree.

An error can be considered harmless in this context if the verdict necessarily shows that the jury would have rejected the defense contained in a requested instruction had the instruction been given. See Christie v. State, 580 P.2d 310, 320 (Alaska 1978). The jury, by rejecting imperfect self-defense, concluded that Weston had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he actually believed that he was acting in self-defense. The burden of establishing imperfect self-defense rests on the defendant, and the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. ⁵ In contrast, the burden of disproving self-defense rests on the State and the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. ⁶ The jury's verdict shows that it found that the evidence either was evenly balanced or preponderated in favor of the state on the issue of actual belief; it does not show, however, that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Weston did not hold such a belief. Thus, the trial court's error was not harmless.

For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the conviction of Miller Weston for first degree murder and REMAND for a new trial.

COMPTON, J., dissents.

COMPTON, Justice, dissenting.

I dissent. There is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could have entertained a reasonable doubt whether Weston acted in self-defense, or whether he would have been justified in doing so.

The court cites Weston's statements that he was scared when Ahsoak came at him with a knife and that he was still scared after he had disarmed Ahsoak and they continued to struggle, as evidence that Weston acted out of fear for his own safety when he slit Ahsoak's throat. Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119, 1122, (Alaska 1984). ¹ However, there is simply no evidence that Weston acted out of fear; his own testimony precludes that interpretation of the evidence. In response to questions from his counsel about the course of events once Ahsoak had fallen and Weston had pinned him to the floor, Weston testified:

Q When you got on top of him what were you feeling?

A I was still angry.

Q How angry were you?

A Very angry.

Q What happened?

....

A At that point I told him I was gonna kill him.

....

Q Why were you going to kill him?

A I was angry. I was really angry at that time.

Q Why--why were you--why were you...