Westpark Pres. Homeowners Ass'n v. Pulte Home Corp.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2D21-2084 |
| Parties | WESTPARK PRESERVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida nonprofit corporation, in its own right and as class representative, and as Assignee of STUART LEVINE, CYNTHIA FERENCZ, GERARD LAGUE, DONNA LAGUE, NOOR KHAN, PARVEEN KHAN, and KEVIN COOK, Assignors, Appellant, v. PULTE HOME CORPORATION, a foreign profit corporation d/b/a PULTE HOMES; G-SUS CONSTRUCTION INC.; HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC; LAWSON INDUSTRIES, INC.; M.M.&A. CONSTRUCTION OF FLORIDA, INC.; RIKMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC.; SORCORP PAINTING INC.; STINKERBUG, INC. d/b/a PROGRESSIVE PAINTING CONTRACTORS, INC.; and SUTTON CONTRACTING SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Darren D Farfante, Judge.
Brian C. Tannenbaum and Alan E. Tannenbaum of Tannenbaum Lemole &Kleinberg, Sarasota, for Appellant.
Garrett A. Tozier and James P. Terpening, III, of Shutts &Bowen LLP, Tampa; and John A. Dannecker of Shutts &Bowen, LLP, Orlando, for Appellee Pulte Home Corporation d/b/a Pulte Homes.
Kellie A. Caggiano, Lauren M. Eliopoulos, Alexander R. Allred, and Randell H. Rowe, IV, of Moyer Law Group, St. Petersburg, for Appellee Lawson Industries, Inc.
Carol M. Rooney of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, for Appellee Hugh MacDonald Construction, Inc.
Geoffrey Lutz and Corey Etcheverry of Resnick &Louis P.C., Orlando, for Appellee Sorcorp Painting Inc.
Diane H. Tutt of Conroy Simberg, Hollywood, for Appellee Sutton Contracting Solutions, Inc.
No appearance for remaining Appellees.
The issue in this appeal involves the interpretation and application of Florida's statute of repose as set forth in section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2018). Specifically, this court is asked to determine when the statute of repose began to run in this case.
Westpark Preserve Homeowners Association, Inc. (Westpark), sued Pulte Home Corporation (Pulte) asserting claims relating to Pulte's construction of Westpark's townhomes. The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Pulte because it found that Florida's ten-year statute of repose bars Westpark's claims. We agree with the trial court and affirm.
Pulte, while owner of the land, constructed townhomes in a development now known as Westpark Preserve. Pulte sold the townhomes to individual purchasers, the last sale occurring on June 12, 2009. Westpark is responsible for the repair and maintenance of the structural and exterior components of the townhomes and other common elements serving Westpark Preserve.
Westpark filed an amended complaint against Pulte in which it alleged the following three claims: failure to construct its townhomes in compliance with the Florida Building Code, negligence, and vicarious liability for the negligence of Pulte's subcontractors.[1] The original complaint was filed on February 12, 2019, and the amended complaint was filed on February 19, 2019.
Pulte moved for summary judgment, arguing that Florida's ten-year statute of repose in section 95.11(3)(c) barred Westpark's lawsuit. The trial court agreed and entered final summary judgment in favor of Pulte. In its order, the court found that Pulte was the owner of all of the townhomes at Westpark Preserve when the certificate of occupancy was issued for each townhome. It further found that the last certificate of occupancy was issued on January 9, 2009, and that because Westpark failed to file its lawsuit against Pulte within ten years of the issuance of the last certificate of occupancy, its complaint against Pulte was barred by the statute of repose.
The parties do not dispute the facts at issue on appeal. Because "the merits of this case only concern statutory interpretation, our review is de novo." Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So.3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (citing GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007)).
We begin our analysis by examining the purpose and operational function of a statute of repose. "A statute of repose . . . eliminates the underlying legal right; it 'precludes a right of action after a specified time . . . rather than establishing a time period within which the action must be brought measured from the point in time when the cause of action accrued.' "Nat'l Auto Serv. Ctrs., Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So.3d 498, 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (quoting Univ. of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 1991), modified on other grounds by Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1993)). Operationally, a statute of repose results in the cessation of a cause of action upon the conclusion of the repose period. Thus, a statute of repose establishes "an absolute bar to the filing of any claim after the expiration of the repose period and as being immune to the efforts of claimants to avoid it." Id. at 510.
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court found that the time period for the statute of repose began to run when the certificates of occupancy were issued for the townhomes. Westpark contends that this finding is incorrect because the latest date pursuant to the statute is "the date of actual possession by the owner," arguing that "owner" should be defined as the party who purchased the townhome from Pulte. In Westpark's interpretation of the statute, the definition of ownership is linked to the purchase of the property. We disagree with this interpretation of section 95.11(3)(c) because it is contrary to the clear language in the statute.
When examining the statutory meaning of the language at issue, we must endeavor "to give effect to the Legislature's intent, looking first to the actual language used in the statute and its plain meaning." English v. State, 191 So.3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 121 So.3d 433, 439 (Fla. 2013)); see also State v. Waiters, 347 So.3d 533, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). Courts must examine the "words in the context of the entire section rather than in isolation." State v. Lewars, 259 So.3d 793, 797 (Fla. 2018) (citing Thompson v. State, 695 So.2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1997)). "If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must recognize the statute's plain meaning and, therefore, need not employ any other rules of statutory construction." Id. (citing State v. Miller, 227 So.3d 562, 563 (Fla. 2017)). "In such an instance, the statute's plain and ordinary meaning must control unless that meaning leads to a result that is unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent." English, 191 So.3d at 450 (first citing Polite v. State, 973 So.2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007); and then citing State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004)). It is not within the power of the judicial branch to change the statute's language. Instead, "[t]he legislature is the proper branch of government to alter the statutory text." Freeman as Tr. of Fiddlesticks Land Tr. U/A/D September 25, 1984 v. Berrin, 352 So.3d 452, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (citing Lewars, 259 So.3d at 798).
Although the term "owner" is commonly understood to be one who has the legal title or the right of possession, we note that the legislature has not defined the term in the statute. When the legislature has not defined a term in the statute, courts may "look to the dictionary in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the term." Debaun v. State, 213 So.3d 747, 751 (Fla. 2017). The term "owner" is defined as "[s]omeone who has the right to possess, use, and convey something; a person in whom one or more interests are vested." See Owner, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In the present case, when construction was complete and the certificate of occupancy was issued for each townhome, Pulte was the "owner" of that townhome. It had the exclusive right to possession of the townhome, and it had the right to sell the townhome.
If we were to accept Westpark's interpretation of section 95.11(3)(c), it would require us to add language to the statute providing that an action may be commenced within ten years after the date the property is sold after the improvement is made or construction is complete. If the legislature had intended for the period of repose to begin when the improved property is sold, it could have stated such.
"When the statutory language is unclear or ambiguous, this Court applies rules of statutory construction to discern legislative intent." English, 191 So.3d at 450 (citing Polite, 973 So.2d at 1111).[2] In discerning the legislative intent of a statute, a court may properly consider "the evil to be corrected, the language, title, and history of its enactment, and the state of law already in existence on the statute." Parsons v. City of Jacksonville, 295 So.3d 892, 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1266 (Fla. 2008)).
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