State v. Lewars

• Decision Date: 13 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. SC17-1002,SC17-1002
• Citation: 259 So.3d 793
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Dazarian Cordell LEWARS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

259 So.3d 793

STATE of Florida, Petitioner,

v.Dazarian Cordell LEWARS, Respondent.

No. SC17-1002

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 13, 2018

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Suzanne Beschard, Bureau Chief, and Lisa Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, Matthew Overpeck, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public Defenders, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, for Respondent

LAWSON, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Lewars v. State , 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1098, –––– So.3d ––––, 2017 WL 1969691 (Fla. 2d DCA May 12, 2017), which certified conflict with the decisions in State v. Wright , 180 So.3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), Taylor v. State , 114 So.3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), and Louzon v. State , 78 So.3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The certified conflict concerns the construction of one element of the definition of "prison releasee reoffender" provided in section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2012). The part of the statute at issue requires the defendant, within the three years preceding his or her commission of a qualifying offense, to have been "released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor." § 775.082(9)(a)1. The First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in Wright and Louzon concluded that this language is satisfied when a defendant is released from a county jail after serving a sentence entirely in the county jail where the sentence would have required transfer to a Florida prison but for the accumulation of jail credit. Wright , 180 So.3d at 1045-46 ; Louzon , 78 So.3d at 680-81. The Second District in this case disagreed with this conclusion and reached the opposite result from the First and Fifth Districts on essentially identical facts.

Lewars , 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D1099-1100, ––– So.3d at –––– – ––––, 2017 WL 1969691. The Second District also disagreed with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Taylor , which construes similar language from the same statute involving release from a "correctional institution of ... the United States," applies its construction to a defendant's release from a county jail after being temporarily housed there, and reaches a result consistent with Wright and Louzon . Id. ; Taylor , 114 So.3d at 355-56.

We have jurisdiction due to the certification of conflict. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision of the Second District in Lewars and hold that release from a county jail under the circumstances of this case does not satisfy the language of section 775.082(9)(a)1. We therefore disapprove the decisions of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts in Wright , Taylor , and Louzon .

FACTS

Dazarian Cordell Lewars was convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. Lewars , 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D1098, ––– So.3d at ––––, 2017 WL 1969691. For this offense, Lewars was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years' imprisonment under section 775.082(9), the prison releasee reoffender (PRR) statute, over his objection that the PRR statute does not apply to him. Id. at D1099, at ––––. On appeal, the Second District agreed with Lewars and reversed his PRR sentence, holding that Lewars does not qualify as a PRR because he was not "released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections [ (DOC) ] or a private vendor" within the three years preceding the burglary at issue, as required by the pertinent language of the PRR statute. Id. at D1099-1101, at –––– – ––––.

To support PRR sentencing, the trial court relied on the fact that Lewars had been released from a twenty-four-month sentence within the three years preceding the burglary. Id. The legal issue concerning the applicability of the PRR statute centers on whether Lewars' release from that sentence satisfies the "released from" language of the PRR statute, given that Lewars served his prior twenty-four-month sentence entirely in the county jail, rather than in prison, due to his accumulation of 766 days' jail credit while he awaited a violation-of-probation hearing and sentencing. Id. at D1099, at ––––.

Although the sentencing order for the prior case committed Lewars to the custody of the DOC for a prison sentence, Lewars was never physically transferred to a prison facility. Id. After sentencing in that case, the local sheriff's office observed that Lewars had been sentenced to time served and contacted the DOC for instructions. Id. Upon receiving confirmation from the DOC that Lewars was entitled to release, the local sheriff's office had Lewars sign a "prison release form" sent by the DOC and then released him directly from the county jail. Id. DOC records state that Lewars was released from the "Central Office." However, it is undisputed that "Lewars never actually set foot in a DOC facility before committing the burglary" for which he was given a PRR sentence. Id.

In reversing Lewars' PRR sentence, the Second District relied on the plain, unambiguous language of the PRR statute, reasoning as follows:

The pertinent language of section 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q) defines a PRR as "any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit ... burglary of a dwelling ... within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Cor rectionsor a private vendor ...." (Emphasis added.) In requiring release from a DOC "facility"—rather than, for example, from DOC "custody" or simply "by DOC"—PRR status plainly contemplates release from a physical plant operated by the DOC (or a private vendor).[n.2]

[n.2] Webster's New World College Dictionary 485 (3d ed. 1996), which was published near the time that the legislature created the PRR designation, see ch. 97-239, § 2, at 4398-4401, 4404, Laws of Fla. (effective May 30, 1997), defines a "facility," in pertinent part, as "a building, special room, etc., that facilitates or makes possible some activity." See alsoSanders v. State , 35 So.3d 864, 871 (Fla. 2010) ("When a word in a statute is not expressly defined, it is ‘ "appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions ..." in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning’ of the word." (omission in original) (quoting Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Survivors Charter Schs., Inc. , 3 So.3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009) ) ).

There is no dispute that, less than two months before committing the qualifying PRR offense of burglary of a dwelling, Lewars was released from a county jail having never spent a moment in a DOC facility. Consequently, under the unambiguous language of the statute, he does not qualify as a PRR.

Id. at D1099, at ––––.

The Second District recognized that "the three other district courts of appeal that have addressed the issue would have held that Lewars does qualify as a PRR" and, accordingly, certified conflict with the three decisions establishing this point: Wright , Taylor , and Louzon . Id. at D1099, D1101, at ––––, ––––. The Second District noted that these three cases, like the case before it, all involved defendants who had been released from either federal or DOC custody while housed in county jails and that these courts had found the PRR statute applicable under a theory of "constructive release" from qualifying facilities. Id. at D1100, at ––––.¹ Rejecting these holdings, the Second District pointed out that the plain language of the statute requires release from a qualifying "facility," not release from qualifying "custody." Id. The Second District also disputed the proposition—advanced by the Fifth District, embraced by the Fourth District, and accepted by one judge in the First District—that the custody-based construction of the statute is appropriate under the absurdity exception to the plain-language doctrine. Id. at D1100-01, at –––– – ––––. We accepted review to resolve the certified conflict.

ANALYSIS

The certified conflict concerns an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. See Lopez v. Hall , 233 So.3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018) ; State v. Miller , 227 So.3d 562, 563 (Fla. 2017). To answer a question of statutory construction, courts must first look to the statute's language, Miller , 227 So.3d at 563, considering its words in the context of the entire section rather than in isolation, Thompson v. State , 695 So.2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1997). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must recognize the statute's plain meaning and, therefore, need not employ any other rules of statutory construction. Miller , 227 So.3d at 563 (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health , 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005) ); Lopez , 233 So.3d at 453.

The plain-language approach is required because the courts of this state lack the "power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit[ ] its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications." Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams , 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968) ). Such a construction "would be an abrogation of legislative power." Id. ; see art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. Thus, "[e]ven where a court is convinced that the legislature really meant and intended something not expressed in the phraseology of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity." St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm , 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard , 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, 694 (1918) ).

Section 775.082(9)(a)1. defines "prison releasee reoffender" as "any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit" any qualifying offense (as enumerated in the statute) within three years after a certain event, described in the statute as follows:

being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a

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