Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 25935.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Chief Justice TOAL
• Citation: 609 S.E.2d 286,362 S.C. 456
• Parties: Danny WHALEY, Respondent, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellant.
• Decision Date: 02 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 25935.

362 S.C. 456
609 S.E.2d 286

Danny WHALEY, Respondent,
v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellant

No. 25935.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard October 6, 2004.

Decided February 2, 2005.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 2005.

362 S.C. 464

Ronald K. Wray, II, Daniel B. White, Andrea M. Hawkins, all of Gallivan White & Boyd, of Greenville; and Lee S. Bowers, of Bowers & Siren, of Estill, for appellant

C. Arthur Rutter, III, of Rutter Mills, of Norfolk; John E. Parker and Randolph Murdaugh, IV, both of Peters Murdaugh Parker Eltzroth & Detrick, of Hampton, for respondent.

Marvin D. Infinger and Lydia Blessing Applegate, both of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, of Charleston; and Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber, and Cary Silverman, all of Shook Hardy & Bacon, of Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae The American Tort Reform Association and The South Carolina Chamber of Commerce.

362 S.C. 465

Wendy J. Keefer, of Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, of Charleston; Robert W. Buffington of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, of Columbia, for Amici Curiae Concerned Citizens for Responsible Government in Hampton County and South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys Association

Stephen G. Morrison and Jacob A. Sommer, both of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, of Columbia; and Hugh F. Young, Jr., of Products Liability Advisory Council, Inc., of Reston, for Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

Chief Justice TOAL:

Danny Whaley (Whaley), a locomotive engineer, filed a complaint against his former employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), alleging that, due to CSX's negligence, he was injured as a result of exposure to excessive heat in a locomotive cab. The jury awarded Whaley actual damages in the amount of $1,000,000. CSX appealed, and after certifying this case for review pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 24, 2000, Whaley reported to work at CSX's Maxwell Yard in Greenwood, South Carolina, to operate a familiar route from Greenwood to Laurens and then back.¹ On the way to Laurens, Whaley became disoriented and began experiencing stomach cramps, nausea, and diarrhea. He also noticed that he was not sweating, even though it was very hot in the locomotive cab. When he arrived in Laurens, Whaley went inside the depot office to cool off in the air conditioning. He tried drinking water but stopped because it made his stomach cramp.

Before Whaley began the return trip to Greenwood, he realized that because of his symptoms, he would not be able to make the trip. He returned to the depot and called 911.

362 S.C. 466

EMS arrived, and after learning that Whaley had not been drinking fluids and was experiencing dizziness, the paramedic administered fluids through an IV. The paramedic then recommended that Whaley be taken to the emergency room "to be checked out." Upon arrival at the emergency room, Whaley's temperature was either 99.1 or 99.7 degrees.² The emergency room physician determined that Whaley suffered heat exhaustion, dehydration, and acute abdominal pain. Whaley was kept in the emergency room for approximately two hours for observation and then was released

After that day, May 24, 2000, Whaley remained out of work for two weeks. On June 7, with his family doctor's permission, Whaley returned to work. Whaley testified that he still felt bad at the time, but he had to work or he would not get paid.

He worked June 7 and 8, and then took the next three days off because he was still not feeling well. The following Monday, June 12, Whaley returned to work, but the very next day, June 13, would be his last day working for CSX. He testified that, even though he did not feel well all day, he was able to complete his duties.

On June 14, 2000, Whaley went to a previously scheduled appointment with his family doctor, Dr. Hatfield, who told Whaley not to go back to work until doctors could determine why Whaley felt so badly and why he was unable to sweat upon exertion. Dr. Hatfield referred Whaley to a number of specialists. Dr. James, a cardiologist, testified that he found no cardiac abnormalities and thought, instead, that Whaley had a viral illness and, accordingly, referred him to an infectious disease specialist. Dr. Holman, an internal medicine specialist, testified that Whaley's symptoms were consistent with a viral illness, heat exhaustion, or dehydration.³

362 S.C. 467

After he was examined by the specialists, Whaley testified that he concluded "[t]here was nothing anybody could do." Because of his inability to perspire upon exertion, Whaley never returned to work. Since then, he has been limited in his physical activity, but has still been able to enjoy hobbies such as fishing and hunting. In January 2003, however, Whaley began experiencing dizziness and shortness of breath. As a result, doctors installed a pacemaker.

Whaley filed a complaint against CSX in Hampton County on February 14, 2001, asserting claims under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., and the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq., and alleging, in sum, that CSX was negligent for failing to provide him with a safe place to work. On November 1, 2002, CSX filed a motion to transfer venue to Greenwood County, which was denied. The case proceeded to trial in Hampton County, and the jury returned a verdict for Whaley in the amount of $1,000,000. CSX's post-trial motions were denied.

On appeal, CSX raises the following issues for review:

I. Did the trial court err in denying CSX's motion to transfer venue?

II. Did the trial court err in denying CSX's motion for JNOV?

III. Were Whaley's claims preempted by federal law?

IV. Did the trial court err in allowing medical experts to testify on Whaley's behalf about causation?

V. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence concerning injuries to other CSX employees, other employee complaints, and equipment on other CSX locomotives?

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. VENUE

A. RESIDENCY

CSX argues that venue was improper in Hampton County because CSX does not "reside" in Hampton County. We agree.

362 S.C. 468

Venue is the place or geographical location of trial. Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 238, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994); see also In re Asbestosis Cases, 276 S.C. 579, 581, 281 S.E.2d 112, 115 (1981) (noting that "venue" refers to the county where the action should be brought). The venue statute in South Carolina provides, in part, that an action "shall be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-7-30 (1976). A defendant's right to be tried in the county of its residence is a substantial right. Blizzard v. Miller, 306 S.C. 373, 375, 412 S.E.2d 406, 406 (1991).

The question of where a defendant resides is a question of law. Breland v. Love Chevrolet Olds, Inc., 339 S.C. 89, 92, 529 S.E.2d 11, 13 (2000). When the facts concerning a defendant's residence are uncontradicted, the trial court must, as a matter of law, change venue to the county where the defendant resides. Blizzard, 306 S.C. at 375, 412 S.E.2d at 406-07.

Early decisions by this Court established that, for purposes of venue, a foreign corporation resides in any county where it has an office and agent for the transaction of business. Sanders v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 235 S.C. 259, 111 S.E.2d 201 (1959); Hancock v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 211 S.C. 432, 45 S.E.2d 850 (1947); Coker v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 S.C. 13, 25 S.E.2d 894 (1943); Shelton v. S. Kraft Corp., 195 S.C. 81, 10 S.E.2d 341 (1940); Tucker v. Ingram, 187 S.C. 525, 198 S.E. 25 (1938); Campbell v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 161 S.C. 49, 159 S.E. 490 (1931); see also Hayes v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 98 S.C. 6, 81 S.E. 1102 (1914) (holding that a foreign railroad corporation resides in the county where it "owns a line of railway" and "maintains offices and agents ... for the transaction of its business"). Domestic corporations, on the other hand, have been held to reside (1) in any county where the corporation maintains an agent and transacts its corporate business or (2) in the county where the corporation maintains its principal place of business. See McGrath v. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co., 74 S.C. 69, 72, 54 S.E. 218, 218-19 (1906); Tobin v. Chester & L. Narrow-Gauge R.R. Co., 47 S.C. 387, 25 S.E. 283 (1896) (holding that a domestic railroad corporation resides in the county "where its line is located,

362 S.C. 469

and where it maintains a public office for the transaction of its business, and an agent upon whom process may be served").

In 1941, however, this Court expanded the definition of venue for domestic corporations. In Miller v. Boyle Constr. Co., this Court held that venue is proper in any county where a domestic corporation "owns property and transacts business." 198 S.C. 166, 172, 17 S.E.2d 312, 314-15 (1941). In support of its decision, the Court relied upon language in a 1927 statute concerning service of process on and jurisdiction over domestic corporations:

in the case of domestic corporations[,] service ... shall be effective and confer jurisdiction over any domestic corporation in any county where such domestic corporation shall own property and transact business regardless of whether or not such domestic corporation maintains an office or has agents in that county.

Id. at 172, 17 S.E.2d at 315 (emphases added). Although the statute pertained to service and jurisdiction — not venue — the Court decided that the statute "governed and controlled" the question of where a domestic corporation resides for purposes of venue. Id. As a result, counties where a domestic corporation owned property and transacted business became an additional place where venue could be found proper.

Six years later, the Court had the opportunity to extend the "owns property and transacts business" test to foreign corporations, but the Court declined to do so. See Hancock v....