Whisenhunt v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 29 January 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 8:15-cv-00173-RBH-JDA
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Tony O'Manley Whisenhunt, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Tony O'Manley Whisenhunt, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 8:15-cv-00173-RBH-JDA

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

January 29, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).¹ Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging an onset of disability date of April 1, 2009. [R. 157-62.] The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 80-103.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and on December5, 2013, ALJ Walter C. Herin, Jr. conducted a de novo hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 28-79.]

The ALJ issued a decision on March 27, 2014, finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act ("the Act"). [R. 10-27.] At Step 1,² the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2014, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2009, the alleged onset date. [R. 15, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, status post L5-S1 hemilaminectomy, foraminotomy and discectomy with radiculopathy; remote history of fractured hip; and peripheral vascular disease. [R. 15, Finding 3.] The ALJ also found Plaintiff had non-severe impairments of untreated hypertension, alcohol dependence, and marijuana abuse. [R.16.] At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 16, Finding 4.] The ALJ considered Listings 1.02, 1.04, and 4.12. [R. 16.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except no lifting or carrying over 10-15 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; no more than occasional stooping, crawling, crouching, kneeling, and climbing of stairs/ramps; no more than frequent balancing; no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; no standing or walking longer than 45 minutes at one time without the ability to sit; and avoidance of exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous machinery.

[R. 16, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at Step 4 that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. [R. 21, Finding 6.] However, based on his age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of a vocational expert, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R. 22, Finding 10.] Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from April 1, 2009, through the date of the decision. [R. 23, Finding 11.]

Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision but the Appeals Council declined. [R.1-5.] Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on January 13, 2015. [Doc. 1.]

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff argues the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and should be remanded because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate whether Plaintiff met Listing 1.04A; failed to conduct a proper Step 5 analysis; and failed to properly assess opinion evidence. [Doc. 12.] The Commissioner, however, contends that the decision is supported by substantial evidence. [Doc. 13.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate tosupport the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963))("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'").

Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Bird v. Comm'r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).

The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficientreasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).

The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding remand was appropriate where the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record of the claimant's residual functional capacity); Brehem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding remand was appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm but was also insufficient for court to find the claimant disabled). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four is usually the proper course to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision or for additional investigation.See Radford v. Comm'r, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); see also Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (remanding case where decision of ALJ contained "a gap in its reasoning" because ALJ did not say he was discounting testimony or why); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (remanding case where neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council indicated the weight given to relevant evidence). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. See Smith, 782 F.2d at 1182 ("The [Commissioner] and the claimant may produce further evidence on remand."). After a remand under sentence four, the court enters a final and immediately appealable judgment and then loses jurisdiction. Sargent, 941 F.2d 1207 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).

In contrast, sentence six provides:

The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may remand a case to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence only if four prerequisites are met: (1) the evidence is relevant to the determination of disability at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence is material to the extent that the Commissioner's decision might...