Whitcomb v. City of Panama City

• Decision Date: 31 December 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 5:13-cv-30-RS-EMT
• Parties: RONALD WHITCOMB, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PANAMA CITY; FRANK McKEITHEN, in his official capacity as SHERIFF OF BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA; CHRIS TAYLOR, individually; MARK AVILES, individually; JEFFREY BECKER, Individually; and SCOTT TEEPLE, individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

RONALD WHITCOMB, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PANAMA CITY; FRANK McKEITHEN, in his official capacity asSHERIFF OF BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA; CHRIS TAYLOR, individually;MARK AVILES, individually; JEFFREY BECKER, Individually;and SCOTT TEEPLE, individually, Defendants.

CASE NO. 5:13-cv-30-RS-EMT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PANAMA CITY DIVISION

ORDERED December 31, 2013

ORDER

Before me are the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Chris Taylor (Doc. 113) and Plaintiff's Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Taylor's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 152).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as toany material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden, the court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

An issue of fact is material "if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Wright v. Sandestin Investments, LLC, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2012). Thus, if reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, a mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).

BACKGROUND

I accept the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Galvez v. Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1343 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002)). "'All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-movant.'" Id. (quoting Burton v. City of BelleGlade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999); Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982).

On September 21, 2010, Plaintiff filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Doc. 147. The restraining order sought by Ms. Whitcomb on September 20, 2010, was denied on September 30, 2010. Doc. 147. According to Plaintiff, after September 19, 2010, Ms. Whitcomb prevented him from seeing their minor child. Doc. 1, at ¶17. In October, Plaintiff attempted to contact various agencies and programs for assistance in helping locate his minor son. Doc. 147. He was told by those agencies, including Bay County Sheriff's Office, Panama City Police Department, and the Department of Family Services, that because it was a civil matter the programs could not assist. Doc. 147. Subsequently, Plaintiff enlisted the aid of his children to locate Ms. Whitcomb and the minor child's location. Doc. 147.

On November 8, 2010, Plaintiff's adult children followed Ms. Whitcomb to the Health Department in Panama City, and contacted Plaintiff via telephone to inform him that Ms. Whitcomb and the minor child were there. Doc. 147. Although Plaintiff and Ms. Whitcomb disagree on what occurred in the Health Department parking lot, it is undisputed that the minor child, who was admittedly forcibly taken from Ms. Whitcomb, was later located with Plaintiff in Walton County. Doc. 147; Doc. 126-16, p. 7.

After Plaintiff's adult children obtained the minor child and placed him in Plaintiff's vehicle, Plaintiff left the Health Department parking lot. Doc. 147. Subsequently, Defendant Taylor, a law enforcement officer employed by the City of Panama City, Florida Police Department, and other officers, including Defendant Aviles, responded to Ms. Whitcomb's 911 call reporting the abduction of her three year old child. Doc. 147. On the 911 recording, Ms. Whitcomb reports that her estranged husband and she were going through a divorce and that her adult step-daughter and three men surrounded her in the Bay County Health Department parking lot and forcibly took her minor child. Doc. 116-8.

During Ms. Whitcomb's sworn statement to Defendant Taylor, she reported that her soon to be ex-husband's daughter, Racheal, physically held her at her vehicle while three men grabbed her three-and-a-half year old son. Doc. 116-2. Additionally, Ms. Whitcomb told Defendant Taylor that Plaintiff has had contact with the minor child, but has not seen him in about a month. Doc. 116-2. She was adamant, however, that she did not give Racheal or the three men permission to take the minor child. Doc. 116-2.

While Defendant Taylor interviewed Ms. Whitcomb, the vehicle Ms. Whitcomb described in her sworn statement was located occupied with Racheal and a man later identified as Paul Hatfield. Doc. 114. However, the minor child was not located in the vehicle. Doc. 147. Racheal and Paul were brought to thestation where Defendant Taylor proceeded to question them under oath. Doc. 114. While under oath, Racheal informed Defendant Taylor that the minor is Plaintiff's child, Ms. Whitcomb had been hiding him from Plaintiff, and that it was Plaintiff's idea to follow Ms. Whitcomb and forcibly take the minor from her. Doc. 116-3. Racheal admitted that as soon as Ms. Whitcomb came out of the health department, she forcibly grabbed the minor and took him to her dad, who was waiting a few cars down. Doc. 116-3. Similarly, while under oath, Paul Hatfield corroborated Racheal's statement and informed Defendant Taylor that Plaintiff personally told him to get the minor child. Doc. 116-4.

While on his way to Walton County, Plaintiff was contacted by an individual who identified himself as Chris Taylor¹, Detective for Panama City Police Department. Doc. 147. According to Plaintiff, during this conversation Plaintiff explained to Defendant Taylor that there were no formal custody orders in place. Doc. 147. However, the officer ordered Plaintiff to reveal his location and turn himself in on charges of kidnapping his minor son. Doc. 147. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant Taylor "told Plaintiff that he did not want to have to have law enforcement pull a gun on Plaintiff in front of" the minor child. Doc. 147.

Plaintiff eventually stopped his vehicle in Walton County, and the Walton County Sherriff's Deputies arrived. Doc. 147. Again, Plaintiff explained thatthere were no court orders in place preventing Plaintiff from having physical custody of his minor son. Doc. 147. The Walton Count officers informed Plaintiff that because the Panama City Police Department was in the process of obtaining an arrest warrant, they had to hold him. Doc. 147.

In connection with his investigation, and after consultation with his supervisors Sergeant Mark Smith and Lieutenant Paul Powell, and the Office of the State Attorney on the issue of probable cause, Defendant Taylor executed a probable cause affidavit seeking a warrant for Whitcomb's arrest based on conspiracy to commit kidnapping. Doc. 113. In the probable cause affidavit, Defendant Taylor states that the Plaintiff,

did without lawful authority knowingly procure another to take a three year old child from his mother in the absence of a court order determining custody or visitation. He did so by soliciting his daughter Racheal Krueger-Whitcomb, his son Timothy Whitcomb and Racheal's boyfriend Paul Hatfield to locate the child and his mother. Upon locating the child and his mother Racheal called her father and told him they had located the two and she was following them. Upon the arrival of the child and his mother at the Bay County Health Department Racheal called her father and let him know their location.

The [Plaintiff] arrived at the health department and waited for his daughter, his son and her boyfriend to take the child by force and deliver the child to him against the child's mothers will. He did receive the three year old child from his son Timothy Whitcomb who took the child from the custody of his mother against her will. The [Plaintiff] left the health department with the child and was located in Walton County, Florida with the child in his custody without the permission of the mother.

Doc. 116-5 (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not dispute that a judge issued a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest, but claims that the affidavit presented to the judge was not accurate or truthful. Doc. 147. According to Defendant Taylor, he personally drove his warrant application to the home of Judge Shane Vann, and after explaining the nature of the situation to the Judge, Judge Shane Vann determined that probable cause existed and issued a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. Doc. 114, Doc. 116-5.

After the Panama City Police Department obtained the arrest warrant, Plaintiff was placed into custody and held at the Walton County Jail until November 13, 2010, when he appeared in front of Judge Overstreet. Doc. 147. Judge Overstreet found no probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and released him from custody. Doc. 126-5. On February 17, 2011, the Office of the State Attorney charged Plaintiff with Interfering with Child Custody. Doc. 126-8. However, on May 23, 2011, this charge was dismissed. Doc. 126-7.

ANALYSIS

Count I: Fourth Amendment Arrest

In Count I of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Taylor violated the Fourth Amendment when he arrested Plaintiff, on November 8, 2010, without probable cause or other legal process. Doc. 1. Defendant Taylor claims that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law...