White v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company
| Decision Date | 20 July 1910 |
| Parties | E. C. WHITE v. MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Pettis Circuit Court. -- Hon. Louis Hoffman, Judge.
Reversed.
Geo. P B. Jackson, Joseph M. Bryson and Lee W. Hagerman for appellant; R. T. Railey amicus curiae.
(1) The objection that the law is violative of section 53 of article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, prohibiting the enactment of any local or special law "granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity" is without force for the reason that that provision of the Constitution was not leveled against laws which apply to a portion of the people of the State as a class. (2) The only ground upon which the statute can be assailed, if at all, is that it is violative of section 30 of article 2, providing that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process," or of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, providing as above and that no law shall be passed by any State denying to any person equal protection of the laws. The law is not violative of either the Federal or State Constitution in this respect, because the effect of the statute in question is to make a class of people in the State of Missouri, all of whom are entitled to the same rights, subject to the same liabilities, to be controlled by the same kind of proceedings, and all subject to the same limitations. Daggs v. Insurance Co., 136 Mo. 380, and 172 U.S. 557; Railroad v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205; Railroad v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26; Railroad v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512; Soon Hing v Crowley, 113 U.S. 703; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27; Railroad v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96; Railroad v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404; Hamman v. Coal Co., 156 Mo. 232; Humes v. Railroad, 82 Mo 221; Burkholder v. Trust Co., 82 Mo. 572; Steele v. Railroad, 84 Mo. 57; Phillips v. Railroad, 86 Mo. 540; Perkins v. Railroad, 103 Mo. 52; Briggs v. Railroad, 111 Mo. 168; State ex rel. v. Wofford, 121 Mo. 61; State ex rel. v. County Court, 128 Mo. 427; State ex rel. v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680; Powell v. Sherwood, 162 Mo. 605; Cambron v. Railroad, 165 Mo. 543; State v. Whittaker, 160 Mo. 59; State v. Etchman, 189 Mo. 648; State ex rel. v. Messerly, 198 Mo. 351; O'Connor v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622; Coffey v. Carthage, 200 Mo. 616. (3) Garnishment is not an original or independent suit. It is simply an ancillary proceeding, in aid of the original cause. It has for its purpose the sequestration of the debtor's property in order that it may be held in custodia legis pending the litigation. Tinsley v. Savage, 50 Mo. 141; Fletcher v. Wear, 81 Mo. 530; Chicago Herald v. Bryan, 195 Mo. 595; Millinery Co. v. Johnson, 130 Mo.App. 331; State ex rel. v. Hughes, 135 Mo.App. 134. Garnishment proceedings are purely creatures of statute. They are in derogation of the common law, and should be strictly construed. Haley v. Railroad, 80 Mo. 113; Howell v. Sherwood, 213 Mo. 576; Bank v. Barnett, 98 Mo.App. 479. Whenever a right of action is given by statute, which did not exist at the common law, it should be strictly construed, and only those named as beneficiaries therein should be construed to come within the provisions of said statute. In other words, where the Legislature grants a right of action which did not exist at common law, it has the undoubted right to name the terms and conditions on which the proposed beneficiary shall act in reference to same. He must take the remedy as given by the Legislature, or he is not entitled to proceed thereunder by accepting a part of its benefits. Oates v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 518; Gilkeson v. Railroad, 222 Mo. 185; Clark v. Railroad, 219 Mo. 539; Millar v. Railroad, 216 Mo. 105; Broadwater v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 437; Strottman v. Railroad, 211 Mo. 227; Bates v. Railroad, 205 Mo. 493; Packard v. Railroad, 181 Mo. 421; Barron v. Lead & Zinc Co., 172 Mo. 228; Hennessy v. Brewing Co., 145 Mo. 113; Barker v. Railroad, 91 Mo. 86; Gibbs v. Hannibal, 82 Mo. 149; McNamara v. Slavens, 76 Mo. 330; Proctor v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 112. Applying the principles of law enunciated by the authorities, it is clear that said sections 3433, 3435, 3447 and 3448 should be construed together, and if so construed they are not in conflict with any provisions of the Federal or Missouri Constitutions. The creditor, in a case of this character, cannot accept the benefits of a part of the garnishment law and repudiate the right of the Legislature to withhold or modify those rights which have already been conferred upon him. Hart v. Handlin, 43 Mo. 174; Jarrett v. Morton, 44 Mo. 275; Estes v. Reynolds, 75 Mo. 565; Dow v. Elec. Co., 31 A. (N. H.) 22; Elec. Co. v. Dow, 166 U.S. 489; Gano v. Railroad, 87 N.W. 719; Railroad v. Gano, 190 U.S. 557; Commissioner v. Railroad, 89 N. W. (Mich.) 967; Railroad v. Commissioner, 193 U.S. 29; Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 350; Baldwin v. Kouns, 81 Ala. 272; Otto v. Long, 77 P. 885; Pitkin v. Springfield, 112 Mass. 509; Deverson v. Railroad, 58 N.H. 129; Hart v. Folsom, 70 N.H. 213; Railroad v. Railroad, 35 S. E. (S. C.) 555; Moore v. Napier, 42 S. E. (S. C.) 997; Purcell v. Conrad, 5 S. E. (Va.) 549.
E. C. White and Barnett & Barnett for respondent.
(1) Section 3447 is unconstitutional and void. It is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from denying to its citizens the equal protection of the laws, in that it arbitrarily undertakes to separate wage-earners who are in the employ of a railroad corporation from other classes of people and even from other wage-earners, and provides for them a different rule of action and a different protection. It protects such railroad wage-earners from garnishment in sums of $ 200 or less until after judgment shall have been recovered, even where a ground of attachment exists, while it does not afford such protection to any other class of people or to any other wage-earners. It is not the equal protection of the law which the Constitution guarantees. In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125; Niagara Falls Insurance Co., 110 F. 823; People v. Construction Co., 175 N.Y. 84; Mathews v. People, 202 Ill. 389. (2) Said section is also in conflict with sec. 53, art. 4, of the Constitution of Missouri, which provides that "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity." This section clearly grants an immunity from garnishment not granted to others. In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 130. Said section is also in conflict with sec. 30, art. 2, and sec. 4, art. 2 of the Constitution of Missouri. In re Flukes, supra. (3) This statute is not, as appellant contends, an exercise of legislative judgment or discretion and is not a police regulation. It is not an attempt to regulate the railroad business, but is an arbitrary separation of different classes of debtors and different classes of wage-earners, and provides that wage-earners who labor for railroad corporations are exempt from garnishment under attachment, while other laborers are subject to garnishment under such circumstances -- thus making an unjust discrimination, and denying the equal protection of the laws, and granting an immunity to railroad employees not granted to others. Railroad v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 104; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 367; Black v. Seal, 6 Honslow (Del.) 541; Pearson v. Portland, 69 Me. 278; Northern Pacific, 3 P. 134; Templer v. Examiners, 131 Mich. 254. The classification must not be arbitrary and without reasonable grounds on which it may be based. Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334; Harmon v. State, 66 Oh. St. 249; Goodale v. Suell, 62 S.C. 516; Stratton v. Morris, 89 Tenn. 497; Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205; Cotton v. Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79; Morgan v. Trust Co., 170 U.S. 283; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303.
OPINION
In Banc.
Plaintiff brought suit by attachment in a justice's court against one York on a promissory note for $ 58.40 and interest; the railroad company was summoned as garnishee; there was no personal service of process on York, he was brought in by publication only on the constable's return of non est, no appearance for him was entered, and nothing of his was reached by the attachment except the debt which the railroad company, the garnishee, owed him. The garnishee by its answer to the interrogatories admitted that it was "indebted to the defendant E. P. York, a married man, the head of a family and a resident of the State of Missouri in the sum of $ 76.90, which amount is for services rendered by defendant to this garnishee during the month of October, 1903, and will be due and payable on or about the 1st day of November, 1903; said sum is for wages earned during the thirty days next preceding its becoming due." The garnishee's answer then stated that no judgment had been rendered against the defendant, that the amount claimed by plaintiff being less than two hundred dollars, and the amount the garnishee owed defendant being for wages owing him as an employee of the railroad company, it was not subject to garnishment, but was exempt therefrom under the provisions of sections 3447 and 3448, Revised Statutes 1899. There was no denial of the garnishee's answer. The justice rendered judgment against the garnishee for $ 76.90, and the latter appealed.
When the cause reached the circuit court the plaintiff filed a motion for a judgment against the garnishee on the admission of the indebtedness in its answer,...
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