White v. Richardson

Decision Date22 September 2022
Docket Number356307
PartiesJONNIE H. WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKITHA NIKI RICHARDSON, Defendant, and COUNTRY PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 20-002380-NI

Before: Amy Ronayne Krause, P.J., and Kathleen Jansen and Brock A. Swartzle, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Johnnie H. White, appeals as of right the order granting defendant, Country Preferred Insurance Company (Country Preferred),[1] summary disposition. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant summary disposition because the provision of the insurance policy shortening the period for plaintiff to file a claim for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits is contrary to Michigan public policy. Plaintiff also contends that the provisions of the insurance policy relating to arbitration are vague and ambiguous, and the period of limitations relating to plaintiff's claim was tolled when the complaint was filed. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On the night of June 9, 2017, plaintiff was driving his motorcycle in Detroit. When plaintiff approached an intersection defendant, Lakitha Niki Richardson (Richardson), driving a 1996 Chevrolet Monte Carlo, began making a left turn, resulting in plaintiff hitting the passenger side of Richardson's vehicle. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital. At the time of the accident, plaintiff s motorcycle was covered under the insurance policy of his wife, Angela Middleton, with defendant, which is headquartered in Illinois. According to the insurance policy, the motorcycle was garaged at an Illinois address.

On February 14, 2020, plaintiff commenced this action against Richardson for negligence and defendant for UM coverage related to injuries he sustained in the accident.[2] Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), arguing that under the insurance policy, plaintiffs claim for UM benefits was barred because he filed the complaint more than two years after the accident, and because plaintiff never submitted a written demand for arbitration. The trial court agreed with defendant and granted summary disposition in defendant's favor. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This appeal resulted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"This Court . . . reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition." Dell v Citizens Ins Co of America, 312 Mich.App. 734, 739; 880 N.W.2d 280 (2015). In addition, "[t]his Court reviews a trial court's findings of fact for clear error." Kuhlgert v Mich. State Univ, 328 Mich.App. 357, 368; 937 N.W.2d 716 (2019), citing MCR 2.613(C). "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Berryman v Mackey, 327 Mich.App. 711, 717-718; 935 N.W.2d 94 (2019).

"Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich. 177, 183; 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds may differ." Id. This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) by considering "the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary evidence submitted in [the] light most favorable to the nonmoving party[.]" Bragan v Symanzik, 263 Mich.App. 324, 327; 687 N.W.2d 881 (2004).

Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. For a motion filed under MCR 2.116(C)(7):

[T]his Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff, unless other evidence contradicts them. If any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence are submitted, the court must consider them to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. If no facts are in dispute, and if reasonable minds could not differ regarding the legal effect of those facts, the question whether the claim is barred is an issue of law for the court. However, if a question of fact exists to the extent that factual development could provide a basis for recovery, dismissal is inappropriate. [Hutchinson v Ingham Co Health Dep't, 328 Mich.App. 108, 123; 935 N.W.2d 612 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).]

"Questions involving the proper interpretation of a contract or the legal effect of a contractual clause are also reviewed de novo." McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich. 191, 197; 747 N.W.2d 811 (2008). "[This Court] construes insurance contracts in the same manner as other contracts, assigning the words in the contract their ordinary and plain meaning if such would be apparent to a reader of the instrument." Auto Owners Ins Co v Seils, 310 Mich.App. 132, 145; 871 N.W.2d 530 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

This Court also reviews de novo the interpretation of administrative rules. Romulus v Mich. Dep't of Environmental Quality, 260 Mich.App. 54, 64; 678 N.W.2d 444 (2003). "The rules of statutory construction apply to both statutes and administrative rules." United Parcel Serv, Inc v Bureau of Safety & Regulation, 277 Mich.App. 192, 202; 745 N.W.2d 125 (2007). Relatedly, "[t]he role of this Court in interpreting statutory language is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute." Mich Ass'n of Home Builders v City of Troy, 504 Mich. 204, 212; 934 N.W.2d 713 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[W]here the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted; alterations in original).

This Court "likewise review[s] de novo issues concerning choice and conflicts of law." In re Bibi Guardianship, 315 Mich.App. 323, 328; 890 N.W.2d 387 (2016) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to defendant because the provision reducing the limitations period to file a UM claim was contrary to Michigan law. Defendant argues the insurance policy is enforceable because Illinois law is favored in this case. We agree with defendant.

A. CHOICE OF LAW

"[W]hen the parties have agreed to an explicit choice of law, that choice will be respected unless there are compelling reasons for not doing so." Chrysler Corp v Skyline Indus Servs, Inc, 448 Mich. 113, 122; 528 N.W.2d 698 (1995). When the parties have not agreed on an explicit choice of law, and the issue is one sounding in contract, Michigan courts will turn to 1 Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, 2d, § 188. See Talmer Bank & Trust v Parikh, 304 Mich.App. 373, 394-395; 848 N.W.2d 408 (2014), vacated in part on other grounds, 497 Mich. 857 (2014) (using 1 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 2d, to determine whether Michigan law or Nevada law applied to a promissory note for a case commenced in Michigan). In 1 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 2d, § 188 states:

(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203. [1 Restatement Conflict of Laws, 2d, § 188(1) through (3).]

Defendant argues this Court should apply Illinois law to this case, and plaintiff argues this Court should apply Michigan law. Because the insurance policy contains no choice-of-law provision, we review 1 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 2d. The place of contracting, place of negotiation of the contract, and the domicile of defendant were in Illinois at the time the contract was entered into. Middleton, the named insured in the insurance policy, insured the Harley Davidson motorcycle under an Illinois address, and defendant is an insurance company headquartered in Illinois. The domicile of the parties of the insurance policy is especially important considering defendant does not issue insurance contracts in Michigan. See 1 Restatement Conflict of Laws, 2d, § 188, comment e ("a corporation's principal place of business is a more important contact than the place of incorporation, and this is particularly true in situations where the corporation does little, or no, business in the latter state."). Therefore, at least three Restatement factors support the application of Illinois law.

Although the motorcycle was apparently located in Michigan, the insurance policy lists the motorcycle as being housed in Illinois, so, for the purposes of the insurance policy, the motorcycle appeared to be located in Illinois. Because both parties to the insurance policy were domiciled in Illinois when the contract was entered into, and the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT