White v. State
Decision Date | 04 April 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-1148.,SC00-1148. |
Citation | 817 So.2d 799 |
Parties | William Melvin WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Chandler R. Muller, Winter Park, FL, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.
William Melvin White appeals his sentence of death following resentencing. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the death sentence.
The facts of the crime and procedural history of this case are detailed in White v. State, 729 So.2d 909 (Fla.1999):
[n. 1]. The trial court found: (1) the murder was committed during the course of a kidnapping; (2) the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder enforcement of laws; and (3) the murder was heinous, wicked, and cruel.
[n. 2]. The trial court found that appellant had no prior violent felony conviction.
Appellant filed [his] initial rule 3.850 motion in 1983. In 1987, while appellant's rule 3.850 motion was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). Hitchcock held that a Florida jury charge which precluded the trial court and the advisory jury from considering nonstatutory mitigation was unconstitutional. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for habeas relief based on Hitchcock. The trial court stayed further proceedings in this postconviction motion until final disposition of the habeas petition. We rejected appellant's claim for relief, concluding that "[t]he charge which may have limited the jury to a consideration of statutory mitigating circumstance was clearly harmless." White v. Dugger, 523 So.2d 140, 141 (Fla.),cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 184, 102 L.Ed.2d 153 (1988). The trial court subsequently held an evidentiary hearing on most of appellant's claims and denied relief on all claims by order. ...
In White's appeal of the denial of his 3.850 motion, this Court affirmed the trial court's order as to his conviction. See id. at 910. However, on the basis of a Hitchcock error,1 we vacated White's death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury. See id.
On remand, the resentencing jury voted ten to two in favor of imposing the death sentence. In sentencing White to the death penalty, the trial court found four aggravators.2 The trial court also found and assigned weight to one statutory and nine nonstatutory mitigating factors.3 In weighing the nature and quality of these aggravators and mitigators, the trial court found that the aggravators greatly outweighed the mitigators.
On appeal to this Court, White raises five issues: (1) the trial court erred in not permitting the cross-examination of the key State witness concerning the underlying facts of the witness's subsequent murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws; (3) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating factor that the murder was committed while White was under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another; (4) the imposition of the death penalty is disproportionate; (5) White's execution, after serving more than twenty-two years on death row, will constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
We summarily reject White's fifth claim, as it has previously been considered and rejected. See Rose v. State, 787 So.2d 786, 805 (Fla.2001)
(. ) We now turn to the issues that merit discussion.
White claims that the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel's full cross-examination of Richard DiMarino, the State's key witness and the other perpetrator of the 1978 murder of Crawford, regarding the facts underlying the third-degree murder to which DiMarino pled guilty in Maryland in 1990. This Maryland crime occurred twelve years after White was convicted for the first-degree murder of Crawford.
The facts underlying DiMarino's Maryland crime occurred in July 1990, when DiMarino and a codefendant were involved in an incident while riding their motorcycles. Words with two rival biker gang members escalated into a fight with the two rival bikers at an intersection. One of the two rival bikers fled, while DiMarino and a codefendant continued to fight with the remaining biker. In the fight, the remaining biker was stabbed and died from a single stab wound to the chest. DiMarino agreed to plead guilty to third-degree murder and agreed to testify against his codefendant in exchange for a reduced sentence of twenty years with ten years of the sentence suspended.
Prior to DiMarino's testimony at the resentencing proceeding, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit defense counsel from questioning DiMarino regarding the underlying facts of the 1990 Maryland murder conviction. After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court stated:
DiMarino gave testimony, on direct and cross-examination, that in 1978, he was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison for the third-degree murder of Crawford. Thereafter, DiMarino agreed to testify against his codefendants, Guy Ennis Smith and White, in exchange for concurrent time in prison on other unrelated felony charges. To protect DiMarino from retaliation from members of the Outlaws motorcycle gang, the State agreed to remove a tattoo and transfer DiMarino to an out-of-state prison facility.
DiMarino further testified that he had been convicted of more than twenty-five felonies, including the 1990 Maryland third-degree murder for which he received a twenty-year sentence with ten years of the sentence suspended, in exchange for his testimony against his codefendant. Furthermore, defense counsel established that DiMarino was on parole for the 1990 Maryland third-degree murder conviction; thus, any deviation from DiMarino's original 1978 testimony in the Crawford case could have been the basis for a perjury charge, constituting a parole violation that could have required DiMarino to serve his complete sentence for the 1990 Maryland murder...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Johnson v. State
...786 So.2d at 552. Discretion is abused only when the trial court's decision is "arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable." White v. State, 817 So.2d 799, 806 (Fla.2002) (citing Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1053 n. 2 The record does not indicate that the trial court acted arbitrarily, fancif......
-
Muhammad v. State
...reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003) (quoting White v. State, 817 So.2d 799, 806 (2002)). The Court has long acknowledged that the public records procedure under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 “is not inte......
-
Geralds v. State
...reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003) (quoting White v. State, 817 So.2d 799, 806 (Fla.2002)). We have already held that the circuit court did not err in summarily denying Geralds' Brady claim regarding other suspect......
-
Hernandez v. State
...even though the codefendant received a lesser sentence but was actively involved in the victim's murder. See, e.g., White v. State, 817 So.2d 799, 801-02, 809-11 (Fla.2002) (finding the defendant's death sentence proportionate where the defendant delivered the fatal stab wounds to the victi......