Wigfall v. State, 75-231
| Decision Date | 21 October 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-231,75-231 |
| Citation | 323 So.2d 587 |
| Parties | Carl Lee WIGFALL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Mark King Leban, Asst. Public Defender, and John C. Coleman, Legal Intern, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Joel D. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.
Appellant, defendant in the trial court, brings this appeal from an order of the trial court withholding adjudication of his guilt after a plea of Nolo contendere.
Pursuant to a complaint affidavit, an information was filed charging appellant with three criminal violations: (1) carrying a concealed weapon, (2) unlawful possession of cannabis in an amount of not more than five grams, and (3) possession of a controlled substance implement. On September 20, 1974, appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that his rights against unlawful search and seizure had been violated, and that the provisions of § 30.384 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, relating to the impoundment of motor vehicles and inventory searches, had not been followed. On January 17, 1975, a hearing was held on this motion. During the course of the hearing, appellant's motion to suppress was denied and appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal, which was accepted by the trial court. At the conclusion of this hearing, the court issued its order withholding adjudication of guilt from which appellant brings this appeal.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the initial encounter, between the arresting officer and himself, which led to his arrest and search violated the requirements of § 901.151, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and constituted an unlawful invasion of his constitutional rights. Also, appellant contends, assuming arguendo, that the initial encounter was lawful, that the subsequent search and discovery of the contraband was an unreasonable and unconstitutional invasion of his rights.
At the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, the record reveals that only the arresting officer, Anthony Leizze, from the Dade County Public Safety Department, testified. His testimony was that the initial encounter with appellant occurred on August 29, 1975, at 1:00 A.M. when he approached appellant, who was sitting in an automobile parked in a parking lot next to a bar, for a routine check. Officer Leizze explained that he had approached appellant because there was a high rate of narcotics used in the area and a number of stolen vehicles had been dropped off in the parking lot. Officer Leizze then asked appellant for his identification and car registration. Upon receipt of his identification, officer Leizze gave it to another officer for a records check. The records check revealed that a bench warrant had been issued for appellant. After Officer Leizze learned of the bench warrant, he asked appellant to get out of the car. As appellant complied, the officers asked him to turn around and put his hands on top of the car. Officer Leizze then searched appellant and advised him he was under arrest on the bench warrant. During the course of searching appellant, Officer Leizze, while kneeling down searching appellant's legs, observed a glass and a gun under the front seat of the automobile. The glass contained cannabis.
The basic question for our determination is whether or not the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress.
The trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress comes to this court with a presumption of correctness and, in testing the accuracy of the trial court's conclusions, we should interpret the evidence and all reasonable inferences and deductions capable of being drawn therefrom in a...
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Wright v. State, AI-362
...a high rate of drug related arrests is one factor properly considered in determining a reasonable suspicion. Cf. Wigfall v. State, 323 So.2d 587, 589-590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).4 The Miller and Parker courts relied on Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), as ......
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...stop. The trial court rested this portion of its holding upon United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.1997); Wigfall v. State, 323 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); State v. Foust, 262 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); and Ruffin v. State, 201 Ga.App. 792, 412 S.E.2d 850 (1991). Respondent pl......
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