Wilcut v. Innovative Warehousing, ED 88247.

• Decision Date: 15 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. ED 88247.,ED 88247.
• Parties: Floyd WILCUT, dec., and Sharon Wilcut, Appellants, v. INNOVATIVE WAREHOUSING, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

247 S.W.3d 1

Floyd WILCUT, dec., and Sharon Wilcut, Appellants, v. INNOVATIVE WAREHOUSING, Respondent.

No. ED 88247.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

January 15, 2008.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 10, 2008.

George T. Floros, St. Louis, MO, for respondents.

Gary G. Matheny, Farmington, MO, for appellant.

OPINION

GLENN A. NORTON, Presiding Judge.

Sharon Wilcut ("Dependent") appeals the Labor and Industrial Relation Commission's ("Commission") final award denying compensation on her claim for death benefits. We hold that the Commission erred in finding that Dependent's husband, Floyd Wilcut ("Employee"), unreasonably refused a blood transfusion. We reverse the award and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Employee was a truck driver for Innovative Warehousing ("Employer"). He was involved in an accident in which he sustained several severe injuries. Employer does not dispute that the accident occurred in the scope of Employee's employment. Employee was taken to a hospital for treatment. He died seven days later.

Employee's treatment was complicated by his refusal to accept a blood transfusion. Employee was a Jehovah's Witness. Members of that faith believe it is a great sin to accept a blood transfusion. Employee was conscious and able to make decisions for himself upon admission to the hospital, and he made it clear that he would not accept the transfusion. This was affirmed by his family and others close to him both before and after losing consciousness. Employee was unable to undergo essential procedures to treat his wounds because he would not accept a blood transfusion, and he died from cardiac ischemia and severe anemia due to the blood lost following the accident.

There was no evidence that Employer objected to the refusal. Employer paid Employee's funeral expenses and paid death benefits to Dependent for nearly two years after the accident. After Employer stopped paying, Dependent filed this action for an award of death benefits commencing from the date they were terminated.

At the hearing in front of the administrative law judge ("ALJ"), doctors testified that Employee's death was preventable if he had accepted the transfusion. A Jehovah's Witness church elder and Employee's family members testified that refusal of blood transfusions is a tenet of the faith and that Employee was a follower of the faith and in good standing with the church. The elder also testified that a Jehovah's Witness may seek forgiveness for sins. The ALJ found, among other things, that Employee's refusal was not unreasonable under section 287.140.5,¹ given his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness, and therefore he was entitled to benefits.

Employer appealed to the Commission. The Commission adopted the ALJ's findings of fact. The Commission differed with the ALJ, however, in its analysis of the reasonableness of Employee's refusal to accept a blood transfusion. The Commission found the refusal unreasonable both because the physical risk was minimal compared to the near certainty Employee would survive his injuries if he accepted the transfusion, and because Jehovah's Witnesses believe they can seek forgiveness for their sins.

Dependent appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

On appeal from a decision of the Commission, we review questions of law and will reverse, remand, modify or set aside the Commission's decision only where we find one of the following: (1) that the Commission acted without or in excess of its power; (2) that the award was procured by fraud; (3) that the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; or (4) that there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. Zimmerman v. City of Richmond Heights, 194 S.W.3d 875, 876 (Mo.App. E.D.2006) (citing section 287.495.1). The Commission's factual findings are conclusive if they are without fraud and supported by substantial and competent evidence on the whole record. Willcut v. Division of Employment Security, 193 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Mo.App. E.D.2006). This standard is not met when the award is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222-23 (Mo. banc 2003). We are not bound, however, by the Commission's determinations of questions of law, which we review independently. Willcut, 193 S.W.3d at 412. We defer to the Commission's determinations of witness credibility and its resolutions of conflicting evidence. Id.

B. The Commission's Decision

We first closely examine the Commission's decision because of the case's unique facts and the decision's complicated reasoning. The Commission addressed Employee's refusal with the aid of Martin v. Industrial Accident Commission, 147 Cal. App.2d 137, 304 P.2d 828 (1956). In Martin, an employee sustained a work-related injury. Id. at 828-29. The employee and his wife informed hospital authorities and the treating physician that he was a Jehovah's Witness and therefore refused blood transfusions. Id. at 829. He died shortly thereafter from complications that arose during a surgical procedure. Id. He likely would have survived had a transfusion been part of the treatment. Id. California's industrial commission denied compensation because it determined that the refusal was unreasonable, interpreting a statute similar to ours here. Id. (quoting "section 4056 of the Labor Code" as it existed in 1956). The California court framed the issue as whether, "in the light of all of the evidence including his religious beliefs, it was unreasonable for him to refuse to accept a treatment necessary to save his life." Id. at 830. The court found that it was unreasonable, explaining that the legislature conditioned an employer's liability on finding that the employee's death was not "the result of the voluntary act of the employee in refusing medical attention." Id.

Here, the Commission agreed with the court's rationale in Martin and considered all facts in the record that it found relevant to its decision, including Employee's beliefs. It found: (1) that the physical risk of transfusion was minimal compared to the benefit; (2) that Employee was 53-years-old at the time of his death; (3) that the spiritual risk from Employee's faith's perspective "was the commission of a capital sin, which would hinder prayer and could prevent enjoyment of everlasting life;" and (4) that "Jehovah's Witnesses believe that Jehovah forgives, so if [E]mployee had lived, [E]mployee may have been able to atone for the sin of accepting the blood transfusion." The Commission concluded that Employee's refusal was unreasonable and "broke the medical causal link between work-related accident and his death."

C. Unreasonable Refusal of Treatment or Procedure Under Section 287.140.5

Whether a claimant's refusal of treatment is unreasonable is a question of fact. Stawizynski v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 936 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Mo. App. E.D.1996), overruled on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 222-23. Under our standard of review, we must examine whether the Commission's determination — that Employee's refusal of treatment was unreasonable — was supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record and was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Our review of Missouri caselaw, however, reveals no case where the reasonableness of an employee's decision to forego treatment was based on religious beliefs. We must then determine what is meant by "unreasonable" in section 287.140.5. Section 287.140.5 states, in pertinent part, that:

No compensation shall be payable for the death or disability of an employee, if and insofar as the death or disability may be caused, continued or aggravated by any unreasonable refusal to submit to any medical or surgical treatment or operation, the risk of which is, in the opinion of the division or the commission, inconsiderable in view of the seriousness of the injury.

Dependent argues for a liberal interpretation of section 287.140.5. At the time of the accident, April 2000, the Workers Compensation Law was to be construed liberally. Section 287.800.² We review a worker's compensation case under the statutes in effect at the time of the accident. See Chouteau v. Netco Construction, 132 S.W.3d 328, 336 n. 3 (Mo.App. W.D.2004). We will construe section 287.140.5 liberally in accordance with the statutes in effect at that time. Thus, we interpret the statute with a view to public welfare and for the purpose of enabling more employees to be eligible for compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. State ex rel. Doe Run Co. v. Brown, 918 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Mo.App. E.D. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Farmer v. Barlow Truck Lines, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Mo. banc 1998).

At the outset, we note that statutory construction is a matter of law, not fact. City of St. Joseph v. Village of County Club, 163 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Mo. banc 2005). We therefore interpret the statute independently. Willcut, 193 S.W.3d at 412. We must ascertain the legislature's intent from the language of the statute. Skabialka v. Tort Victim Compensation Fund, 133 S.W.3d 565, 567 (Mo.App. E.D. 2004). Further, provisions of a legislative act such as the Worker's Compensation Law are to be construed consistently and harmoniously to give effect to the entire statute. See, e.g., St. Louis County v. B.A.P., Inc., 25 S.W.3d 629, 631 (Mo.App. E.D.2000); Snow v. Hicks Brothers Chevrolet, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo.App. 1972) (finding that the Worker's Compensation Law is in pari materia and its provisions are to be construed together).

We must determine to what extent the legislature intended an employee's religious beliefs to be considered when analyzing whether a refusal of treatment was unreasonable. Section 287.140.5 does not simply state that any refusal of a low-risk, but beneficial, treatment will result in denial of compensation; the...