Wilkerson v. Carlo

• Decision Date: 20 November 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 46890
• Citation: 300 N.W.2d 658,101 Mich.App. 629
• Parties: William J. WILKERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John CARLO, Defendant-Appellee. 101 Mich.App. 629, 300 N.W.2d 658
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 658

300 N.W.2d 658

William J. WILKERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John CARLO, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 46890.

101 Mich.App. 629, 300 N.W.2d 658

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Nov. 20, 1980.

Released for Publication Jan. 29, 1981.

Neil Marzella, Troy, for plaintiff-appellant.

[101 MICHAPP 630] Edward F. Draugelis, Plymouth, for defendant-appellee.

[101 MICHAPP 631] Before BASHARA, P. J., and RILEY and QUINNELL, ^* JJ.

QUINNELL, Judge.

In February and March, 1978, defendant, the executive manager of Northville Downs, made public accusations implicating plaintiff, an owner and trainer of standardbred horses, in a race-fixing scheme at the track. Defendant also barred plaintiff from future racing at Northville Downs. Plaintiff commenced an action against defendant for defamation on April 16, 1979. The Circuit Court granted defendant's motion for accelerated judgment since the action was commenced after the expiration of the one-year period of limitation of actions for libel and slander. M.C.L. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7).

Thereafter, on June 6, 1979, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging tortious interference with advantageous economic relations. Defendant again moved for accelerated judgment on the basis that the complaint continued to be one for defamation. Plaintiff's position was that the amended complaint was governed by the three-year statute of limitations for torts. M.C.L. § 600.5805(8); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(8). Following a hearing on August 10, 1979, the Circuit Court granted the motion for accelerated judgment. Plaintiff now appeals as of right, asserting that the three-year statute of limitations should have been applied.

The type of interest allegedly harmed is the focal point in determining what limitations period controls. Stringer v. Board of Trustees of Edward W. Sparrow Hospital, 62 Mich.App. 696, 699-700, 233 N.W.2d 698 (1975), lv. den. 395 Mich. 768 (1975); Glowacki v. Motor Wheel Corp., 67 Mich.App. 448, 459-460, 241 N.W.2d 240 (1976). Where the same set [101 MICHAPP 632] of facts can support either of two distinct actions, the applicable limitations period is the one controlling the theory actually pled. Campos v. General Motors Corp., 71 Mich.App. 23, 25-26, 246 N.W.2d 352 (1976).

The elements of tortious interference with economic relations are: (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) an intentional interference causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy, and (4) resulting damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. Northern Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Henderson Brothers, Inc., 83 Mich.App. 84, 93, 268 N.W.2d 296 (1978), lv. den. 405 Mich. 845 (1979). Defamatory statements are those which tend to harm an individual's reputation in the community. Unlike an action for tortious interference with economic relations, a defamation claim will lie even where there is no proof of any damage to the individual's business relationships or expectancies. An accusation of a commission of a crime, as here ¹, is defamatory per se and is actionable without proof of special harm or loss of reputation on a defamation theory. This is also unlike a tortious interference theory which requires proof of actual damage. See, Tumbarella v. The Kroger Co., 85 [101 MICHAPP 633] Mich.App. 482, 493, 271 N.W.2d 284 (1978), lv. den. 406 Mich. 939 (1979).

Despite the differences between the defamation and tortious interference actions, defendant contends that, where the claimed interference with business relationships or expectancies has occurred through the making of allegedly defamatory statements, any damage is merely incident to the defamation and does not present a separate cause of action. In Harrison v. Arrow Metal Products Corp., 20 Mich.App. 590, 608-609, 174 N.W.2d 875 (1969), lv. den. 383 Mich. 816 (1970), one panel of this Court reached the position advocated by defendant. However, in Campos, supra, where defendant argued that plaintiff's action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was merely a subterfuge to avoid the limitations period controlling a slander action, another panel of this Court held that the two torts protected distinct interests. The Campos Court held:

"Harrison v. Arrow Metal Products Corp., 20 Mich.App. 590, 174 N.W.2d 875 (1969), lv. den., 383 Mich. 816 (1970), does not compel a different result. In Harrison plaintiff argued that the false accusations of criminal activity deprived him of other employment and that this deprivation of employment was a separate tort. This Court held that it was not. This case may be distinguished on that basis. The courts of this state have recognized an intentional infliction of mental distress as a separate cause of action. Warren v. June's Mobile Home Village & Sales, Inc., (66 Mich.App. 386, 239 N.W.2d 380 (1976)). There is no need to bootstrap this claim on a claim for slander." 71 Mich.App. 23, 26-27, 246 N.W.2d 352.

Harrison holds that this state has not recognized tortious interference with economic relations as actionable in and of itself. We disagree. Meyering [101 MICHAPP 634] v. Russell, 53 Mich.App. 695, 704-705, 220 N.W.2d 121 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 393 Mich. 770 (1974); ² Dassance v. Nienhuis, 57 Mich.App. 422, 432-433, 225 N.W.2d 789 (1975); National Pharmaceutical Services, Inc. v. Harrison Community Hospital, 67 Mich.App. 286, 294, 241 N.W.2d 76 (1976), lv. den. 397 Mich. 824 (1976). Thus, the rationale of Campos is applicable to this case. In our opinion, actions alleging tortious interference with economic relations are subject to the three-year statute of limitations of M.C.L. § 600.5805(8); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(8), even though the unlawful interference was caused by defamatory statements. ³

[101 MICHAPP 635] Defendant also contends that plaintiff's amended complaint fails to set forth anything other than a defamation action. Although we have concluded that an action for tortious interference with business relations can represent a separate basis for recovery where defamatory statements represent the cause of the damage, plaintiff must still make sufficient allegations to support his theory of liability. Defendant notes that plaintiff's amended complaint alleges dissemination of the allegedly defamatory statements to the community at large, and not to individuals who could have some influence on the type of economic relationships plaintiff enjoys in the racing community. We do not view plaintiff's use of the term "community at large" to be fatal to his complaint. The "community" alleged could be shown to be a very small community, namely, the harness racing "community at large". Considering the facts most favorable to plaintiff, there are only a small number of places where plaintiff could ply his trade. These tracks could reasonably, if not certainly, be expected to be aware of defendant's accusations. Defendant could reasonably have expected other tracks to bar plaintiff from entering his horses in their races, and thus, ruin plaintiff's business. In fact, by paragraph 14 of his amended complaint, plaintiff avers that this is precisely what happened:

"As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's intentional interference with Plaintiff's existing and prospective advantageous economic relationships, Plaintiff suffered injury to his business and his advantageous economic relationships, to his damage in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars as follows:

[101 MICHAPP 636] "a. Plaintiff was no longer admitted at the various tracks throughout the State of Michigan as an owner of horses and was, therefore, forced to sell his horses at a loss.

"b. Plaintiff was no longer admitted at the various tracks throughout the State of Michigan as a trainer of horses and, therefore, lost the customers whose horses he trained.

"c. Plaintiff was...