Wilkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 November 1942
• Docket Number: 38140
• Citation: 165 S.W.2d 858,350 Mo. 185
• Parties: Frances Britt Wilkins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

165 S.W.2d 858

350 Mo. 185

Frances Britt Wilkins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a Corporation, Appellant

No. 38140

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 10, 1942

Appeal from Audrain Circuit Court; Hon. Frank Hollingsworth, Judge.

Reversed.

Hunter & Chamier, Kenneth E. Midgley and Michaels Blackmar, Newkirk, Eager & Swanson for appellant Harry Cole Bates of counsel.

(1) There is nothing in either policy or in the 1928 announcement (disregarding the statute) which can possibly be construed as evidencing an intention to extend double indemnity benefits beyond lapse. Therefore, the policies having lapsed before death, and ordinary benefits having been paid plaintiff's rights, if any, are wholly statutory. Walls v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125 S.W.2d 86; Prange v. International Life Ins. Co., 46 S.W.2d 523. The only "amount" extended under the statutory provisions is the "face amount," which does not include double indemnity benefits. No other amount of extended insurance is mentioned in the statute except to refer to the amount of extended insurance specified in the policies, which in this case is none. Sec. 5852, R. S. 1939; Smith v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 107 S.W.2d l. c. 195; Valenti v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1 F.Supp. 993, 71 F.2d 229; Cleaver v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 142 S.W.2d 474. (3) The parties had the right to eliminate accidental death benefits from the coverage carried on extended insurance. This was clearly and unambiguously done by making current payment of premiums a condition in the accidental death benefit coverage clause, which is inconsistent with coverage on extended insurance. The parties did not need to say the same thing again by express exclusion. Smith, Cleaver, and Valenti Cases, supra; Sec. 5852, R. S. 1939, being, Sec. 5741, R. S. 1929; Rose v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 153 Mo.App. 90; Langan v. United States Life Ins. Co., 121 S.W.2d 268, affirmed 130 S.W.2d 47; 32 C. J., pp. 1095-1096, 1109, secs. 180, 202; Mitchell v. Accident Co., 179 Mo.App. 1; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "exception;" Fletcher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 S.W.2d 621, criticized; Salamone v. New York Life Ins. Co., 103 S.W.2d 506, and Rositzky v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F.2d 758, distinguished. (4) Full ordinary death benefits having been paid, whether the accidental death benefits, added by amendment of the contracts in 1928, were carried on extended insurance, is to be determined under Section 5852, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, enacted in 1923, and not by predecessor statutes, even though the policies were issued in 1903 and 1908. Sec. 6151, R. S. 1919, being Sec. 7897, R. S. 1899, as amended in 1903; Sec. 5852, R. S. 1939, being Sec. 5741, R. S. 1929, enacted in 1923; Carmen v. Harrah, 182 Mo.App. 365, 170 S.W. 388; Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 153 F. 1; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595. (5) Even if the statutes in force prior to 1923 were controlling, they required only extension of the full amount of ordinary life insurance written in the policy, not including accidental death benefits. This is clear beyond question in light of the statutory history, the section considered as a whole and statutes in pari materia. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Roth, 122 Fed. l. c. 858; Westerman v. Supreme Lodge, 196 Mo. 670, 94 S.W. 470; Sec. 6151, R. S. 1919, enacted 1903; Mooney v. Merriam, 77 Kan. 305; Magers v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 S.W.2d 148; Laws 1879, pp. 130-131; R. S. 1879, secs. 5983, 5984, 5985, 5986; Sec. 5854, R. S. 1939, being Sec. 5985, R. S. 1879; Art. II, Chap. 119, R. S. 1879; Art. III, Chap. 89, R. S. 1889; Logan v. Insurance Co., 146 Mo. 114, 47 S.W. 948; Rose v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 153 Mo.App. 90, 96, 132 S.W. 613; 32 C. J. 1095, sec. 180; Sec. 6153, R. S. 1919; Fox v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 715; Fletcher and Rositzky cases, supra, criticized; Leibing v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 269 Mo. 509.

C. C. Franklin and Harry H. Evans for respondent.

(1) Under the terms of the policies and the statutes then in force, the accidental death benefits as well as the amount provided for natural death benefits were payable. Secs. 5852, 5854, R. S. 1939; Secs. 6151, 6153, R. S. 1919; Fletcher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 S.W.2d 621; Salamone v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 103 S.W.2d 506; New York Life v. Rositzky, 45 F.2d 758; Gooch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 61 S.W.2d 704; Westerman v. Supreme Lodge, 196 Mo. 760, 94 S.W. 470, l. c. 480; Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583, 50 S.W. 519, affirmed 178 U.S. 389, 20 S.Ct. 962; Burridge v. Ins. Co., 211 Mo. 158; Rosenberry v. American Benevolent Assn., 121 S.W. 785, 142 Mo. 552; Prindle v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 223 S.W. 252; Givin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 S.W.2d l. c. 1122. (2) The Legislature, when it adopted the nonforfeiture statutes in 1879, intended the act to apply to insurance on life, which includes policies of insurance insuring against death solely through external, violent and accidental means. (a) All sections of the nonforfeiture statute must be read in pari materia in ascertaining the legislative intention. Law 1869, p. 27, sec. 1; Sec. 5938, R. S. 1879; Sec. 6151, R. S. 1919; Secs. 5852, 5854, R. S. 1939; Logan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 146 Mo. 114, 47 S.W. 948; Moore v. Ins. Co., 112 Mo.App. 696, 87 S.W. 988; Lamport v. General Accident, 272 Mo. 19, 197 S.W. 95; Smith v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 173 Mo. 329. (b) The amendment to Sec. 6151, R. S. 1919, should be so construed that a harmonious construction be placed upon this section when construed with Sec. 6153, R. S. 1919. Secs. 6151-53, R. S. 1919; Secs. 5741-53, R. S. 1929; Secs. 5852-54, R. S. 1939; Laws 1923, p. 233, amending Sec. 6151, R. S. 1919; Valenti v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 71 F.2d 229, criticized; Smith v. Equitable, 107 S.W.2d 191, l. c. 195, criticized; Elias v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 50 S.W.2d 130; State ex rel. Dean v. Daues, 14 S.W.2d 990; Hegberg v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 147 S.W. 192, 146 Mo.App. 514; State v. Messino, 30 S.W.2d 750; State ex rel. Aull v. Field, 112 Mo. 554, 20 S.W. 742; Cleaver v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 142 S.W.2d 474, distinguished.

Clark, J. All concur except Hays, J., absent.

OPINION

CLARK

On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff in the circuit court, this cause was heard and determined by the St. Louis Court of Appeals. An opinion was adopted by a majority of the judges of that court but, upon the request of one dissenting judge, the case has been transferred to this court and we rehear and determine it as in case of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary appellate process. (Mo. Const., sec. 6 of 1884 amendment to Art. VI.)

The suit is to recover accidental death benefits under two policies of insurance on the life of William Cooper, who died on August 1, 1936, as the result of an accident. Our policy for $ 210.00 with increasing benefits, was issued in 1903 and the other for $ 258.00 with increasing benefits, was issued in 1908. Neither policy, when issued, provided an accidental death benefit, but on December 1, 1928, the defendant sent out an announcement granting such benefits on certain policies then in force, including the two in question.

The announcement provided that, upon due proof of insured's accidental death "while this policy is in force, and while premiums are not in default beyond the grace period specified in this policy," the company would pay, in addition to any other sums due under the policy, an accidental death benefit "equal to the face amount of insurance then payable at death." The announcement also said that the accidental death benefit was granted without specific extra premium, the cost being included in the original premiums.

Both policies lapsed for non-payment of premiums on August 1, 1932, four years before the death of insured. Defendant (appellant) paid the principal amounts of the policies, but refused to pay the accidental death benefits.

It was admitted that the net value of each policy at date of lapse was sufficient to purchase temporary or extended insurance, even for double the principal sum, beyond the date of death of the insured.

Thus, the sole issue to be determined is whether the accidental death coverage was continued as temporary or extended insurance. That depends upon a proper construction of the policies, together with applicable statutes which must be considered as part of the policies.

As already stated, when first written these policies did not provide any accidental death benefits. As amended by the announcement of 1928, they provided for such benefits only "while this policy is in force, and while premiums are not in default beyond the grace period specified in this policy." This provision, considered alone, would clearly preclude recovery by plaintiff, because at insured's death the premiums were in default beyond the grace period.

Respondent says that, notwithstanding the terms of the policies, not only the ordinary death benefits, but accidental death coverage as well, were required to be carried forward as temporary or extended insurance under the terms of Sections 5852 and 5854, Revised Statutes Missouri, 1939. [Mo. Stat. Ann., sections 5741 and 5743, pages 4388 and 4394.] Moreover, respondent says that we must consider these sections as they existed at the dates when the policies were first issued.

At the original dates of these policies, Section 5852 (then section 6151, R. S. 1919) provided for extended insurance after payment of three or more annual premiums on life policies "for the full amount written in the policy." In 1923 the section was amended to provide that the temporary or extended...