William Deering & Co. v. Peterson

• Decision Date: 27 December 1898
• Citation: 77 N.W. 568,75 Minn. 118
• Parties: WILLIAM DEERING & CO. v. PETERSON (GILLESPIE, Garnishee).
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

75 Minn. 118

77 N.W. 568

WILLIAM DEERING & CO.

v.PETERSON (GILLESPIE, Garnishee).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 27, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Marshall county; Frank Ives, Judge.

Action by William Deering & Co. against P. A. Peterson. John Gillespie, Jr., was garnishee, and the board of county commissioners of Marshall county interposed as claimants. From an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint of interveners, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. By comparing the description found in one part of the instrument with that found in another part, held, the description of the land is sufficiently definite and certain.

2. An applicant for a seed-grain loan, under chapters 225, 226, Laws 1893, stated in his application that he had 360 acres of land, but did not state whether or not the same was subject to any mortgage incumbrance. Those acts prohibit persons owning more than 160 acres of land, free from mortgage incumbrance, from receiving such loans. It does not appear that, in granting the application, the statute was complied with in some other respects. Held, the applicant having accepted the benefit of the act, he, and all those standing in his shoes, are estopped from asserting that he was not entitled to its benefits, or that the proceedings granting his application were irregular.

3. Held, chapters 225, 226, Laws 1893, are neither of them unconstitutional because the subject of the act is not expressed in the title.

4. Held, the method provided for collecting back the amounts so loaned by the state is not unequal taxation, or taxation at all, but a statutory method of foreclosing a statutory lien for money borrowed from the state.

5. Held, said acts appropriate public money for a private purpose, and are therefore unconstitutional.

6. But held, he who has taken the benefit of the act, and those claiming under him with actual notice, are estopped to deny the validity of the act.

7. Held, it cannot be presumed that the county or its officials have complied with an unconstitutional statute. S. Cooke and Lewis E. Jones, for appellant.

Leo S. Bayrell, for respondents.

CANTY, J.

The garnishee herein disclosed that he had in his possession and under his control 142 bushels of wheat, the property of defendant. It is also to be inferred from the disclosure that defendant held the title to this wheat under a chattel mortgage given by one Herman Peterson on his crop. It appeared also on the disclosure that Marshall county made a claim to the wheat. Thereupon the board of county commissioners of that county intervened as claimants, and alleged in their complaint that on March 25, 1893, said Herman Peterson was, and ever since has been, the owner and in actual possession of certain described land in that county, on which the wheat in question was raised; that on said March 25th he applied, under chapters 225, 226, Laws 1893, for money to buy seed grain; and that the money was furnished him. The application, and all the proceedings had in procuring the money, are set out in said complaint, and the interveners claim a lien on the wheat in question for the repayment of the money. Plaintiff demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, and on the ground that there is a defect of parties claimant, and appeals from an order overruling the demurrer.

Chapter 225 is entitled ‘An act to appropriate money for seed-grain loans to farmers in this state whose crops were destroyed by hail or storms last year.’ The act appropriates $75,000 out of the state treasury for such purpose, and provides that any person desiring to avail himself of the benefits of the act shall file his application with the town clerk, who shall forward it to the county auditor, who shall publish a notice that the board of county commissioners will meet at his office on a day named for the purpose of considering the allowance of relief to such applicants. It is further provided that the board shall at such time fix and determine the amount to be allowed to each applicant, the county auditor shall furnish a copy of the resolution to the state auditor, and the governor, state treasurer, and state auditor shall meet and distribute the appropriation among the several counties in which relief is sought. It is further provided ‘that any person or persons owning more than 160 acres of land free from mortgage incumbrance, whether the same be cultivated or not, shall be deprived from any of the benefits set forth in this act.’ The act further provides that ‘the county auditor shall levy a tax against the land for which such seed-grain loan may be granted, and on which such loan is hereby declared to be a lien, which shall take precedence over any and all incumbrances.’ Section 5 provides ‘that such tax shall be paid in three installments as nearly equal as may be, and be included in the tax levy for the years 1894, 1895 and 1896.’ Section 6 provides that, to distribute the money appropriated, the state auditor shall draw a warrant on the state treasurer for the amount allowed each county, and the county auditor shall thereupon draw his warrant on the county treasurer for the amount allowed each person. Section 7 provides that all moneys collected on such seed-loan tax shall be paid over to the state treasurer, and section 8 provides that, whenever such tax remains unpaid and becomes delinquent, the board of county commissioners shall order the amount thereof paid to the state treasurer out of the county treasury. Chapter 226 amends chapter 225 in several particulars, and declares the seed-grain loan a lien on the land for which the loan was made, ‘and upon the crop of grain raised each year by the person receiving such loan until such amount is fully paid.’ It also provides that such lien ‘shall take precedence over any and all incumbrances acquired subsequent to the lien of such loan.’

1. There is nothing in appellant's claim that the application of Herman Peterson for the seed-grain loan, set out in interveners' complaint, does not state the land which he owns or that he owns any land. The third question in the application, and the answer thereto, is as follows: ‘(3) Give full description of land, with the number of acres owned. 160 on Sec. 10, Town. 158, range 48; 80 acres on Sec. 9; 40 acres on Sec. 17; and 80 acres on Sec. 19.’ True, this does not state what part of the section each parcel of land is in, but the twelfth question is, ‘(12) Give description of land upon which you intend to sow seed grain,’ and the answer to this question gives the same description and same number of acres, with the addition of the government subdivision of the section, and states that all of the land is in township 158, range 48. These proceedings must be construed liberally in favor of the state, and it should be presumed that the same land is referred to in the third answer as in the twelfth answer in the application. The law did not permit him, because he owned land in one place, to obtain state aid to procure seed grain to sow in another place.

2. The application shows that Herman Peterson owned more than 160 acres of land, to wit 360 acres, and it does not appear, by the application or otherwise, that there was a mortgage incumbrance on any of it. Appellant contends that, as the statute prohibits every person owning more than 160 acres of land, free from mortgage incumbrance, from taking the...