Williams-Raymond v. Jones, 4D06-1067.

• Decision Date: 25 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 4D06-1067.,4D06-1067.
• Citation: 954 So.2d 721
• Parties: Deirdre WILLIAMS-RAYMOND, Appellant, v. Keith Edwin JONES, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

954 So.2d 721

Deirdre WILLIAMS-RAYMOND, Appellant, v. Keith Edwin JONES, Appellee.

No. 4D06-1067.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 25, 2007.

Adelmis Bohigas Naderpour of Adelmis Bohigas Naderpour, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Karen E. Black-Barron, Fort Lauderdale, (withdrawn as counsel after filing brief), and Keith Edwin Jones, Covington, Georgia, pro se.

STEVENSON, C.J.

Deirdre Williams-Raymond appeals an order dismissing, with prejudice, the paternity action she filed against Keith Edwin Jones. We affirm.

According to the complaint, on July 5, 2000, Williams-Raymond, unmarried at the time, gave birth to Christopher Raymond, Jr. Christopher Raymond, Sr., believed the child to be his, signed the birth certificate, and subsequently married Williams-Raymond. Raymond, Sr., has fulfilled the role of father to Raymond, Jr., since the child's birth. On September 14, 2005, Williams-Raymond filed the paternity complaint in the instant case, alleging that, in October 1999, she and Jones had a sexual relationship at which time Raymond, Jr., was conceived. Williams-Raymond sought to have Jones declared to be the child's father, to recover some of the expenses associated with her pregnancy and to have Jones pay child support. The complaint also named Raymond, Sr., as a defendant. In his answer, Raymond, Sr., admitted he signed the birth certificate believing the child to be his, subsequently married the mother, and has acted as father since the child's birth, but maintained that DNA testing has confirmed that Jones is the biological father and Jones should be required to contribute to the support of Raymond, Jr. Because the complaint's allegations demonstrated that Raymond, Jr.'s paternity had already been established, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.

Because Williams-Raymond's complaint alleges that, at the time the child was born, she was not married, chapter 742, Florida Statutes, governs her paternity claim. See § 742.10(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) ("This chapter provides the primary jurisdiction and procedures for the determination of paternity for children born out of wedlock."). Section 742.011 provides that "[a]ny woman who is pregnant or has a child, any man who has reason to believe that he is the father of a child, or any child may bring proceedings in the circuit court, in chancery, to determine the paternity of the child when paternity has not been established by law or otherwise." Thus, a paternity action can be stated under chapter 742 only when paternity "has not been established by law or otherwise."

Pursuant to Florida law, "[i]f the mother of any child born out of wedlock and the reputed father shall at any time after its birth intermarry, the child shall in all respects be deemed and held to be the child of the husband and wife, as though born within wedlock. . . ." § 742.091, Fla. Stat. (2005). In I.A. v. H.H., 710 So.2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the Second District held application of this statute was one of the ways in which paternity was "otherwise" established so as...