Williams v. Alpla, Inc.

• Citation: 92 N.E.3d 256,2017 Ohio 4217
• Decision Date: 12 June 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 1–16–53,1–16–53
• Parties: Ryan WILLIAMS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ALPLA, INC., Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

92 N.E.3d 256

2017 Ohio 4217

Ryan WILLIAMS, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.ALPLA, INC., Defendant–Appellee.

NO. 1–16–53

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Allen County.

Date of Decision: June 12, 2017

Tabitha L. Stewart, for Appellant

Andrew J. Wilhelms, Toledo, for Appellee

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Ryan Williams ("Williams") appeals the judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court for granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, ALPLA, Inc. ("ALPLA"). For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On August 24, 2013, Williams was employed by ALPLA and sustained a severe injury to his right arm while he was working at ALPLA. Id. According to Williams, ALPLA's SSB160 machine, which manufactures bottles, was not functioning properly during his shift. Doc. 70 at 28–29. Doc. 66 at 12. The bottles being processed by this machine were slipping off of the track and accumulating under the machine. Doc. 67 at 12–13. If too many bottles pile up in this area, the machine shuts down. Id. at 11–12. The area in which these bottles were accumulating can be accessed by opening a sliding plexiglass door on the side of the machine. Id. at 12. Williams claims that he had been trained to open this plexiglass door, reach inside this area of the SSB160, and gather the fallen bottles while the machine was still running. Id. at 52–53, 60–61. Williams tried to figure out what was causing the bottles to fall off of the track and tried several adjustments to correct this issue. Doc. 70 at 23. After several attempted fixes failed, Williams decided to check what he believed to be a photo eye that was located inside the compartment where the bottles were falling off of the track and accumulating under the machine. Id. at 23–24.

{¶ 3} To avoid a break in production, Williams chose not to shut off the machine while he opened the plexiglass access door and reached into the SSB160 machine to wipe down what he believed to be a photo eye sensor in that area of the machine.¹ Id. at 22. He, however, admitted that he could have shut down the machine before he put his arm inside the SSB160 as he was the supervisor in charge of the floor that evening. Id. at 27, 57. While he had previously reached into this machine to clear out bottles, this was the first time that Williams had ever attempted to wipe off this sensor. Id. at 24, 35. As he was attempting to service the SSB160, Williams's arm got caught in the machine, causing his injuries. Doc. 67 at 55. Doc. 70 at 28.

{¶ 4} On August 21, 2014, Williams filed a complaint with the Allen County Common Pleas Court that named ALPLA as the defendant in an action brought under Ohio's employer intentional tort law. Doc. 1. On August 22, 2016, ALPLA filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc. 64. In this motion, ALPLA argued that Williams had not shown that ALPLA had breached any duty owed to Williams and that ALPLA was not, therefore, liable to Williams for damages. Id. On October 11, 2016, the trial court granted ALPLA's motion for summary judgment. Doc. 73. Williams filed a notice of appeal on November 7, 2016. Doc. 75. On appeal, he raises the following two assignments of error.

First Assignment of Error

The Common Pleas Court of Allen County, Ohio, erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact in this matter.

Second Assignment of Error

The Common Pleas Court of Allen County, Ohio, erred in concluding that Plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the removal of a steel plate, a safety mechanism, from the SSB 160 machine.

We will consider these assignments of error together as both address the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment.

Legal Standard

{¶ 5} Appellate courts consider a summary judgment order under a de novo standard of review. James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Neifer , 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-16-20, 2016-Ohio-7641, 2016 WL 6636380, ¶ 5, citing Esber Beverage Co. v. Labatt USA Operating Co., L.L.C. , 138 Ohio St.3d 71, 2013-Ohio-4544, 3 N.E.3d 1173, ¶ 9. Under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure,

[s]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law * * *. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.

Civ.R. 56(C). "The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden ‘to inform the trial court of the basis for the motion, identifying the portions of the record, including the pleadings and discovery, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ " Middleton v. Holbrook , 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-15-47, 2016-Ohio-3387, 2016 WL 3223956, ¶ 8, quoting Reinbolt v. Gloor , 146 Ohio App.3d 661, 664, 767 N.E.2d 1197 (3d Dist. 2001).

{¶ 6} "The burden then shifts to the party opposing the summary judgment." Id. "In order to defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere denials but ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Hancock Fed. Credit Union v. Coppus , 54 N.E.3d 806, 2015-Ohio-5312, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.), quoting Byrd v. Smith , 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, ¶ 10, quoting Civ.R. 56(E). "[B]ecause summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation, it must be awarded with caution." Murphy v. Reynoldsburg , 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358–359, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992). "The court must thus construe all evidence and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party, here Plaintiffs." Webster v. Shaw , 63 N.E.3d 677, 2016-Ohio-1484, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.), citing Murphy at 358–359, 604 N.E.2d 138. "The court must thus construe all evidence and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party * * *." Id. , citing Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Cos. , 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346, 617 N.E.2d 1129 (1993).

{¶ 7} R.C. 2745.01, which is Ohio's employer intentional tort statute, reads, in relevant part, as follows:

(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee * * * for damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.

(B) As used in this section, "substantially certain" means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death.

(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard * * * creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was committed with intent to injure another if an injury * * * occurs as a direct result.

R.C. 2745.01(A–C). With this provision, "the General Assembly intended to limit claims for employer intentional torts to situations in which an employer acts with the ‘specific intent’ to cause an injury to another." Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc. , 134 Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 24, citing Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co. , 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 56 ; Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C. , 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 26.

{¶ 8} R.C. 2745.01(A) appears to give two options for demonstrating this specific intent: either "the employer committed the tortious act with [1] the intent to injure another or [2] with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur." R.C. 2745.01(A). However,

R.C. 2745.01(B) equates ‘substantially certain’ with ‘deliberate intent’ to injure. Thus, the ‘two options of proof [under R.C. 2745.01(A) ] become: (1) the employer acted with intent to injure or (2) the employer acted with deliberate intent to injure.’ Kaminski at ¶ 55, quoting Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 175 Ohio App.3d 227, 2008-Ohio-1521, 886 N.E.2d 262, ¶ 31 (7th Dist.). ‘[W]hat appears at first glance as two distinct bases for liability is revealed on closer examination to be one and the same.’ Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co. , 709 F.3d 595, 602–603 (6th Cir.2013) (describing R.C. 2745.01 as ‘a statute at war with itself’).

Hoyle v. DTJ Ents., Inc. , 143 Ohio St.3d 197, 2015-Ohio-843, 36 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 10.

{¶ 9} "Acting with the belief that an injury is ‘substantially certain’ to occur is not analogous to wanton misconduct, nor is it ‘enough to show that the employer was merely negligent, or even reckless.’ " Roberts v. RMB Ents., Inc. , 197 Ohio App.3d 435, 2011-Ohio-6223, 967 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 21, quoting Talik v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc. , 117 Ohio St.3d 496, 2008-Ohio-937, 885 N.E.2d 204, ¶ 17. This standard requires more than "mere knowledge of a hazardous condition." Thompson v. Oberlander's Tree & Landscape Ltd. , 2016-Ohio-1147, 62 N.E.3d 630, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.), quoting Broyles v. Kasper Mach. Co. , 517 Fed.Appx. 345, 353 (6th Cir. 2013), citing Houdek .

{¶ 10} Under Ohio law, "alleged deficiencies in training, safety procedures, safety equipment, instructions, or warnings, have been found to show recklessness, but are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to deliberate intent." Meadows v. Air Craft Wheels, L.L.C. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96782, 2012-Ohio-269, 2012 WL 253344, ¶ 18. McCarthy v. Sterling Chems., Inc. , 193 Ohio App.3d 164, 2011-Ohio-887, 951 N.E.2d 441, ¶ 9, 14–15 (1st Dist.) ; Jefferson v. Benjamin...