Williams v. Bennett
Decision Date | 19 January 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 2005-CA-00754-SCT.,2005-CA-00754-SCT. |
Citation | 921 So.2d 1269 |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Parties | Floyd WILLIAMS, Jr. v. Donald BENNETT, Individually and d/b/a Krosstown Trade & Pawn Shop. |
Daniel M. Czamanske, Jr., attorney for appellant.
William O. Luckett, Jr., Theresa L. Cummings, attorneys for appellees.
Before SMITH, C.J., CARLSON and RANDOLPH, JJ.
¶ 1. This case is before us on appeal from a final judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Coahoma County granting summary judgment for Donald Bennett and against Floyd Williams, Jr. Finding the trial court properly granted summary judgment, we affirm.
¶ 2. This cause of action, grounded in products liability, stems from a gunshot wound suffered by Floyd Williams when his Lorcin .380 handgun accidentally fell to the ground from the door of his vehicle and discharged, striking his right leg. Notably, at the time of the accident the safety on the handgun was off and in the "fire" position.
¶ 3. While the weapon's chain of title is somewhat unclear from the pleadings, the record does indicate that on August 9, 2001, the Lorcin handgun was purchased by Krosstown Trade & Pawn Shop ("Krosstown"), owned and operated by Donald Bennett, from Stephanie Johnson, a local resident of Coahoma County. The record reveals that on January 15, 2002, Bennett, through Krosstown, sold the Lorcin handgun to Alex Donte Crumb. However, it is unclear from the pleadings how the Lorcin handgun came into Williams' possession.
¶ 4. Williams filed suit on March 1, 2004, and named "Donald Bennett, Individually, and d/b/a Krosstown Trade & Pawn Shop, and Euclid Avenue Sales, Inc." as defendants.1 Specifically, Williams alleged the defendants were strictly liable for his injuries and claimed the Lorcin handgun was designed, manufactured and distributed in a defective condition and was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use. Additionally, and in the alternative, Williams alleged the defendants were negligent for failing to provide adequate instruction as to the proper use of, and dangers associated with, the handgun, and that the defendants failed to distribute a handgun which would not discharge when dropped.
¶ 5. Bennett filed a motion for summary judgment on July 26, 2004, and responded to Williams' claims by asserting there was no privity between the parties; that he was an innocent seller in the stream of commerce; and, that the handgun was not defective as it is an inherent characteristic of a handgun to discharge when placed in the fire position.
¶ 6. Williams filed his response in opposition to Bennett's motion for summary judgment. On September 27, 2004, Circuit Court Judge Albert B. Smith, III, granted Bennett's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Williams's claim with prejudice finding Williams failed to offer proof of the condition of the handgun at the time it left Bennett's control and failed to rebut Bennett's contention that Miss.Code Ann. Section 11-1-63(b) applied to this action.2 Additionally, in explaining his grant of summary judgment, the trial judge, by way of a written opinion, found Williams had failed to prove his case by failing to support his claim with expert testimony any other documentation which would support of contention that the Lorcin handgun had a design defect and that there existed other feasible design alternatives that could have prevented Williams's injury.
¶ 7. On November 12, 2004, Williams filed a motion to reconsider, noting the circuit court's grant of summary judgment was never certified as final for purposes of appeal and offering new evidence by way of expert testimony in support of the allegation that the Lorcin handgun was defective and unreasonably dangerous. In his response, Bennett reiterated his assertion that Williams had not proven his case; that Bennett was an innocent seller; and that a handgun is an inherently dangerous product. While the trial judge ultimately denied Williams's motion to reconsider, he recognized the intention of Williams's expert to testify as to the defective condition of the Lorcin handgun. The trial judge reaffirmed his grant of summary judgment, but found that his Miss.Code Ann. Section 11-1-63(b) ruling was an issue best addressed by the appellate courts.
¶ 8. By agreement of the parties, the other defendant, Euclid Avenue Sales, Inc., was dismissed with prejudice. Williams has now filed his notice of appeal with this Court, contesting the trial court's grant of Bennett's motion for summary judgment and subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration. These issues are now properly before this Court on appeal.
¶ 9. The standard of review of a trial court's grant of a summary judgment motion is de novo. Stuckey v. Provident Bank, 912 So.2d 859, 864 (Miss.2005) (citing Miller v. Meeks, 762 So.2d 302, 304 (Miss.2000), Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss.1988)). This Court employs a factual review tantamount to that of the trial court when considering evidentiary matters in the record. Id. (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 70 (Miss. 1996)). As with the federal rule, Miss. Rule Civ. P. 56(c) requires that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "If any triable facts exist, the lower court's grant of a summary judgment will be reversed; otherwise the decision will be affirmed." Miller, 762 So.2d at 304 (citing Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983)). The party opposing the motion must be diligent and may not rest upon allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing there are indeed genuine issues for trial. Owens Corning v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 868 So.2d 331, 335 (Miss.2004) (citing Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp., 692 So.2d 60, 61 (Miss.1997)).
¶ 10. For summary judgment review, the mere existence of triable issues do not entitle one to a trial. This legal tenet has been clearly expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court: Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy & Zatzkis, 799 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir.1986) (see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "With regard to `materiality', only those disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing substantive law will preclude summary judgment." Phillips Oil Company, v. OKC Corporation, 812 F.2d 265, 272 (5th Cir.1987). Where ("[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1138 (5th Cir.1992).
I. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS EXPLICITLY ENUMERATED IN MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63.
¶ 11. In arguing summary judgment was not appropriate in this case, Williams asserts his claim presents triable issues of fact under our products liability statute. Williams refutes arguments advanced by Bennett, asserting that privity is not an issue for purposes of a products liability claims; that Bennett is not entitled to avoid suit as an "innocent seller" in the stream of commerce; and that evidence of a handgun discharging upon being dropped presents a triable question of fact for a jury as to whether the weapon was defective.
¶ 12. While the parties' arguments are appropriate issues to be considered for the purposes of a products liability claim in the state of Mississippi, we must embark upon a threshold evidentiary review and determine whether the claim advanced by Williams in today's case is properly supported by proof. In filing a motion for summary judgment, the movant pierces the face of the non-movant's pleadings and puts the non-movant in a position of having to at least present triable issues of fact to the satisfaction of the trial judge. Therefore, this Court must examine Williams's claim and determine whether he has set forth specific facts showing there are indeed genuine issues to be decided by a trier of fact. Accordingly, we must determine the nature of Williams's claim and identify the evidence proffered in support thereof.
¶ 13. In 1993, the Mississippi legislature promulgated the Products Liability Act and codified what had formerly been common law strict liability. See State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss.1966). Since that time, products liability claims have been specifically governed by statute, and a claimant, in presenting his case, must pay close attention to the elements of the cause of action and the liability limitations enumerated in the statute. In general, a claimant must make out a prima facie products liability case in Mississippi by showing that a product was defective; that the defect caused the product to be unreasonably dangerous; that the unreasonably dangerous defect caused the harm complained of; and that the defective condition existed at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller. Specifically, Miss. Code Ann. Section 11-1-63(a)(I)-(iii) reads as follows:
a) The manufacturer or seller of the product shall...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Cromwell v. Williams
...and the facts must be material.’ " Smith v. City of Southaven , 308 So. 3d 456, 461 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Williams v. Bennett , 921 So. 2d 1269, 1272 (¶10) (Miss. 2006) ). "To be exact, the content of summary-judgment evidence must be admissible at trial although the evidence......
-
Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 26860
...Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 329-30 (Mich. 1995); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (Minn. 1987); Williams v. Bennett, 921 So.2d 1269, 1273-75 (Miss. 2006); Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201-02 (Mont. 1986); Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 518, 522 (N.J. 2000); ......
-
Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo
...v. Gregory , 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004) ; Jenkins v. Int'l Paper Co. , 945 So.2d 144, 150–51 (La. Ct. App. 2006) ; Williams v. Bennett, 921 So.2d 1269, 1273 (Miss. 2006) ; Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 222 Mont. 318, 723 P.2d 195, 201 (1986) ; Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.......
-
Branham v. Ford Motor Co.
...Inc., 450 Mich. 1, 538 N.W.2d 325, 329-30 (1995); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (Minn.1987); Williams v. Bennett, 921 So.2d 1269, 1273-75 (Miss.2006); Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 222 Mont. 318, 723 P.2d 195, 201-02 (1986); Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 164 N.J. 1, 751 A.2d 518, 52......
-
Alternative Approaches To Alternative Design: Understanding The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement And Its Different Applications
...(Miss. 2004); Timpte Indus. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009). The Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269 (Miss. 2006) nicely illustrates the approach. In that case, the plaintiff sued the store that had sold him a handgun after he dropped the gun......
-
Design defects.
...v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa 2006); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004); Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269, 1275 (Miss. 2006) ("demonstrating a feasible alternative design as proof of a design defect is elemental to a claimant's prima facie case");......