Williams v. Chase Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Jamie Dimon, Matthew E. Zames, Mirianna Lake, Dana S. Deasy, Paul H. Compton, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., R.K. Arnold, Bill Huffman, Trottand Trott, P.C.
| Decision Date | 08 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-10565,15-10565 |
| Parties | STEPHANIE WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CHASE BANK, JP MORGAN CHASE, JAMIE DIMON, MATTHEW E. ZAMES, MIRIANNA LAKE, DANA S. DEASY, PAUL H. COMPTON, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, R.K. ARNOLD, BILL HUFFMAN, TROTT& TROTT, P.C., DAVID A. TROTT, JAMES W. BATCHELOR, MELISSA S. BYRD, STEVEN A. JACOBS, and FLAGSTAR BANK, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
On January 14, 2015, Plaintiff Stephanie Williams filed a pro se civil complaint in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging numerous claims against numerous Defendants arising out of a loan and mortgage that were executed in 2003. The case was removed to this Court on February 2, 2015 [Doc. #1]. Before the Court are the following four motions to dismiss, which have been referred for Reports and Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B):
-Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) by Defendants Dimon, Zames, Lake, Deasy, Compton, Arnold, and Hultman [Doc. #5].
-Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) by Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA (which Plaintiff incorrectly identified as both Chase Bank and JP Morgan Chase), Dimon, Zames, Lake, Deasy, Compton, Mortgage Electronic RegistrationSystems, Inc. ("MERS"), Arnold, and Hultman [Doc. #6].
-Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5), 12(b)(6), and 9(b) by Defendants Trott & Trott, David A. Trott, Batchelor, Byrd, and Jacobs [Doc. #8].
-Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings by Flagstar Bank [Doc. #12].
For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that all four motions be GRANTED and that the complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff's complaint is somewhat rambling and verbose, but her allegations stem from the 2003 closing on her real estate loan. She claims that the appraisal on the property was "intentionally and knowingly inflated" to justify granting a mortgage that she would be unable to pay. Complaint, ¶ 6. She states that she was "induced...into a transaction that did not and could not meet normal underwriting standards for a residential mortgage." Id. ¶ 5. Again referring to events that occurred at or before the time of the 2003 closing, she alleges that "the Loan Seller was neither the source of funding nor the 'Lender.'" Id. ¶ 15. She states that "before or contemporaneously with the 'closing' of the loan transaction," she was provided with "either forged blank notes or vague descriptions of the content of the notes that were placed into the pool of assets that would be 'securitized.'" Id. ¶¶ 16, 16.1. Plaintiff summarizes her general allegations asfollows:
"The end result of the false and misleading representations and material omissions of Defendants as to the true nature of the mortgage loan actually processed, which said Defendants had actual knowledge was in direct conflict wit the original Uniform Residential Loan Application, early TIL, and Plaintiff'[s] stated intentions and directions to said Defendants at the time of original application for the loan, fraudulently caused Plaintiff to execute predatory loan documents." Id. ¶ 32.
Plaintiff brings the following enumerated claims:
The exhibits submitted with Defendants' motions3 show that on July 25, 2003, inexchange for a $110,000.00 loan from Flagstar Bank, FSB, Plaintiff granted a mortgage on real property in the City of Detroit to MERS. On August 27, 2013, an assignment of the mortgage from MERS to Chase was recorded. Following Plaintiff's default on the loan, Chase commenced foreclosure by advertisement proceedings, and as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, Chase was given a Sheriff's Deed on November 6, 2014. The six-month statutory redemption period expired on May 6, 2015.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint "for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, and asks whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief. Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2001).
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S 544 (2007), the Court, construing the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), held that although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true." Id., at 555 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6thCir. 2007). Stated differently, a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombley, at 570.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court explained and expanded onwhat it termed the "two-pronged approach" of Twombley. First, it must be determined whether a complaint contains factual allegations, as opposed to legal conclusions. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id., at 678, citing Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555. Second, the facts that are pled must show a "plausible" claim for relief, which the Court described as follows:
556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations omitted).
Despite being ordered to respond to all four dispositive motions, with the response to Flagstar Bank's motion due on April 13, 2015 and responses to the other three motions due on April 2, 2015 (see Doc. #10 and Doc. #15), Plaintiff has not filed any responses. Numerous cases have held that where a plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss, his or her claims are deemed abandoned. In Bazinski v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 1405253, *1 -2 (E.D.Mich. 2014), the Court, citing cases, stated:
."
See also Wheeler v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., 2015 WL 1637619, *2 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (); Fredericks v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 3473972, *3 (E.D.Mich. 2015)("Plaintiffs failure to timely respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as required by E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(c)(1) and 7.1(e)(1) (B), amounts to a waiver of any argument in opposition to Defendants' motion")(citing Humphrey v. U.S. Att'y Gen.'s Office, 279 F. App'x. 328, 331 (6th Cir.2008).
As in all of the above cases, the Plaintiff has waived opposition to the Defendants' motions to dismiss. Nevertheless, I have undertaken an independent review of the sufficiency of her complaint, and find that it fails to set forth any plausible claim, as required by Iqbal. See Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 497 (6th Cir.2006) ().
TILA is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, which runs from the date of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). This one-year limitation period also applies to claims under HOEPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1639. Thielen v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 671 F.Supp.2d 947 (E.D. Mich. 2009); Girgis v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 733 F.Supp.2d 835 (N.D. Ohio 2010). In addition, TILA claims for rescission of a mortgage are subject to a three-year statute of repose, which runs from the date of the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
A RESPA that alleges violations of the disclosure requirement at the time ofclosing are subject to a...
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