Williams v. Dorchester Cnty. Det. Ctr. & Captain Terry Van Doran

• Decision Date: 16 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:13–cv–2284–RMG.,2:13–cv–2284–RMG.
• Citation: 987 F.Supp.2d 690
• Parties: Francena WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. DORCHESTER COUNTY DETENTION CENTER and Captain Terry Van Doran, Jail Director in his individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

987 F.Supp.2d 690

Francena WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,

v.DORCHESTER COUNTY DETENTION CENTER and Captain Terry Van Doran, Jail Director in his individual capacity, Defendants.

No. 2:13–cv–2284–RMG.

United States District Court,

D. South Carolina,

Charleston Division.

Dec. 16, 2013.

A. Christopher Potts, Hitchcock and Potts, Charleston, SC, for Plaintiff.

D. L. Dirk Aydlette, III, Gignilliat Savitz and Bettis, Columbia, SC, for Defendants.

ORDER

RICHARD MARK GERGEL, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of the Magistrate Judge recommending that this Court grant Defendants' partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 15). For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with and adopts the R & R as the order of the Court.

Background

Plaintiff initially filed this action in state court. As filed in state court, this action asserted a claim against the Defendant Dorchester County Detention Center (“Detention Center”) for violations of the South Carolina Human Affairs Law, S.C.Code § 1–13–10, et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (Dkt. No. 1–1). The Detention Center then removed this action to this Court on August 22, 2013, due to Plaintiff's federal statutory claim. (Dkt. No. 1).

Plaintiff also filed a separate action in the United States District Court on July 11, 2013, against the Defendant Detention Center, as well as against Terry Van Doran, Director of the Detention Center, asserting claims under the FMLA and the Rehabilitation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq.,Williams v. Dorchester Cnty. Det. Ctr., et al., No. 2:13–cv–1906–RMG. On August 26, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to consolidate these cases on the grounds that they involve common questions of law and fact, and on August 27, 2013, the Magistrate Judge entered an order consolidating these cases. (Dkt.Nos, 4, 5). The following day, August 28, 2013, the Defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's FMLA claims against both Defendants. (Dkt. No. 6). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion and Defendants filed a reply. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 14). The Magistrate Judge then issued the present R & R recommending the Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted. (Dkt. No. 15). Plaintiff then filed objections to the R & R. (Dkt. No. 17).

Legal Standard

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R to which specific objection is made. Additionally, the Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court may also “receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.

Discussion

In the R & R, the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing the FMLA claims against both Defendants, As to the Defendant Detention Center, the R & R recommends dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity since this defendant is under the control of the Sheriff of Dorchester County, who is considered a state agency. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954–55 (D.S.C.1988). Further,South Carolina has not waived its sovereign immunity, nor has it been abrogated by Congress through the FMLA. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1332, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012). As to Defendant Van Doran, the R & R recommends dismissal of the FMLA claim because it is essentially an action against the state since the complaint alleges that Van Doran acted as an employee of the Detention Center. See Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 135–36 (4th Cir.2001), overruled on other grounds by Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003).

Plaintiff's first objection is that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her FMLA claim pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and that the Court must therefore remand this action. Fourth Circuit precedent indicates it is not clear whether Eleventh Amendment immunity limits the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Brown v. Lt. Governor's Office on Aging, 697 F.Supp.2d 632, 635 n. 4 (D.S.C.2010) (citing Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 481 (4th Cir.2005) (stating in dicta that “Eleventh Amendment immunity does not limit a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction”)). However, the Court need not reach this question because Plaintiff's claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., is not addressed by this motion and provides an independent basis for jurisdiction here.

Plaintiff's next objection is that the Magistrate Judge erred in dismissing her FMLA action against Van Doran, a state employee, in his individual capacity. In support, Plaintiff cites to some non-binding authority permitting public employees to be sued in their individual capacities. See Ainsworth v. Loudon Cnty. Sch. Bd., 851 F.Supp.2d 963, 972 (E.D.Va.2012) (stating the Fourth Circuit has not ruled on this issue and following the majority view to permit public employees to be individually liable under the FMLA); Reed v. Md., Dep't of Human Res., No. ELH–12–472, 2013 WL 489985 (D.Md. Feb. 7, 2013) (permitting FMLA claim against state employee in her individual capacity).

However, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the proper decision is to follow the Fourth Circuit's precedent in Lizzi and dismiss Plaintiff's FMLA claim against Van Doran in his individual capacity. See Brown, 697 F.Supp.2d at 638–39 (quoting Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 138) (because the State “enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims brought under the FMLA, the individual supervisors under the FMLA are protected by that same immunity”). The cases Plaintiff cites are either distinguishable or unpersuasive. Ainsworth did not involve state employees and therefore did not implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns. Further, Ainsworth cites Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 Fed.Appx. 366, 369 (4th Cir.2010), in stating that it is an open question in the Fourth Circuit whether public employees may be held individually liable under the FMLA. 851 F.Supp.2d at 972. However, Jones did not involve public employees, but rather supervisors of a private company, Everything Casual, Inc. Plaintiff's citation of Reed also does not persuade the Court to depart from the R & R. That decision never discusses Lizzi and further concedes that “it would be an odd result for supervisors at a State's public agencies to be subject to liability in their individual capacities under the FMLA's self-care provision, when the State agencies for which they work are immune.” Reed, 2013 WL 489985, at *14.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court agrees with and adopts the R & R of the Magistrate Judge as the order of the Court. (Dkt. No. 15). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' partial motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 6).

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BRISTOW MARCHANT, United States Magistrate Judge.

This action was originally filed by the Plaintiff in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, First Judicial Circuit. As filed in state court, this action asserted a claim against the Defendant Dorchester County Detention Center for violations of the South Carolina Human Affairs Law, S.C.Code Ann. § 1–13–10, et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The Defendant Dorchester County removed this action to federal court on August 22, 2013 due to Plaintiffs federal statutory claim.

Plaintiff also filed a separate action in United States District Court on July 11, 2013 against the Defendant Detention Center, as well as against Terry Van Doran, Director of the Detention Center, asserting claims under the FMLA and the Rehabilitation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.Williams v. Dorchester County Detention Center, et al., Civil Action No. 13–1906. On August 26, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to consolidate these cases on the grounds that they involve common questions of law and fact, and on August 27, 2013 an Order was entered consolidating these cases, with Civil Action No. 13–1906 being consolidated into Civil Action No. 13–2284, and Civil Action No. 13–1906 being administratively closed.

The following day, August 28, 2013, the Defendants filed a motion for partial dismissal pursuant to Rule 12, Fed.R.Civ.P., seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's FMLA claims against both Defendants. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' motion on October 7, 2013, to which the Defendants filed a reply memorandum on October 10, 2013. Defendants' motion is now before the Court for disposition.¹

Plaintiff's Allegations

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that the Defendant Dorchester County Detention Center is a “state or county agency”, and that she was hired by the Detention Center in 2002 as a detention officer. Plaintiff alleges she adequately performed her job duties until on or around December 2007, when she was assaulted and injured at work, following which she went out on FMLA leave and filed a claim for worker's compensation. Plaintiff further alleges that when her FMLA leave expired in March 2008, she was not at that time able to return to work. Plaintiff alleges that the “defendant” sent her a letter stating she could extend her FMLA leave, but that shortly after sending this letter, the “defendant” terminated her because she was unable to return to work after her leave expired.

Plaintiff alleges that she was advised she could reapply for her job once her health improved, and that by the summer of 2009 she was able to return to work. Plaintiff alleges that sh...