Williams v. Eason

• Decision Date: 03 October 1927
• Docket Number: 26551
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAMS et al. v. EASON. [*]

114 So. 338

148 Miss. 446

WILLIAMS et al. v. EASON. ^[*]

No. 26551

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 3, 1927

(Division B.)

ARMY AND NAVY. Insured under war risk policy had contingent interest in proceeds at time of death which immediately vested in sole surviving heir (World War Veterans' Act 1924, [38 U.S.C. A., section 514], and amendments Hemingway's Code 1927, sections 1447-1459).

Under the World War Veterans' Act 1924, section 303 (38 U.S.C A., section 514 [U. S. Comp. St., section 91271/2-303]), and amendments thereto, and law of descent and distribution (Hemingway's Code 1927, sections 1447-1459), insured under contract of war risk insurance had an interest or estate in proceeds of insurance at time of his death, though contingent on death of beneficiary named therein dying before receiving all installments payable under its terms, and such interest after death of beneficiary immediately vested by inheritance in insured's sole heir surviving him.

Division B

APPEAL from chancery court of De Soto county.

HON. N R. SLEDGE, Chancellor.

Contest in the matter of the administration of the estate of David J. Williams, deceased, between Strong Williams and others as heirs of deceased, and the heirs of the deceased's widow, for the proceeds of a war risk insurance certificate held by S.W. Eason, administrator. Decree for the heirs of deceased's widow, and the heirs of deceased appeal. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Logan & Barbee, for appellant.

This insurance money can be paid only to a person or persons within the permitted class as fixed by the acts of Congress and to those only who would inherit from the insured in this state because the insured died intestate. Bean v. U.S. 7 F. 2d., 393; Fleming et al. v. Grimes, 107 So. 420 (Miss.).

We refer also to Helmholz et al. v. Horst et al., 294 F. 417, where the insured named no beneficiary in his application for insurance, but by his will named his aunt as his beneficiary and, under the law at that time she was without the permitted class. The insured died and his half-brother and half-sister drew the monthly installments until December 31, 1920. The law having been changed putting the aunt within the permitted class of beneficiaries, she successfully brought suit for the installments falling due after that date. See, also, Meisner v. U.S. 295 F. 866; Richmond v. U.S. 6 (2d) F. 143; Sturgess et al. v. Sturgess et al., 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1014.

From the foregoing it will be seen that in the case at bar, David J. Williams, the insured, did not die seized and possessed of this insurance in the sense that it would descend as his property in the state of Mississippi. Section 1385, Hemingway's Code; U. S. v. Law, 299 F. 61; Cassarello v. U.S. 271 F. 486; Cassarello v. U.S. 279 F. 396; Elliott v. U. S. et al., 271 F. 1001; Salzer v. U.S. 300 F. 764, 767; Carson et al. v. Vicksburg, 22 So. 1; Shelton v. Minnis, 54 So. 114 (Miss.); Sykes v. Armstrong, 71 So. 262 (Miss.); In Re Storum's Estate, 218 N.Y.S. 394.

It is clear to our mind that as the beneficiary has no vested interest in the policy until after the death of the insured because the insured could and might change the beneficiary, then it is equally clear and certain that no one to whom the policy finally becomes payable has a vested interest in it until at the time and after the money actually comes into his or her hands. If the former is true, then the latter is bound to be true. In the case at bar the administrator did not receive the check from the government until two days after the death of the widow of the insured and it necessarily had to take several days after that before the check got back to its source and cleared there.

It is clear to us that the insured intended for his mother to have the benefit of this insurance because he named her as the beneficiary therein and afterwards married and did not change the beneficiary which he could have done and named his wife, his brothers-in-law or sisters-in-law as beneficiary therein. His mother having died and by a subsequent act of Congress, the unpaid balance upon the happening of certain events became payable to the estate of the insured and was paid to this estate long after the death of the widow of the insured. Not being something that the insured died possessed of and not coming into his estate until long after the death of the insured, it cannot go to the heirs of one who if she had been living and received the money would have been entitled to it, but it must go to those living who would inherit the estate of the insured, the blood relations.

Dinkins & Wilroy, for appellee.

It was the opinion of the chancellor and his decree is to the effect that the disposition of the fund involved is to be determined by the statutes and laws of this state governing the distribution of intestate property under our inheritance laws, as directed by the director of the Veterans' Bureau.

There is no room for controversy as to what disposition should be made of this fund if it had been derived through an ordinary policy of insurance or if it represented a part of the estate of a decedent. The question as to whether or not distribution of an estate is to be made as of the time of the death of the intestate or as of the time of the distribution of his estate is definitely settled in Thompson v. Thompson, 30 Miss. 152.

It must he conceded that Congress in dealing with persons can determine the conditions upon which it will be obligated to pay out money. The War Risk Insurance Act is an example of the exercise of such authority. Congress had the power to say who should and who should not benefit by the provisions of that act. It could limit the authority of the insured in naming his beneficiary and, in the absence of proper designation, it could say to whom the proceeds of the policy should be paid, but after payment the authority of Congress ended; and whether the payment be made to the person entitled thereto or not, the person receiving the payment is free from the influence of the acts of Congress unless the government should see fit to proceed to recover the sum as erroneously paid to the recipient. If payment is made by the government, whether properly or improperly, it cannot influence or determine to whom it shall pass at the death of the person who receives it. See Nutt v. Forsythe, 84 Miss. 211; Law v. Lay, 118 Miss. 549.

There is no call here to determine to whom the balance due on the policy should have been paid by the government. It has been paid. Its last word has been spoken and its last decision has been rendered. The government promised to pay upon the conditions existing here to the "Estate of the Insured;" and that ended, there can be no controversy with the government. The voice of Congress is hushed and this court must speak its own language and by its own oracles.

Let us suppose that the wife of the soldier were now alive. In that event no one would question her right to the fund; nor if she had received it in her lifetime, would any one suggest that is would not pass at her death to her heirs. She did not survive actual receipt of the money by the administrator of her husband's estate, nor did the money ever actually come into her possession, but she survived the decision of the government as to who was entitled to it and also the issuance of the warrant on which it was paid.

OPINION

ANDERSON, J.

This was a contest in the matter of the administration of the estate of David J. Williams, deceased, pending in the chancery court of De Soto county, between his heirs, on the one hand, and the heirs of his widow, D. L. O. Williams, on the other hand, for the proceeds of a war risk insurance certificate held by the deceased at the time of his death, as a soldier of the United States in the World War. The chancery court decreed the proceeds of the war risk insurance to the heirs of the widow of the deceased. From that decree the heirs of the deceased appeal to this court.

The cause was tried on agreed facts, in writing, and made a part of the record, the material parts of which follow:

"It is stipulated and agreed that David Jack Williams, deceased, in his lifetime; was a regularly enlisted soldier in the service of the government of the United States during the recent World War, and as such soldier he secured and there was issued to him by the War Risk Insurance Department of the United States, an insurance certificate No T-3882635, on his life for the sum of five thousand dollars, and that the same became effective August 1, 1918, copy of which is hereto attached, and agreed to be correct.

"That the said David Jack Williams because of disease contracted during the period of his service in the United States Army was awarded permanent disability compensation by the Veterans' Bureau of the War Risk Department, but that no part thereof was paid to him in his lifetime, and that subsequent to his death, which occurred on the 28th day of July, 1920, the said S.W. Eason, as administrator of the estate of the said David Jack Williams, received from the said Veterans' Bureau the sum of one thousand four hundred eighty-six dollars and ninety-four cents, as the disability compensation so awarded, and that he has paid out and distributed the same as shown by his final account filed in this court in cause No. 4710, the files and records of which may be introduced in evidence on the trial of this cause, by any of the parties in interest to such extent as they may be determined by the court to be competent, but it is agreed that after payment of expenses, etc., in the said cause No. 4710, the balance remaining in the hands of the administrator of the said fund was paid to D. L. O. Williams, the widow of the said David Jack Williams.

"It is further...