Williams v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 28 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1293,93-1293 |
| Citation | 14 F.3d 1305 |
| Parties | 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,815 Don C. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Eric Vickers, St. Louis, MO, argued (Raymond Howard on the brief), for appellant.
John M. Thomas, Dearborn, MI, argued (John S. Sandberg, St. Louis, MO, on the brief), for appellee.
Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Don C. Williams appeals from a final judgment entered in the United States District Court 1 for the Eastern District of Missouri in favor of Ford Motor Company (Ford). Following a bench trial, the district court held that (1) Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII, and (2) assuming arguendo that a prima facie case had been established, Williams failed to show that Ford denied him reinstatement for race-motivated reasons. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., No. 90-2411-C(5) (E.D.Mo. Nov. 25, 1992) (memorandum and order). For reversal, Williams argues the district court erred in reaching both of these conclusions. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
The material facts in this case are undisputed. Williams is an African-American male who was employed by Ford from 1977 to 1989. The terms and conditions of Williams' employment were determined in part by a national collective bargaining agreement between Ford and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agriculture Implement Workers of American (UAW). The medical leave provisions of the collective bargaining agreement state that once an employee's medical leave of absence expires, that employee is sent a "five day letter" which directs the employee to either report to work or provide medical evidence of the need for an extension within five days of receiving the letter. Employees were permitted to telephone Ford and provide the reasons supporting their need for an extension. The "five day letter" also warns employees that failure to respond within the five-day period will result in immediate termination. Ford also has a policy in place whereby "reinstatement waivers" will be awarded under certain conditions to employees who have been terminated. Employees specifically terminated for violating the "five day letter" rule may apply for such a "reinstatement waiver." An employee who receives a "reinstatement waiver" is permitted to return to work under probation.
In April 1989, Williams told his supervisors that he had been diagnosed with a defective heart valve. Williams requested and was granted a medical leave of absence. On May 18, 1989, Williams received a "five day letter" informing him that his medical leave of absence had expired. Williams reported to the labor relations office at Ford within the five-day period. Williams then received an extension of his medical leave after the Ford plant physician determined that Williams' blood pressure was too high for him to return safely to work. On June 28, 1989, Ford sent Williams a second "five day letter" informing him that the extension of his medical leave of absence had expired. Williams did not return to work or contact Ford within the five-day period. On July 20, 1989, over two weeks after the extension of his medical leave had expired, Williams returned to the Ford plant prepared to resume work. Williams claimed that he had been receiving treatment for hypertension and high blood pressure. Williams was terminated by a labor relations representative for not following the "five day letter" rule. Williams applied for, but did not receive, a reinstatement waiver.
From 1988 to 1990, Ford terminated twenty-one employees (fifteen Caucasian, five African-American and one Hispanic) for violating the "five day letter" rule. Nine of the fifteen Caucasian employees received a reinstatement waiver. No African-American or Hispanic employee received a reinstatement waiver.
Williams filed suit in district court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that statistical evidence showed that Ford applied its reinstatement waiver policy in a racially discriminatory fashion. The district court entered judgment in favor of Ford following a bench trial. The district court held that Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because he could not demonstrate that Ford replaced or sought to replace him with a non-minority. Op. at 1308-1309. The district court also held that, assuming arguendo, that Williams had established a prima facie case, Ford articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision which was not pretextual. Id. at 1309.
On appeal, Williams essentially contends that the district court misapplied applicable law and, under the correct legal standards, the district court's finding of no discrimination is clearly erroneous.
Williams first argues that the district court erred in concluding that he had failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII. Williams contends that he need not show that Ford replaced or sought to replace him with a Caucasian in order to establish a prima facie case. We agree.
The district court analyzed this case as a disparate treatment, wrongful discharge case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas ). The district court required Williams to prove the following elements to establish a prima facie case: (1) that he was a member of a protected group; (2) that he was qualified for his position and satisfied its normal requirements; (3) that he was discharged; and (4) that after his discharge, Ford replaced or sought to replace him with a person outside the protected class in question. The district court concluded that Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination because he "had failed to establish that Ford sought persons who were not members of the protected group to fill his job after his discharge." Op. at 1308-1309. We hold that the district court erred in imposing such a strict requirement. "No such per se requirement has traditionally been imposed in cases brought under Title VII." Walker v. St. Anthony's Medical Center, 881 F.2d 554, 558 (8th Cir.1989) (Walker ). Rather, Title VII has been interpreted to require only that, in addition to the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff show that his or her discharge occurred under circumstances which create an inference of unlawful discrimination. Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469 (8th Cir.1984) (Craik ). In the context of a sex discrimination claim brought under Title VII, this court noted that it is entirely plausible that a woman discharged and replaced by another woman will be able to establish that she was the object of impermissible discrimination based on gender. Walker, 881 F.2d at 558. In such a case, the gender of the employee who replaced the plaintiff pertains to the weight of the evidence as opposed to its legal sufficiency. Id. In sum, "[t]he elements of a prima facie case vary with the circumstances of the alleged discrimination." Jones v. Frank, 973 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir.1992) (Jones ). See also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 13. The district court erred in requiring Williams to show that Ford replaced or sought to replace him with a non-minority in order to establish a prima facie case.
In the present case, Williams claimed that Ford's refusal to reinstate him after discharge was based upon reasons related to his race. We note that the McDonnell Douglas wrongful discharge test has been applied to reinstatement cases. See Johnson v. Arkansas State Police, 10 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir.1993) (Johnson ) (). However, in light of the fact that Williams' claim of discriminatory refusal to reinstate was based solely upon the fact that Ford reinstated nine allegedly comparable Caucasian employees but no minority employees, we analyze Williams' prima facie case according to the elements set forth in Jones. In Jones, the plaintiff likewise alleged discriminatory refusal to reinstate based upon a theory of disparate treatment. Under Jones, to establish his prima facie case of race discrimination, it was sufficient that Williams showed (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for but denied reinstatement, and (3) similarly situated employees outside his protected class were reinstated to their positions. 973 F.2d at 676.
The prima facie case requires only that Williams establish facts adequate to permit an inference of discrimination. Craik, 731 F.2d at 469. "[T]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not...
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