Williams v. Garcetti, S024925

• Decision Date: 01 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. S024925,S024925
• Citation: 5 Cal.4th 561,853 P.2d 507,20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 853 P.2d 507 Gary WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Gilbert GARCETTI, as District Attorney, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 341

20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341

5 Cal.4th 561, 853 P.2d 507

Gary WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Gilbert GARCETTI, as District Attorney, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S024925.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

July 1, 1993.

Debbie Lew, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent Hahn.

John A. Daly, Chase, Rotchford, Drucker & Bogust, Ronald A. Dwyer, and Thomas P. Higgins, Dist. Attorney's Office, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent Reiner.

Carol A. Sobel, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

MOSK, Justice.

Penal Code section 272 (hereafter section 272) provides that every person who commits any act or omits any duty causing, encouraging, or contributing to the dependency or delinquency of a minor is guilty of a misdemeanor. A 1988 amendment thereto (hereafter the amendment) provides that for the purposes of this section parents or guardians "shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control" over their children. We granted review in this case to determine whether on its face the amendment is so vague or overbroad as to violate constitutional due process requirements. As will appear, we conclude that the amendment withstands challenge on the grounds of both vagueness and overbreadth, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For decades there has been some form of statutory prohibition against the conduct known as "contributing to the delinquency of a minor." ¹ Section 272 is the most recent of these provisions, although its "contributing to delinquency" title is incomplete because it explicitly applies not only to delinquency (see Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 601 [habitually disobedient or truant minors], 602 [minors who commit crimes] ) but also to dependency (see id., § 300 [minors within the jurisdiction of juvenile courts by reason of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, or neglect, among other factors] ).

Between 1979 and 1988 section 272 provided, in relevant part: "Every person who commits any act or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of 18 years to come within the provisions of Sections 300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or which act or omission contributes thereto ... is guilty of a misdemeanor...." In 1988 the Legislature appended a sentence to section 272: "For purposes of this section, a parent or legal guardian to any person under the age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor child." (Stats.1988, ch. 1256, § 2, p. 4182.) This amendment is the object of the present lawsuit.

As part of the bill that included the amendment, the Legislature established a parental diversion program. (Pen.Code, § 1001.70 et seq.) Under specified circumstances the probation department may recommend the diversion of parents or guardians (hereafter collectively referred to as parents) charged under section 272 to an education, treatment, or rehabilitation program prior to trial. Satisfactory completion of the program results in dismissal of the criminal charges.

Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief to halt the enforcement of the amendment, claiming it would constitute a waste of public funds. (Code Civ.Proc., § 526a.) They named as defendants Ira Reiner, as Los Angeles County District Attorney, and James K. Hahn, as Los Angeles City Attorney. (Gilbert Garcetti has since succeeded Reiner as district attorney.) The grounds of the complaint were that the amendment was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and an impingement on the right to privacy.

Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding that the amendment was neither vague nor overbroad and that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge it in any case.

Plaintiffs appealed. Reversing the judgment, the Court of Appeal first held that the trial court erred on the question of standing and that plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers. ² On the merits, the court struck down the amendment as unconstitutionally vague, expressly declining to reach the question of its overbreadth. ³

II. VAGUENESS

The constitutional interest implicated in questions of statutory vagueness is that no person be deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law," as assured by both the federal Constitution (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV) and the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7). Under both constitutions, due process of law in this context requires two elements: a criminal statute must " 'be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt.' " (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 141, 253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852; see also Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903.)

We evaluate the specificity of the amendment according to the following standards: " 'Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.' " (Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755, 763, 221 Cal.Rptr. 779, 710 P.2d 845, quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, fns. omitted.)

The starting point of our analysis is "the strong presumption that legislative enactments 'must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its provisions, but it cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.' " (Walker v. Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 143, 253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852.)

A. Notice

According to the foregoing principles, the amendment is not sufficiently specific unless a parent of ordinary intelligence would understand the nature of the duty of "reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control" referred to therein, as well as what constitutes its omission. Plaintiffs contend the amendment changed the law by creating a new--and impermissibly vague--parental duty as a basis for criminal liability. Defendants reply that the amendment did not change the law; rather, it merely clarified the statute's application to an existing parental duty. ⁴

" 'Where changes have been introduced to a statute by amendment it must be assumed the changes have a purpose....' " (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1337, 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240.) That purpose is not necessarily to change the law. "While an intention to change the law is usually inferred from a material change in the language of the statute [citations], a consideration of the surrounding circumstances may indicate, on the other hand, that the amendment was merely the result of a legislative attempt to clarify the true meaning of the statute." (Martin v. California Mut. B. & L. Assn. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 478, 484, 116 P.2d 71.)

In support of their contention that the purpose of the amendment was to clarify existing law and facilitate prosecution of parents under section 272, defendants offer a declaration to this effect by the legislative assistant to the principal author of the legislation that included the amendment. This declaration is not dispositive of the amendment's purpose. In construing a statute "we do not consider the motives or understandings of an individual legislator even if he or she authored the statute." (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 801, fn. 12, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934; accord, In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 589-590, 128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371.)

We therefore turn to the statutory context as a sign of legislative purpose. The Legislature enacted the amendment and the related parental diversion program as part of the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, the premise of which was that "the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods." (Stats.1988, ch. 1256, § 1, p. 4179.) The act included measures establishing criminal penalties for gang participation and allowing sentence enhancements for gang-related conduct; defining certain buildings in which gang activities take place as nuisances subject to injunction, abatement, or damages; and prohibiting terrorist threats of death or great bodily injury.

Viewed in the context of the act, i.e., as part of its broad scheme to alleviate the problems caused by street gangs, the amendment to section 272 and the parental diversion program appear intended to enlist parents as active participants in the effort to eradicate such gangs. ⁵ Because the legislative history of the amendment is sparse, confined largely to the declaration described above, we cannot rule out either plaintiffs' interpretation that the Legislature intended to enlarge the scope of...