Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc., C9-94-2257

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Writing for the Court: KALITOWSKI; SHORT
• Citation: 530 N.W.2d 852
• Parties: 67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1569, 10 IER Cases 1252 Sarah E. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. ST. PAUL RAMSEY MEDICAL CENTER, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
• Docket Number: No. C9-94-2257,C9-94-2257
• Decision Date: 02 May 1995

Page 852

530 N.W.2d 852 67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1569, 10 IER Cases 1252 Sarah E. WILLIAMS, Appellant,
v.
ST. PAUL RAMSEY MEDICAL CENTER, INCORPORATED, Respondent. No. C9-94-2257. Court of Appeals of Minnesota. May 2, 1995.
Review Granted June 23, 1995.

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Syllabus by the Court

1. The exclusivity of remedies provision in the Minnesota Human Rights Act does not bar appellant from bringing both a reprisal claim under the Human Rights Act and a retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Statute.

2. Where the district court resolved Minnesota Human Rights Act reprisal issues after erroneously dismissing employee's whistleblower retaliation claim, employee's

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right to a jury trial precludes application of collateral estoppel.

Robert J. Hennessey, Ansis V. Viksnins, Lindquist & Vennum, Minneapolis, for appellant, Sarah E. Williams.

Pat Skoglund, Thomas M. Countryman, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, St. Paul, for respondent.

Douglas A. Hedin, Daniel S. Goldberg, Elizabeth A. Glidden, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Minn. Chapter, Nat. Employment Lawyers Ass'n.

Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, P.J., LANSING and SHORT, JJ.

OPINION

KALITOWSKI, Judge.

Appellant Sarah E. Williams contends the district court erred in ruling the exclusivity of remedies provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn.Stat. §§ 363.01-.15 (1992), barred her from bringing both a retaliation claim against respondent St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center (Ramsey) under Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (1992) (Whistleblower Statute), and a reprisal claim under the MHRA.

FACTS

From July 1987 through October 1991, Williams was employed as a pharmacy technician at Ramsey. Williams contends that during the fall of 1989, a co-worker began pursuing a romantic relationship with her. After declining to begin a relationship with her co-worker, Williams contends she was subjected to evaluation processes that reflected poorly on her job performance. Williams ultimately filed a three-count complaint against respondent contending: (1) her co-worker's conduct constituted illegal workplace sexual harassment in violation of the MHRA; (2) Ramsey retaliated against her, and thus committed an unlawful reprisal prohibited by the MHRA; and (3) Ramsey's retaliation against her violated the Whistleblower Statute.

The district court granted Ramsey's motion for summary judgment with regard to Williams' whistleblower claim, concluding that it was preempted by the exclusivity provision in the MHRA. The district court denied Ramsey's motion for summary judgment on Williams' other claims because of the existence of factual disputes. After a bench trial on the two remaining claims, the district court entered judgment against Williams concluding that Williams failed to establish her co-worker's conduct constituted actionable sexual harassment and that Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination. On appeal Williams challenges the trial court's dismissal of her whistleblower claim.

ISSUES

1. Does the exclusivity provision of the MHRA preempt appellant's whistleblower claim?

2. Is appellant collaterally estopped from reasserting her claim under the Whistleblower Statute?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from a summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact; and (2) whether the lower court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). The construction of a statute is a question of law for the court and is subject to de novo review on appeal. Hibbing Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn.1985).

I.

Minnesota's Whistleblower Statute codified the public policy exception to the general rule of at-will employment. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 570-71 (Minn.1987). Generally, an employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee who reports a violation of a federal or state law. Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (1992). Section 181.932, subdivision 1 provides:

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[a]n employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate against, or penalize an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because:

(a) the employee * * * in good faith, reports a violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.

The Whistleblower Statute only protects employees who expose violations of laws designed to protect general public interest. Vonch v. Carlson Cos., 439 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. July 12, 1989).

The MHRA prohibits employer reprisal against an employee who reports a violation of the MHRA. Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 7 (Supp.1993). The MHRA provides in part:

It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any employer * * * to intentionally engage in any reprisal against any person because that person:

(1) Opposed a practice forbidden under this chapter or has filed a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.

Id.

Whether a plaintiff may assert a reprisal claim under the MHRA along with a retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Statute is a matter of first impression. We conclude the district court erred in dismissing Williams' claim under the Whistleblower Statute.

First, we agree with the court's conclusion in Thompson v. Campbell that reporting sexual harassment furthers a "clearly mandated public policy and, therefore, constitute[s] conduct protected by the Whistleblower Act." 845 F.Supp. 665, 675 (D.Minn.1994). In addition, although the preemption issue was not addressed, federal cases have allowed plaintiffs to assert claims under both the MHRA and the Whistleblower Statute. See id. at 674-75 (denial of summary judgment on MHRA reprisal claim and whistleblower claim); Baufield v. Safelite Glass Corp., 831 F.Supp. 713, 715-16 (D.Minn.1993) (discriminatory reprisal under MHRA and whistleblower claims tried together).

Further, the rules of statutory construction support the conclusion that Williams' whistleblower claims are not preempted. When provisions in two statutes are irreconcilable, the specific provision prevails over the general,

unless the general provision shall be enacted at a later session and it shall be the manifest intention of the legislature that such general provision shall prevail.

Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (1992).

The MHRA provides that when bringing a claim alleging a discriminatory practice, "the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive." Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (Supp.1993). The Whistleblower Statute provides:

In addition to any remedies otherwise provided by law, an employee injured by a violation of section 181.932 may bring a civil action to recover any and all damages recoverable at law.

Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a) (1992) (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent the Whistleblower Statute applies to persons alleging...