Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. C9-94-2257,C9-94-2257 |
| Citation | 530 N.W.2d 852 |
| Parties | 67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1569, 10 IER Cases 1252 Sarah E. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. ST. PAUL RAMSEY MEDICAL CENTER, INCORPORATED, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The exclusivity of remedies provision in the Minnesota Human Rights Act does not bar appellant from bringing both a reprisal claim under the Human Rights Act and a retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Statute.
2. Where the district court resolved Minnesota Human Rights Act reprisal issues after erroneously dismissing employee's whistleblower retaliation claim, employee's right to a jury trial precludes application of collateral estoppel.
Robert J. Hennessey, Ansis V. Viksnins, Lindquist & Vennum, Minneapolis, for appellant, Sarah E. Williams.
Pat Skoglund, Thomas M. Countryman, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, St. Paul, for respondent.
Douglas A. Hedin, Daniel S. Goldberg, Elizabeth A. Glidden, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Minn. Chapter, Nat. Employment Lawyers Ass'n.
Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, P.J., LANSING and SHORT, JJ.
Appellant Sarah E. Williams contends the district court erred in ruling the exclusivity of remedies provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn.Stat. §§ 363.01-.15 (1992), barred her from bringing both a retaliation claim against respondent St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center (Ramsey) under Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (1992) (Whistleblower Statute), and a reprisal claim under the MHRA.
From July 1987 through October 1991, Williams was employed as a pharmacy technician at Ramsey. Williams contends that during the fall of 1989, a co-worker began pursuing a romantic relationship with her. After declining to begin a relationship with her co-worker, Williams contends she was subjected to evaluation processes that reflected poorly on her job performance. Williams ultimately filed a three-count complaint against respondent contending: (1) her co-worker's conduct constituted illegal workplace sexual harassment in violation of the MHRA; (2) Ramsey retaliated against her, and thus committed an unlawful reprisal prohibited by the MHRA; and (3) Ramsey's retaliation against her violated the Whistleblower Statute.
The district court granted Ramsey's motion for summary judgment with regard to Williams' whistleblower claim, concluding that it was preempted by the exclusivity provision in the MHRA. The district court denied Ramsey's motion for summary judgment on Williams' other claims because of the existence of factual disputes. After a bench trial on the two remaining claims, the district court entered judgment against Williams concluding that Williams failed to establish her co-worker's conduct constituted actionable sexual harassment and that Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination. On appeal Williams challenges the trial court's dismissal of her whistleblower claim.
1. Does the exclusivity provision of the MHRA preempt appellant's whistleblower claim?
2. Is appellant collaterally estopped from reasserting her claim under the Whistleblower Statute?
On appeal from a summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact; and (2) whether the lower court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). The construction of a statute is a question of law for the court and is subject to de novo review on appeal. Hibbing Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn.1985).
Minnesota's Whistleblower Statute codified the public policy exception to the general rule of at-will employment. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 570-71 (Minn.1987). Generally, an employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee who reports a violation of a federal or state law. Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (1992). Section 181.932, subdivision 1 provides [a]n employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate against, or penalize an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because:
(a) the employee * * * in good faith, reports a violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.
The Whistleblower Statute only protects employees who expose violations of laws designed to protect general public interest. Vonch v. Carlson Cos., 439 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. July 12, 1989).
The MHRA prohibits employer reprisal against an employee who reports a violation of the MHRA. Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 7 (Supp.1993). The MHRA provides in part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any employer * * * to intentionally engage in any reprisal against any person because that person:
(1) Opposed a practice forbidden under this chapter or has filed a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
Whether a plaintiff may assert a reprisal claim under the MHRA along with a retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Statute is a matter of first impression. We conclude the district court erred in dismissing Williams' claim under the Whistleblower Statute.
First, we agree with the court's conclusion in Thompson v. Campbell that reporting sexual harassment furthers a "clearly mandated public policy and, therefore, constitute[s] conduct protected by the Whistleblower Act." 845 F.Supp. 665, 675 (D.Minn.1994). In addition, although the preemption issue was not addressed, federal cases have allowed plaintiffs to assert claims under both the MHRA and the Whistleblower Statute. See id. at 674-75 (); Baufield v. Safelite Glass Corp., 831 F.Supp. 713, 715-16 (D.Minn.1993) ().
Further, the rules of statutory construction support the conclusion that Williams' whistleblower claims are not preempted. When provisions in two statutes are irreconcilable, the specific provision prevails over the general,
unless the general provision shall be enacted at a later session and it shall be the manifest intention of the legislature that such general provision shall prevail.
Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (1992).
The MHRA provides that when bringing a claim alleging a discriminatory practice, "the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive." Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (Supp.1993). The Whistleblower Statute provides:
In addition to any remedies otherwise provided by law, an employee injured by a violation of section 181.932 may bring a civil action to recover any and all damages recoverable at law.
Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a) (1992) (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent the Whistleblower Statute applies to persons alleging discrimination under the MHRA, its remedy provision conflicts with the MHRA's exclusivity provision.
The MHRA's provision prohibiting reprisal against an employee who raises a claim under the MHRA applies more specifically to the facts here than the Whistleblower Statute, which prohibits retaliation against an employee who "reports a violation * * * of any federal or state law or rule." Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). The MHRA was enacted in 1955, however, and the Whistleblower Statute was enacted in 1987. In addition, because the language at issue in the Whistleblower Statute is "clear and free from all ambiguity," we must follow the "letter of the law" in construing the intent of the statute. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1992).
We conclude that the language in the Whistleblower Statute: "[i]n addition to any other remedies otherwise provided by law," takes precedence over the exclusivity provision of the MHRA because: (1) it was enacted later in time than the MHRA; and (2) the legislative intent to allow additional remedies is manifest from its language. The district court erred in concluding the MHRA preempted Williams from asserting a claim under the Whistleblower Statute.
Respondent contends that even if the district court erred in dismissing Williams' claim under the Whistleblower Statute, Williams is now collaterally estopped from pursuing this claim because the elements necessary to establish a whistleblower violation were litigated and finally determined in Williams' bench trial on her MHRA claims. Collateral estoppel precludes parties from relitigating issues between the same parties that were previously determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn.1984).
The elements necessary to make a prima facie case under a whistleblower claim are: (1) the plaintiff engaged in conduct protected under the act; (2) adverse employment action by the employer; and (3) causal connection between the two. Thompson, 845 F.Supp. at 674 (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn.1983)). A prima facie case of reprisal discrimination under the MHRA requires the same elements. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 444. Here, after a trial on Williams' MHRA reprisal claim, the district court concluded Williams failed to establish a prima facie case, and ruled in favor of respondent. Thus, respondent argues, Williams should be collaterally estopped from reasserting her claim under the Whistleblower Statute. We disagree.
We conclude that the application of collateral estoppel in this case is directly addressed by the holding in the United States Supreme Court decision in Lytle v. Household Mfg., 494 U.S. 545, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990). In Lytle the employee filed an action under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. §...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Abraham v. County of Hennepin, No. CX-00-835
...raised on appeal when reasoning relied upon by court is neither novel nor questionable). The exception is Williams v. St. Paul Med. Ctr., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 852, 856-57 (Minn.App.1995),reversed on other grounds, 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn.1996). The court of appeals concluded that there is a jury t......
-
Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc.
...cause of action after her reprisal claim failed and that she was entitled to a jury trial on that claim. Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Center, 530 N.W.2d 852 (Minn.App.1995). We reverse and reinstate summary Williams was employed as a pharmacy technician during the period from July 27, 1......