Williams v. State, 5D00-2226.

Decision Date25 May 2001
Docket NumberNo. 5D00-2226.,5D00-2226.
Citation788 So.2d 334
PartiesBobby WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and M.A. Lucas, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Denise O. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

ORFINGER, R.B., J.

Bobby Williams pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine but reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. He contends that evidence seized from his motel room was improperly obtained because no one with actual or apparent authority authorized police officers to enter his room. We agree and reverse.

Because the Daytona Beach Police Department had received several complaints regarding the sale of drugs from room 202 of the Sea Brazil Motel, Detective Herbert Dockery and four other Daytona Beach police officers went to room 202 for a "knock and talk."1 Upon arriving at the motel, the officers, dressed in identifiable police uniforms, knocked on the door of room 202. According to Detective Dockery, after he knocked on the door:

A voice said, "Who is it?" I said, "Herb." I replied "Herb," which is my first name, Herbert. Everybody calls me Herb. At that point, a white female answered the door-well, opened the door actually, and she stepped back as she's saying, "come in."

The woman who answered the door was Catherine Quain. Dockery testified that the police officers did not know Quain or know of her connection, if any, to the room, nor did they know who had rented the room. All five officers then entered the motel room and advised the occupants that they were there to investigate suspected narcotics activity. About this time, Detective Dockery saw Williams, who was sitting on a bed, grab a baggie from the night stand and put it in his mouth. The officers attempted to grab the baggie and Williams threw up some "green leafy substance" that they correctly believed to be marijuana. The officers then found cocaine in the freezer and arrested Williams.

Through counsel, Williams filed a motion to suppress, contending that the officers entry into the room was illegal because Quain lacked the actual or apparent authority to authorize the officers to enter. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial judge found that Quain had the apparent authority to authorize the police entry into the room, though she lacked any actual authority. Because we find that the evidence does not support the finding that Quain had apparent authority to authorize the officers to enter into the motel room, we reverse.

On review of a trial court's order on a suppression motion, legal questions are subject to de novo review while the factual decisions by the trial court, viewed in light of constitutionally mandated burdens of proof, are entitled to deference if supported by competent substantial evidence. Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Butler v. State, 706 So.2d 100, 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

In the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances justifying a search, the State has the burden of proving the police were given free and voluntary consent to enter the premises by someone with actual or apparent authority to do so. It is not enough to show the occupant merely submitted to a claim of lawful authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). A warrantless entry is valid when based on the consent of a third party whom police, at the time of entry, reasonably believe possesses common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not possess such authority. Id. at 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793. But Rodriguez cautioned that mere consent to an officer's entry is not, standing alone, sufficient to justify the officer's belief that the person giving consent has the authority to do so. Specifically, the Supreme Court said:

[W]hat we hold today does not suggest that law enforcement officers may always accept a person's invitation to enter premises. Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry. As with other factual determinations bearing upon search
...

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15 cases
  • Ortiz v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • November 13, 2009
    ...were given free and voluntary consent to enter the premises by someone with actual or apparent authority to do so." Williams v. State, 788 So.2d 334, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). A minor may provide valid third-party consent for a warrantless entry of a home that the minor shares with a parent ......
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 15, 2016
    ...were given free and voluntary consent to enter the premises by someone with actual or apparent authority to do so. Williams v. State, 788 So.2d 334, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Thus, when making entry or conducting a search, an officer must elicit sufficient facts from which he or she can dete......
  • Marganet v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 31, 2006
    ...were given free and voluntary consent to enter the premises by someone with actual or apparent authority to do so. Williams v. State, 788 So.2d 334, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Thus, when making entry or conducting a search, an officer must elicit sufficient facts from which he or she can dete......
  • Ortiz v. State, Case No. 5D08-1653 (Fla. App. 4/24/2009)
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 24, 2009
    ...were given free and voluntary consent to enter the premises by someone with actual or apparent authority to do so." Williams v. State, 788 So. 2d 334, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). A minor may provide valid third-party consent for a warrantless entry of a home that the minor shares with a parent......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Who's that knocking at your door? Third party consents to police entry.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 77 No. 10, November 2003
    • November 1, 2003
    ...but instead jumped to a conclusion that was not warranted by the circumstances." (12) A similar case to Cooper is Williams v. State, 788 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The case may be summarized as follows: The Daytona Beach police department received several complaints that drugs were bei......

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