Williams v. State, 54277
| Decision Date | 15 November 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 54277,54277,2 |
| Citation | 241 S.E.2d 261,144 Ga.App. 410 |
| Parties | David WILLIAMS, Sr. v. The STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
B. T. Edmonds, Jr., Albany, for appellant.
William S. Lee, Dist. Atty., Loring A. Gray, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Albany, for appellee.
The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana, more than one ounce, and with obstruction of officers. A mistrial was declared on the possession of marijuana charge when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The defendant was, however, convicted on the obstruction of officers charge and was sentenced to serve 12 months.
1. The defendant was arraigned on March 11, 1977. His pro se motion to suppress evidence was heard on March 23, 1977. The motion was denied and defendant's case was called for trial upon conclusion of the hearing. The defendant's counsel moved for a continuance on the ground that he had just recently agreed to represent the defendant and needed time to prepare his case properly. The trial judge denied his motion, relying on the absence of any legal grounds for a continuance and on the fact that the defendant had waived his right to counsel at arraignment.
The granting of requests for continuance is generally left to the discretion of the trial judge. Code § 81-1419. This court, however, has the responsibility to review the trial judge's ruling whenever the exercise of that discretion is challenged on appeal. Fair v. Balkcom, 216 Ga. 721, 119 S.E.2d 691 (1961); Tucker v. State, 136 Ga.App. 456, 221 S.E.2d 664 (1975).
While there is no document included in the record which establishes defendant's waiver of his right to counsel (Code Ann. § 2-111), there is no evidence to support an inference that the defendant's waiver was anything other than knowing and voluntary. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The trial judge stated that he offered to appoint a lawyer to represent the defendant, but that he declined this representation. Despite his valid waiver, the defendant was not precluded from changing his mind about proceeding pro se before trial and at his own expense retaining counsel to conduct his defense, provided the change was not made solely for purposes of delay. See generally Chapman v. U. S., 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501, 238 S.E.2d 52 (1977). Thus, the major issue before the court on appeal is whether defendant's counsel was then entitled to additional time in order to prepare for trial.
In reviewing denials of motions for continuance, we are guided by the standard of the Supreme Court that Harris v. State, 119 Ga. 114, 115, 45 S.E. 973, 974 (1903); Fair v. Balkcom, 216 Ga. 721, 726, 119 S.E.2d 691, supra. Our decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis after reviewing the particular facts at hand.
In this case, the record shows that on March 22 the defendant's counsel requested the judge's permission "to sit with Mr. Williams and represent him" although he did not sign as attorney of record until March 23. The record also shows that when defense counsel's motion for continuance was denied, he entered the following facts into the record: that at the time the defendant requested a date and time for a hearing on his motion to suppress, that Mr. Hind in the District Attorney's office informed them (apparently counsel had accompanied defendant although he had not yet begun his official representation) ". . . that although Mr. Williams had received a letter stating that the case would be tried on Wednesday, that the case would, in fact, be tried on a Thursday because of . . . (other cases)."
Defense counsel further stated that when the hearing was set for Wednesday morning at 8:30, the defendant was present and counsel was...
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Brookins, In re
...would be tried on Wednesday, that the case would, in fact, be tried on Thursday because of . . . other cases.' " Williams v. State, 144 Ga.App. 410, 412, 241 S.E.2d 261, 263. We held: ". . . upon consideration of all the facts in this case, including the apparent confusion of both the defen......
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Jordan v. State, A92A1575
...from preparing sufficiently for trial. Compare Johnson v. State, 185 Ga.App. 475, 364 S.E.2d 609 (1988) with Williams v. State, 144 Ga.App. 410(1), 241 S.E.2d 261 (1977). Moreover, appellant has not shown prejudice. The only thing he contends counsel was unable to do was to obtain his Blaze......
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White v. State, 55980
...it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to deny defense counsel's motion for continuance. See Williams v. State, 144 Ga.App. 410(1), 241 S.E.2d 261 (1977). 3. After being advised of his Miranda rights, the defendant told the deputy sheriff that he owned a gun and stated that h......