Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 05 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 5D14–3543.,5D14–3543.
• Citation: 167 So.3d 483
• Parties: William WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

167 So.3d 483

William WILLIAMS, Appellant

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D14–3543.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

June 5, 2015.

Rehearing Denied July 1, 2015.

Eric A. Latinsky and Aaron D. Delgado, of Damore, Delgado, Romanik & Rawlins, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion

COHEN, J.

William Williams appeals the denial of his dispositive motion to dismiss after being convicted under Florida's “Refusal to Submit” statute.¹ He argues that the statute, as applied to him, violates the Fourth Amendment—specifically, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) —and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The issue presented, boiled down to its essence, is whether it is unconstitutional to punish a person criminally for refusing to submit to a breath-alcohol test when the officer conducting the test does not have a warrant. We hold that it is not and affirm.

I.

On October 4, 2013, at approximately 10:17 p.m., Williams was arrested for driving under the influence. Less than twenty minutes later, the arresting officer asked Williams to submit to a breath test to determine his blood-alcohol content; he refused. The officer did not have a warrant. Williams was then issued five uniform traffic citations, including a citation for Refusal to Submit in violation of section 316.1939, Florida Statutes. That section provides, in pertinent part:

(1) Any person who has refused to submit to a chemical or physical test of his or her breath, blood, or urine, as described in s. 316.1932, and whose driving privilege was previously suspended for a prior refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath, urine, or blood, and:

(a) Who the arresting law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, chemical substances, or controlled substances;

(b) Who was placed under lawful arrest for a violation of s. 316.193 unless such test was requested pursuant to s. 316.1932(1)(c) ;

(c) Who was informed that, if he or she refused to submit to such test, his or her privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for a period of 1 year or, in the case of a second or subsequent refusal, for a period of 18 months;

(d) Who was informed that a refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath, urine, or blood, if his or her driving privilege has been previously suspended for a prior refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath, urine, or blood, is a misdemeanor; and

(e) Who, after having been so informed, refused to submit to any such test when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer or correctional officer

commits a misdemeanor of the first degree and is subject to punishment as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

§ 316.1939, Fla. Stat. (2013).

Williams filed a motion to dismiss the Refusal to Submit charge, arguing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied. For purposes of the motion, the parties stipulated that: (1) the police had probable cause to ask Williams to submit to a breath test; (2) the initial stop of Williams' vehicle was lawful; (3) Williams refused to take the breath test; (4) Williams' driving record reflected a prior refusal to submit to a breath test; and (5) the motion to dismiss was dispositive as to the Refusal to Submit charge.

The county court denied the motion to dismiss and certified the following question as one of great public importance:

If the implied[-]consent statute provides consent to search as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, then can that consent be withdrawn by refusal to submit to an otherwise lawful test of breath, blood or urine and can the second such refusal be punishable as a criminal offense?

The court then accepted Williams' no contest plea, which specifically reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. Williams was sentenced to two days' imprisonment, with two days' credit for time served. This appeal followed.

II.

Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, “the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., –––U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2594, 186 L.Ed.2d 697 (2013) (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) ). This doctrine “vindicates the Constitution's enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into giving them up.” Id. In other words, “[w]hat the state may not do directly[,] it may not do indirectly.” Lebron v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam., 710 F.3d 1202, 1217 (11th Cir.2013) (quoting Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 191 (1911) ). However, the Constitution does not prohibit “ ‘every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.’ ” Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) ).

The most compelling case in support of Williams' position is Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), although it is not clear whether its reasoning was based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine or some other rationale.² In that case, the defendant was charged criminally with violating the San Francisco Housing Code because he refused to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence. Id. at 525, 87 S.Ct. 1727. He alleged that the ordinance authorizing such inspections was facially unconstitutional. Id. Preliminarily, the Supreme Court stated that “except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” Id. at 528–29, 87 S.Ct. 1727. The Court concluded that the defendant “had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that [the defendant] may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.” Id. at 540, 87 S.Ct. 1727.

Camara is distinguishable in some important respects. Most importantly, section 316.1939, Florida Statutes, criminalizes the refusal to submit to a breath test only if the officer had probable cause to believe the driver was under the influence. See § 316.1939(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). By contrast, the statute in Camara allowed suspicionless searches. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 526, 87 S.Ct. 1727 ; accord State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302, 308 (N.D.2015) (distinguishing Camara on this basis). Nevertheless, we agree with Williams that its general reasoning is applicable to this case. If Williams had a Fourth Amendment right to refuse a breath test, criminalizing his assertion of that right would be unconstitutional. To conclude otherwise would allow the State to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Therefore, we must determine whether the arresting officer had a legal right to search Williams, in the form of a breath test, without a warrant.

III.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A breath-alcohol test is a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) ; see also Maryland v. King, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1968–69, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (“Virtually any ‘intrusio[n] into the human body,’ will work an invasion of ‘cherished personal security’ that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).

Generally, warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). The warrant requirement ensures that “inferences to support the search ‘[are] drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’ ” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) ).

In Schmerber, the Supreme Court addressed blood-alcohol tests in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The issue was whether a warrantless blood draw based upon probable cause was admissible. Id. at 766–67, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Court considered whether the test was permissible under the warrant exception for searches incident to arrest and indicated that it was not, reasoning that the considerations that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine was founded upon have “little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface.” See id. at 769–70, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (“[T]he mere fact of a lawful arrest does not end our inquiry.”). The Court also noted that the fundamental privacy interests in one's body outweighed the risk that evidence may disappear:

The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.

Id. at 769–70, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Court ultimately concluded, however, that the blood test...